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ABSTRACT 
A THINK TANK ON THE LEFT:  
THE INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES AND COLD WAR AMERICA, 1963-1989 
by 
Brian S. Mueller 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2015 
Under the Supervision of Professor J. David Hoeveler 
 
For American intellectuals, the Cold War involved a battle far more important 
than the ones taking place in faraway lands. While the nearly half-decade conflict never 
degenerated into a nuclear war, the combat between intellectuals resembled a nuclear 
explosion at times. Participants in the war of words believed that intellectual debates 
would determine the direction of American foreign policy, and possibly whether the 
United States survived the Cold War. Led by groups such as the Americans for 
Democratic Action, liberal intellectuals held the dominant position during the first 
decades of the Cold War as they became hardened Cold Warriors intent on containing the 
Communist menace. By the late 1960s, however, the liberal consensus collapsed under 
the pressure of the Vietnam War. This dissertation looks at the instrumental role played 
by the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), a leftist think tank located in Washington D.C., 
in causing the breakup of the liberal consensus, as well as the Institute’s attempt to 
restore liberalism to its true form. From the time that IPS opened its doors in 1963 until 
the end of the Cold War in 1989, the Institute served as the guardian of a genuine 
liberalism corrupted by the actions undertaken by liberals in pursuit of victory in the Cold 
War.  
III 
 
 Analyzing the intellectual contributions of the activists and writers associated 
with IPS from 1963 until the end of the Cold War, this dissertation probes a heretofore 
unexamined set of ideas regarding liberalism, democracy, and American foreign policy. 
Given life just as a New Left came into being in America, IPS carried forth the ideals of 
groups like Students for a Democratic Society by calling for a non-interventionist and 
non-ideological foreign policy, greater participatory democracy, and a more moral and 
humane world. Thus, despite the demise of liberalism and the concomitant rise of 
conservatism, a more progressive form of liberalism survived at IPS. At the same time, 
this study demonstrates the inherent difficulties facing intellectuals trying to influence 
policymakers, particularly when offering a progressive vision for America at home and 
abroad in a conservative climate. Drawing upon the think tank’s records and the 
expansive writings of IPS intellectuals, this study reveals the ways in which the think 
tank kept alive the promise of a reconstructed liberalism in Cold War America. 
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Introduction: The Decline and Fall of Liberalism? 
On September 21, 1976, Orlando Letelier, a former Defense and Foreign Minister 
of Chile under Salvador Allende, Michael Moffitt, and Ronnie Karpen Moffitt were 
driving to work near Sheridan Circle in Washington D.C. At 9:35 a.m. a bomb exploded 
underneath the car. Letelier lost both of his legs in the explosion and remained trapped 
under the car. Ronnie remained conscious but the blast severed her carotid artery. The 
explosion ejected her husband, Michael, from the backseat of the car. Both Ronnie and 
Letelier later died as a result of their injuries.1 Within two years of the bombing, FBI 
officials named an associate of the Chilean National Intelligence Directorate (DINA), 
American-born Michael Vernon Townley, along with several members of the Cuban 
National Movement, as suspects in the killings.  
All three passengers worked at the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), Letelier and 
Michael as fellows and Ronnie as an assistant. The death of Letelier, who led the 
movement against Augusto Pinochet after the latter overthrew the democratically-elected 
socialist leader Allende in a coup on September 11, 1973, brought worldwide attention to 
the ruthlessness of Pinochet. Letelier’s assassination did not come as a surprise to IPS, 
which had paid close attention to Pinochet and other right-wing dictators in Latin 
America and elsewhere for the past decade. Marcus Raskin and Richard Barnet, the 
former a staffer of National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy and the latter a lawyer in 
the State Department during the Kennedy administration, founded IPS in 1963. In 1965, 
as the war in Vietnam escalated, Raskin and associate fellow Bernard Fall edited The 
                                                            
     1 Saul Landau, They Educated the Crows: An Institute Report on the Letelier-Moffitt Murders 
(Washington D.C.: Transnational Institute, 1978), 1-2. 
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Vietnam Reader, which became popular with teach-in organizers. Two years later, Raskin 
and founding fellow Arthur Waskow co-wrote “A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority” 
in support of the draft resistance movement. By the end of the decade, Barnet also 
published Intervention and Revolution, detailing the efforts by America to prevent 
revolutions abroad. IPS’s studies on Vietnam and the Third World, as well as later 
publications, shared a common theme: liberalism had run amok as a result of the Cold 
War.    
This study argues that IPS sought to resuscitate what the historian Doug Rossinow 
has called the “left-liberal tradition” in American history. Unlike in the 1950s and 1960s, 
a coalition made up of left and liberal elements existed in America between the 1880s 
and the 1940s. During this time, according to Rossinow, “bridges of cooperation” existed, 
though not, as some argue, a form of “cooptation” of the leftist radicals by liberals. “This 
left-liberal tradition,” Rossinow explains, “includes liberals who were deeply critical of 
American capitalism as well as leftists who saw great value in social reform, as opposed 
to revolutionary upheaval.”2  Though disagreement occurred within IPS over how closely 
to work with liberals and sometimes disapproval of the slowness of reform rose to the 
surface, the Institute repeatedly worked with the liberal Establishment.  
This study will show the ambivalent and often combative relationship IPS had 
with liberalism and liberals in power, which made the re-emergence of the left-liberal 
alliance enormously challenging. The strained relationship between IPS and liberalism 
had much to do with the think tank’s advocacy of a more robust liberalism based on the 
ideals put forward by the New Left, particularly as articulated by the Students for a 
                                                            
     2 Doug Rossinow, Visions of Progress: The Left-Liberal Tradition in America (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 2. 
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Democratic Society (SDS) in the organization’s manifesto, the Port Huron Statement. 
One look at the founding document of SDS illustrates where IPS stood within liberalism. 
Reading the Port Huron Statement, in fact, is like reading the studies and books put out 
by IPS intellectuals. SDS complained of “depersonalization” and turning humans into 
“things.” At another point, SDS’s manifesto referred to the “militarization of society” 
made possible by a “moral callous” brought on by the looming threat of nuclear war. The 
document advocated disarmament rather than deterrence and proclaimed that the latter 
“should be seen as a political issue, not a technical problem.” SDS, moreover, excoriated 
bureaucrats in schools, labor unions, the Soviet Union, and corporations alike. Most 
importantly, the Port Huron Statement put forth the ideal of “participatory democracy.”3  
IPS had, as this study shows, personal relationships with several important SDS leaders, 
but the association went far beyond friendship. For decades after SDS’s implosion, IPS 
carried on the principles set forth in the Port Huron Statement and, in the process, proved 
that a Left existed, even in the most conservative of times in American history. 
This study refutes the “declension narrative” found in scholarly works that use 
SDS’s turn to revolutionary violence in the late 1960s to argue that the New Left, in its 
original form, no longer existed. Before historians of the 1960s would look to the decade 
and see the period as one of decline for the New Left, Irving Howe, like many of his 
contemporaries, admonished the New Left. Howe claimed that the “politics” of the New 
Left “asserts so unmodulated and total a dismissal of society, while also departing from 
Marxist expectations of social revolution, that little is left to them but the glory or burden 
of maintaining a distinct personal style.” This “style,” furthermore, took precedence over 
                                                            
     3 The Port Huron Statement is reprinted in its entirety in Miller, Democracy Is In The Streets, 332, 340, 
345, 355-356, 333. 
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substance and rational thinking. He went on to deride the New Left for its “lack of clear-
cut ideas, sometimes even a feeling that it is wrong—or worse, ‘middle-class—to think 
systematically, and as a corollary, the absence of a social channel or agency through 
which to act.” In a similar manner, Howe criticized the New Left for its “extreme, 
sometimes unwarranted, hostility toward liberalism,” which he blamed on an ahistoricism 
that ignored much of the good accomplished by liberals.4  The intellectuals at IPS, though 
perhaps not as early as 1965, would agree that specific elements of the New Left pursued 
an anti-intellectual and violent path, but the New Left included among its ranks more 
than just SDS members. Part of the problem with Howe’s and later historians’ caricature 
of the New Left as street fighting radicals holding Mao’s Little Red Book is that such 
observations fail to distinguish between SDS and the New Left. 
There is no doubt that SDS is synonymous with both the 1960s and the New Left. 
As a result, the historical studies on the New Left that appeared in the 1980s placed the 
organization at the center of the narrative. In the process of writing about the New Left, 
James Miller, Todd Gitlin, and a host of others created a narrative that privileged SDS. In 
doing so, the authors make it seem as though the downfall of SDS signaled the decline of 
the New Left as well. “Participatory democracy,” community organizing, and intellectual 
debates in the early 1960s, proponents of this narrative claim, gave way to anarchism and 
violence as SDS moved from “protest to resistance” in the middle 1960s.5  The 
                                                            
     4 Irving Howe, “New Styles in Leftism,” in 50 Years of Dissent, eds. Nicolaus Mills and Michael Walzer 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 75-76, 78-79. 
     5 See, for instance, James Miller, Democracy Is in the Streets: From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago, 
2nd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004); Todd Gitlin, The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of 
Rage (1987; reprint, New York: Bantam Books, 1993); Maurice Isserman, If I Had a Hammer: The Death 
of the Old Left and the Birth of the New Left (New York: Basic Books, 1987). IPS is mentioned on one 
page in Gitlin’s book, Miller mentions the think tank in passing on two occasions, and Isserman does not 
mention the Institute at all. 
      5 
 
 
“declension” narrative that dominated the early literature of the New Left and the 1960s 
has led important groups and events to be overlooked in both the sixties and beyond. 
As the declension narrative makes clear, historians have dated the demise of the 
New Left to the late 1960s when activists turned to revolutionary rhetoric and violence. 
Such an argument, however, deals with the New Left only as a social movement. The 
declension narrative fails to take into account the continued existence of New Left ideas 
long after the implosion of SDS. Just as various studies have shown New Left ideals 
existing prior to the 1960s, this study recasts the fortunes of the New Left by showing 
how the ideology of the New Left survived into the 1970s and 1980s.6  While the New 
Left as a social movement, if there ever existed such a monolithic movement, surely 
disappeared by the early to mid-1970s, the ideas put forth in the Port Huron Statement 
and countless other works of the era found a home in the writings of IPS intellectuals. In 
this sense, I agree with Doug Rossinow, who has cautioned against “retrospectively 
lengthening the New Left’s life span” because it “sacrifice[s] the distinctive, and 
distinctively radical, ideology of the New Left.” Furthermore, Rossinow agrees with the 
“reasonable argument” that the New Left disappeared in 1973, following the official end 
of the Vietnam War and the Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade. As a result, any 
surviving Left after 1973 did not represent a “continuation” of the New Left of the 1960s. 
With this end date in mind, Rossinow calls on historians to distinguish the New Left as “a 
                                                            
     6 James Tracy, Direct Action: Radical Pacifism from the Union Eight to the Chicago Seven (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996), especially 125-126. Other examples of this sort of scholarship include 
Isserman, “If I Had a Hammer . . .”; Van Gosse, Where the Boys Are: Cuba, Cold War America, and the 
Making of a New Left (London: Verson, 1993); Doug Rossinow, The Politics of Authenticity: Liberalism, 
Christianity, and the New Left in America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); and John 
McMillian and Paul Buhle, eds., The New Left Revisisted (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003). 
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political outlook” versus “a social movement,” with the latter no longer existing.7  I, of 
course, would add philosophical or theoretical to “political outlook.” 
Further, this study recasts the relationship between the New Left and the Third 
World. For the last decade and more scholars have looked at the ties between social 
movements in America and the Third World. The majority of these studies, however, 
chronicle the interactions between non-white activists in America and Marxist and anti-
colonial liberation movements around the world.8  When historians look into the white 
New Left’s interest in the Third World, it is primarily to show how groups like the 
Weathermen sought to imitate the revolutionary violence of Che Guevara. As hopes of 
changing America diminished, SDS, and later the Weathermen, proponents of this 
outlook argue, looked to the Third World. Justin Jackson, for instance, has noted how 
antiwar activists in SDS felt “isolated from an increasingly conservative American 
working class and middle class blinded by anticommunist ideology and sated by high 
living standards rooted in the exploitation of Third World people,” and thus became 
fascinated with Che Guevara and Regis Debray and their revolutionary techniques.9 
                                                            
     7 Doug Rossinow, “Letting Go: Revisiting the New Left’s Demise,” in The New Left Revisited, eds. John 
McMillian and Paul Buhle (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003), 245-247, 252. For another view 
on the start and end date of the New Left, see Van Gosse, “A Movement of Movements: The Definition and 
Periodization of the New Left,” in A Companion to Post-1945 America, eds. Jean-Christophe and Roy 
Rosenzweig (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 278-279, 292-293. 
     8 Timothy B. Tyson, Radio Free Dixie: Robert F. Williams and the Roots of Black Power (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1999); Fanon Che Wilkins,” The Making of Black Internationalists: 
SNCC and Africa Before the Launching of Black Power, 1960-1965,” Journal of African American History 
92 (2007): 468-491; Robin D.G. Kelley and Betsy Esch, “Black Like Mao: Red China and Black 
Revolution,” Souls 1 (Fall 1999): 6-41; Laura Pulido, Black, Brown, Yellow, and Left: Radical Activism in 
Los Angeles (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006); Cynthia A. Young, Soul Power: Culture, 
Radicalism, and the Making of a U.S. Third World Left (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006); Julia 
Erin Wood, “Freedom is Indivisible: The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), Cold War 
Politics, and International Liberation Movements” (PhD diss., Yale University, 2011).  
     9 Justin Jackson, “Kissinger’s Kidnapper: Eqbal Ahmad, the U.S. New Left, and the Transnational 
Romance of Revolutionary War,” Journal for the Study of Radicalism 4 (2010), 82. 
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It is important to note, however, that several exceptions to the narrative of a 
revolutionary shift among New Left activists do exist. Van Gosse’s research into the New 
Left’s support—through the activities of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee—of the 
Cuban revolution in the early 1960s is one example. Disputing the claim made by other 
historians that the New Left’s influence declined once activists took to the streets and 
joined forces with Third World anti-imperialists, Gosse has called for a long view of the 
American Left. By showing “a continuous line of solidarity with Latin America” by 
activists beginning in the late 1950s and continuing into the 1980s with the solidarity 
movements against American intervention in Central America, Gosse aims to overturn 
the declension narrative.10  Caitlin Casey has also shown how the New Left, in this case 
SDS, always had an interest in the Third World. While the student organization spent a 
disproportionate amount of time on Vietnam, SDS members also wrote papers, held 
workshops on the Middle East, carried out protests against South Africa, and traveled to 
Cuba, Eastern Europe, and Japan. Casey claims that the “internationalism” followed by 
SDS “was a conscious and much-debated decision.” Only after “it became clear that 
international meetings, travels, and friendly letters of brotherhood were not ending the 
war, the language of imperialism blended with a language that went beyond radicalism to 
revolution.” SDS did, therefore, eventually follow a revolutionary path to obscurity, but 
not before the organization spent a better part of its existence working across borders, 
                                                            
     10 Van Gosse, Where the Boys Are: Cuba, Cold War America and the Making of a New Left (New York: 
Verso, 1993), 9-10. In arguing for the inclusion of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee as part of the New Left, 
Gosse makes an argument that appears repeatedly in much of his scholarly work, which is that the New Left 
should be viewed more as a group following the tenets of “radical liberalism,” which would make it possible 
to include the Old Left, activists such as Dorothy Day, and groups fighting for everything from disarmament 
to anti-imperialism. See Ibid., 255-258. Likewise, see Dan Berger, ed., The Hidden 1970s: Histories of 
Radicalism (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2010), especially 97-176, which offers information 
on some of the solidarity movements of the 1970s.  
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both intellectually and physically. Furthermore, as Casey details in subsequent chapters 
of her study, transnationalism continued in various forms in the Left.11  IPS had a similar 
long-term interest in the Third World. From Vietnam in the 1960s, to Chile in the 1970s, 
and Central America in the 1980s, IPS spoke with and for the people of the Third World 
against American imperialism, both economic and military. 
Therefore, not only the New Left, but also liberalism, I argue, remained a viable 
school of thought well into the 1970s and 1980s in spite of the destruction of the liberal 
consensus and the subsequent popularity of conservative ideas. The scholarly literature 
on liberalism in the twentieth century, however, generally conforms to the “rise and fall” 
thesis, which posits that almost as soon as liberalism achieved ascendency during the 
New Deal it began experiencing a slow decline.12  Alan Brinkley, for instance, has 
pointed to a “reconstruction of postwar liberalism” whereby further reform no longer 
seemed necessary due to the tremendous success of the New Deal. Liberals lauded the 
New Deal for preserving the capitalist system without bringing totalitarianism to the 
United States. Postwar liberals, according to Brinkley, “abandoned or greatly de-
emphasized the abortive experiments in statist planning, the failed efforts to create 
cooperative associational arrangements, the vigorous if short-lived anti-monopoly 
crusades, the overt celebration of government, and the open skepticism toward capitalism 
and its captains.” Achieving full-employment and expanding social welfare benefits took 
                                                            
     11 Caitlin Marie Casey, “Vanguards of Globalization: Transnationalism in American Activism, 1960-
1975” (PhD diss., Yale University, 2011), 56-173. 
     12 Jefferson Cowie and Nick Salvatore have gone so far as to claim that the New Deal represented a 
minor hiccup, or “historical aberration,” in a conservative century bookended by William Graham Sumner 
and Richard Nixon. See, “The Long Exception: Rethinking the Place of the New Deal in American 
History,” International labor and Working-Class History 74 (Fall 2008), 4-6. 
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center stage in postwar America.13  The death knell of New Deal liberalism sounded the 
loudest in 1948 when the Cold Warrior Harry Truman easily defeated Roosevelt’s former 
vice president, Henry Wallace, who ran as a candidate for the Progressive Party. A group 
that helped determine the contest between progressivism and liberalism in 1948 was the 
Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), which had formed in early 1947. Despite its 
relative newness, the ADA played a key role in the defeat of Wallace and, more 
generally, progressivism. According to a historian of the organization, Steven Gillon, 
“the ADA’s excessive anticommunism and its yearning to be involved in the political 
fight—in this case as part of the Democratic Party—prevented it from recognizing the 
relevance of Wallace’s criticisms.”14  Questioning of American policies, both domestic 
and foreign, became rarer as the second red scare took over the country in the 1940s and 
1950s. Part of the reason for this chilled environment stemmed from the loyalty 
investigations approved by President Truman in 1947 with Executive Order 9835, but as 
Landon Storrs has shown, earlier and later investigations also silenced America’s more 
progressive voices.15 
Out of reconstructed postwar liberalism came what Godfrey Hodgson has labeled 
the “liberal consensus.” According to Hodgson, the consensus reached its apex in the 
                                                            
     13 Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War (1995; repr., New 
York: Vintage, 1996), 265-268. See also, Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds., The Rise and Fall of the New 
Deal Era, 1930-1980 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). 
     14 Allen Yarnell, Democrats and Progressives: The 1948 Presidential Election as a Test of Postwar 
Liberalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 90-92; Steven M. Gillon, Politics and Vision: 
The ADA and American Liberalism, 1947-1985 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 39-47, 50-55. 
     15 Landon R.Y. Storrs, The Second Red Scare and the Unmaking of the New Deal Left (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2013). On the impact of anti-communism on pacifists and the peace movement 
more generally, see Milton S. Katz, Ban the Bomb: A History of SANE, the Committee for a Sane Nuclear 
Policy, 1957-1985 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), especially 50-58; Lawrence S. Wittner, Resisting 
the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954-1970 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1997), especially 325-329; The Strangest Dream: Communism, Anticommunism, and the 
U.S. Peace Movement, 1945-1963 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000), especially chapter 6. 
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1950s and represented an “ideology of liberal conservatism,” which involved a general 
agreement that America’s free market economic system brought tremendous economic 
growth to the nation and lessened, if not completely erased, class divisions. Thus, 
managerialism and industrial efficiency would solve all of America’s social ills. America, 
though, would have to play a much larger role in containing Marxism and communism 
and spread America’s free market ideals around the world. Such a consensus allowed 
liberals, in the words of Hodgson, “the hope of progress and a feeling of benevolence,” 
while conservatives could approve of the “business prosperity” and reaffirmation of the 
status quo.16  The consensus, of course, broke down in the 1960s for myriad reasons. 
Even in a decade that witnessed the passage of legislation related to civil rights, health 
insurance, poverty, and welfare, “liberals were constrained to act within a political 
culture that imposed severe limits on the extent of permissible change,” according to 
Allen Matusow. Despite such restraints, the American public turned against liberalism for 
what many citizens considered the failures of liberal reform, claiming that it either did 
too much or too little.17 
For historians, the 1970s has come to represent the decade in which America 
became conservative. The resurgence of conservatism in the 1970s had two interrelated 
causes. First, white blue-collar and middle-class Americans, fed up with antiwar 
protestors, welfare recipients, busing, women’s rights issues, and the supposed 
immorality of America, blamed liberalism for encouraging discussion of the 
                                                            
     16 Godfrey Hodgson, America In Our Time: From World War II to Nixon, What Happened and Why 
(1976; repr., New York: Vintage, 1978), 76-81. 
     17 Allen J. Matusow, The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the 1960s (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1984), 270. See also, William L. O’Neill, Coming Apart: An Informal History of America 
in the 1960s (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1971). 
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aforementioned issues. As a result, a main component of the New Deal coalition left the 
Democratic Party, leading to electoral gains by the Republicans.18  Yet, despite the 
monumental defeat of George McGovern, often considered the face of interest group 
politics, in the 1972 presidential election, liberal ideas still found an audience, 
particularly in local and state elections.19  IPS, though, generally stayed away from the 
contentious issues associated with identity politics, choosing instead to speak about 
democracy more broadly. As a result, it avoided alignment with groups making demands 
for particular interest groups. 
At the same time, historians have begun to question the dominance of 
conservatism in the 1970s and 1980s. As Dan Berger has noted, the 1970s represented a 
“time of limits”—seen domestically with the energy crisis and stagflation and in foreign 
policy with the rise of détente—but also as “the ultimate exploder of limits.” Individuals 
and groups from across the ideological spectrum voiced their displeasure with the 
direction the country was going. Keynesian economics fell out of favor, replaced by 
neoliberalism and its free-market orthodoxies; unlikely political alliances formed due to 
                                                            
     18 See, for instance, William C. Berman, America’s Right Turn: From Nixon to Clinton, 2nd ed. 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Thomas Byrne Edsall and Mary D. Edsall, Chain 
Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics (1991; repr., New York: Norton, 
1992); Jonathan Rieder, Canarsie: The Jews and Italians of Brooklyn Against Liberalism (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1985); Robert O. Self, All in the Family (New York: Hill and Wang, 2012). Most 
of these studies place blame on the Democratic Party for ignoring economic issues in favor of social issues. 
As an example, New Politics liberals, according to the historian Jeffrey Bloodworth, “eschewed economic 
concerns that had been the basis of New Deal liberalism’s success in favor of moral piety.” Maintaining a 
moral superiority over others, Bloodworth suggests, mattered more to these New Politics liberals than 
winning elections. See Jeffrey Bloodworth, Losing the Center: The Decline of American Liberalism, 1968-
1992 (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2013), 5. 
     19 Terry H. Anderson, The Movement and the Sixties: Protest in America from Greensboro to Wounded 
Knee (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 402-404. See also, Pierre Clavel, The Progressive City: 
Planning and Participation, 1969-1984 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1986); Pierre Clavel, 
Activists in City Hall: The Progressive Response to the Reagan Era in Boston and Chicago (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2010). On McGovern’s failed bid for the presidency, see Bruce Miroff, The Liberals’ 
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racial, ethnic, and economic convulsions; and the rise of New Age religions made 
possible the collapse of boundaries. As the “exploder of limits,” the 1970s, as a result, 
made it possible for activists of all political persuasions to protest and debate the future of 
America.20  Thus blanket statements that attempt to put decades neatly into either the 
liberal or conservative pile ignore the ambiguity of history.21  As Bradford Martin, 
Michael Foley, Christian Smith, and others have shown, liberal and radical activists did 
not sit idly by as conservative politicians attempted to enact their programs in 
Washington and, in regard to foreign policy, around the world.22  
Nonetheless, for IPS, liberalism had gone astray and required rehabilitation. At 
the center of IPS’s critique of liberalism was a belief that liberals had habitually limited 
democracy both at home and abroad. In 1949, one of the founders of ADA, Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr., published The Vital Center. Proponents of the “vital center” held 
steadfastly to the view that the “people,” especially when joined together and becoming 
the “masses,” could not be trusted with power, so bureaucratic “elites” needed to serve in 
leadership roles. Such an outlook, Richard Pells has suggested, ignored the fact that non-
elites could construct alternatives just as “specific and pragmatic.” Yet for most 
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(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995). 
     22 Simon Hall, American Patriotism, American Protest: Social Movements Since the Sixties 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011); Bradford Martin, The Other Eighties: A Secret 
History of America in the Age of Reagan (New York: Hill & Wang, 2012); Michael Stewart Foley, Front 
Porch Politics (New York: Hill & Wang, 2013); Christian Smith, Resisting Reagan: The U.S. Central 
America Peace Movement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
      13 
 
 
bureaucrats, according to Pells, technique became more valuable than “content.”23  In the 
1950s and early 1960s, support for “democratic elitism” grew. “Participatory ideals were 
useful primarily for purposes of legitimation and ensuring elite responsibility but were 
not to be taken seriously as ideals,” Robert Westbrook has written about democratic 
thought in this era. Such arguments differed greatly from those made by Walter 
Lippmann and others in the 1920s. These earlier realists sought, according to Westbrook, 
“to open to view the gap between the reality of American politics and democratic ideals,” 
whereas later realists “tried to establish the reality of American politics as a new ideal.” 
Liberal realists defended democratic realism partly in response to the Cold War. Though 
not perfect, America, unlike communist nations, had an open system of governance that 
deserved much adulation and to be spread across the globe. These realists, as Westbrook 
shows, put a much greater emphasis on making government run more smoothly and 
making sure that it “retained enough participation to be relatively democratic in a world 
of more or less authoritarian regimes.”24  Looking at the work of prominent intellectuals 
during this period, such as Reinhold Niebuhr and Daniel Bell, and the activities of groups 
devoted to the promotion of intellectual and cultural production, particularly the 
American Committee for Cultural Freedom, clearly marks the period as a desolate time in 
American history for democratic participation.25 
By grounding its criticism of liberalism in democratic terms, IPS could trace its 
ideological lineage back to John Dewey. In his authoritative biography of Dewey, 
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Westbrook has rejected the notion that the philosopher’s ideas served as an ideological 
backdrop for liberalism in America. Rather, Westbrook writes that “a rejection of 
Dewey’s democratic faith has become a standard feature of the dominant strain of liberal-
democratic ideology.” Dewey’s unending yearning for a more inclusive form of 
democracy made him “a deviant among liberals,” according to Westbrook. Dewey, as a 
result, became a lifelong critic of a liberalism that perceived the “participatory ideal” as 
“hopelessly utopian and potentially threatening to social stability,” as Westbrook has 
written.26 IPS stood on the same fringe of liberalism that Westbrook has Dewey perched 
upon through the philosopher’s life. Yet due to IPS’s precarious position at the edge of 
liberalism, studies of liberalism and the Left in American history have tended to ignore 
IPS’ contributions to both. Simply put, IPS attempted to construct a form of liberalism 
more conducive to democratic participation. Thus, sprinkled throughout the writings of 
IPS intellectuals is the concept of power. IPS intellectuals were concerned with who 
possessed it, the meaning behind it, and how individuals and nations used it. 
Although IPS wrote on issues related to domestic reform and neighborhood 
government, this study focuses on the writings of IPS intellectuals having to do with the 
American response to the Cold War and the concomitant effect on democracy at home 
and abroad. By looking at how IPS responded to the Cold War, it is possible to 
understand the role the think tank played in undermining the intellectual underpinnings of 
the Cold War liberal consensus. Robert Latham has described five characteristics of 
liberal internationalism that served as “the building blocks of liberal social existence” 
during the early years of the Cold War. Among these he includes free trade, a domestic 
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market economy, government based on liberal designs, the protection of citizens’ rights, 
and “the right of collective self-determination.” Latham argues that the liberal order 
operated on a “uniaxis” with the United States holding a position of dominance with 
other states situated alongside it on the axis and changing the makeup of the order. 
However, unlike other illiberal states included on the “uniaxis,” such as Latin American 
nations under the rule of authoritarian leaders, the Soviet Union did not fit on the axis 
because, in the words of Latham, it was “capable of disrupting the definition process and 
challenging the broad contours of liberal relations” far more than weaker nations. As 
“Soviet externalization” began, a concurrent “consolidation” within the liberal order also 
occurred in order to limit the distance states roamed from the center of the uniaxis. 
Furthermore, Latham argues, these moves by the United States led to the increasing 
military nature of the Cold War, as exemplified by the Truman Doctrine in 1947, the 
Marshall Plan in 1948, and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 
1949.27  IPS, as this study illustrates, opposed the existence of the “uniaxis” and the 
militarized nature of the Cold War. 
Further, IPS’s writings in the 1970s and 1980s, after the collapse of Cold War 
liberalism brought about by the Vietnam War, demonstrates the long reach of New Left 
ideas even as intellectuals associated with Trilateralism or neoconservatism seemed to 
dominate discussions about the Cold War. The disappearance of liberal intellectuals on 
the foreign policy debate is particularly prominent in the literature on neoconservatism. 
While such scholars as John Ehrman and Justin Vaïsse do not necessarily agree on the 
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exact date that liberal intellectuals became neoconservatives, they generally agree that 
Cold War liberalism gave birth to neoconservatism.28 
The breakdown of the Cold War consensus led to a series of splits in the foreign 
policy Establishment that would have important ramifications for future foreign policy 
debates. Both Ehrman and Vaïsse have offered the most precise portraits of the 
intellectual environment to help scholars understand the fragmentation that occurred 
during the breakup of the consensus. Relying on the standard liberal to conservative 
spectrum, Ehrman and Vaïsse situate New Left revisionist historians like William 
Appleman Williams and Walter LaFeber, as well as Richard J. Barnet and Marcus 
Raskin, on what Vaïsse describes as the “extreme left” of the political scale. Leftist 
intellectuals opposed U.S interventionism and, more generally, containment itself. On the 
other end of the spectrum stood the neoconservatives, who, in addition to demanding a 
more robust form of containment, believed that the New Left’s anti-interventionist 
outlook threatened America’s survival. Intellectuals from both ends of the spectrum 
opposed détente for very different reasons. Between the New Left and neoconservatives 
stood the moderates. At the middle of the spectrum, there existed what Vaïsse has called 
a “center-left / center-right consensus on détente.” Liberal moderates, including Paul 
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Warnke, Stanley Hoffmann, Leslie Gelb, and Tony Lake, wrote for Foreign Policy, 
which had its first issue in 1970, and paid far closer attention to economic matters and 
other non-military issues. Though certain liberal moderates like Zbigniew Brzezinski still 
kept a close eye on East-West relations, the majority of intellectuals associated with this 
group considered issues involving North-South interactions of far greater importance. 
Thus, rather than looking at the world from a bi-polar perspective, liberal moderates 
promoted interdependence. Finally, like the national security advisor and secretary of 
state Henry Kissinger, liberal moderates supported détente as a means to reduce tensions 
in the Cold War.29  
By far, scholars paid the most attention to the neoconservatives, with less 
attention given to the Trilateralists and almost none to the group furthest to the Left. 
Beyond the cursory descriptions of Trilateralists and neoconservatives mentioned in 
reference to each group’s position on the political spectrum, it is necessary to explore 
further their general attitudes toward the Cold War, which will make it easier to see how 
IPS differed from them. Though much of the material written about the Trilateralists, as 
well as their chief organization, the Trilateral Commission, has been quite partisan, it is 
possible to obtain an understanding of their views from these accounts. First, though, a 
little background on the Trilateral Commission. David Rockefeller, Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
William Scranton, and several other prominent Americans, along with European and 
Japanese businessmen and policy makers formed the organization in 1973 to bring 
greater harmony into the relationship between the United States, Europe, and Japan. 
Members of the Trilateral Commission, as Stephen Gill has shown, came from companies 
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“at the apex of world economic hierarchies and at the vanguard of the 
transnationalization process.” Politically, the trilateralists tended to come from the center 
and held moderate views. Many members often had ties to academic or policy 
institutions, especially in the fields of political science and economics. By the 1980s, 
furthermore, almost half of the Commission’s budget came from corporate donations.30 
Jerry W. Sanders portrays Paul Warnke and other liberal moderates as following 
the “global managerial approach” to foreign policy. Global managerialists downplayed 
the significance of East-West tensions, and thus containment, and argued for a greater 
focus on the discrepancies between the North and South in regard to development. Thus, 
according to Sanders, “unilateral military strength” was far less important than a nation 
being able to create a “new rationalized international order” to allow for equal 
development in all nations. In other words, threatening Third World nations with military 
force would not achieve America’s goal of securing scarce resources. In addition to 
lowering tariffs on Third World goods entering America and paying higher prices for raw 
materials, the Trilateral Commission also advocated improved trade relations with the 
Soviet Union so as to temper the militarism of the Cold War. In each of these instances, 
though, America would remain the primary force, albeit based on economics instead of 
the military. Accepting Sanders’s description of foreign policy officials and 
commentators as “managerialists,” Natasha Zaretsky has compared liberal moderates to 
“benign parents” promoting a “prudent policy that took account of the nation’s 
limitations.” In general, the “managerialists” demanded more diplomacy and less 
intervention, expressed a greater concern for the world’s resources—which in turn led to 
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a recognition of a shift from East-West to North-South problems—and their preservation, 
and, in the words of Zaretsky, “greater responsibility for others, not out of a sense of 
charity, but out of a deeper conception of self-interest.” In her highly critical account of 
trilateralism, Holly Sklar has described the Trilateral Commission as seeking to bring 
together the United States, West Germany, and Japan to serve in a “custodial role” to 
preserve and help flourish “corporate capitalism,” particularly the multinational 
corporation. Thus, rather than meeting the demands of Third World nations for a New 
International Economic Order, trilateralists offered plans with “a few flourishes of 
affirmative action for Third World elites and whatever ‘trickle-down’ effects an 
expanding world economy could afford.” In regard to human rights, too, trilateralists 
sought the preservation of the status quo by aiding in the removal of the most barbaric 
dictators and replacing them with more “moderate” leaders while staying away from 
revolutionary forces.31 
Before turning to the neoconservatives, it is worth exploring briefly the 
transformation of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the premier Establishment 
foreign policy organization of the Cold War consensus era. Founded in 1921, the CFR 
had a membership composed of financiers, lawyers, journalists, and academics. The CFR, 
composed of both Democrats and Republicans, sought to develop an informed analysis of 
international affairs to guide America’s foreign policy and discourage isolationism.32 
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Although, Vaïsse and Ehrman do not include the CFR on their spectrums, it is clear that 
the foreign policy body, in the aftermath of the demise of the consensus, favored the 
trilateral view of the Cold War. Lawrence H. Shoup and William Minter have shown how 
the CFR and the Trilateral Commission, in the 1970s, shared not only personnel but an 
affinity for viewing the world from a transnational perspective that required a greater 
level of interdependence among the nations of the world. Yet, despite a greater interest in 
the Third World, the trilateralists and CFR, Shoup and Minter have argued, desired 
nothing beyond a slight increase in raw material prices and the transfer of some industry 
to the region, as evidenced by their faith in multinational corporations.33 
Trilateralists rose to prominence in the late 1970s as the newly elected 
Democratic president Jimmy Carter, himself a member of the Trilateral Commission, 
asked members from both the Trilateral Commission and the CFR to join his 
administration. While Carter shunned the Committee on the Present Danger, a major 
neoconservative organization, by not appointing any of its members to administration 
positions, scholars have concluded that neoconservative ideas reigned supreme by the 
early 1980s due in part to the president’s attempt to straddle both perspectives. As a 
result, by 1980, Carter offered a more militaristic foreign policy for America. Sanders has 
argued that the “Carter Doctrine,” enunciated by the president during his 1980 State of 
the Union Address, “represented the return to full-fledged Cold War ideology and the 
relegitimation of Containment Militarism as the foundation for American foreign policy 
for the 1980s.” Viewing every conflagration in the world as proof of Soviet aggression, 
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proponents of Containment Militarism argued that only American military might, rather 
than economic leadership, could stop the Soviet menace.34   
Taking note of the various strands of thought in the 1970s and into the 1980s, 
Zaretsky has urged historians to view the decade as a time of transition with various 
groups offering their visions of America. Zaretsky describes the 1970s as a period of 
“struggle between those who interpreted recent upheavals through a nationalist lens, and 
those who were already coming to grips with a nascent post-Cold War transnational 
order.” In fact, this explains, Zaretsky suggests, the “family-under-siege” mentality that 
dominated much of the discussion in the 1970s “because it worked to reassert the 
boundaries of the nation itself at a moment when a transnational order was coming into 
being.” Political Scientist Joseph Peschek has portrayed these exchanges as an “intra-elite 
debate” that extended into the 1980s. Among policymakers associated with the Brookings 
Institution and the Trilateral Commission, “managerialism” served as a solution to the 
world’s problems. Another group of policymakers, usually tied to the Heritage 
Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute, and other conservative and 
neoconservative organizations like the Committee on the Present Danger, favored 
increased defense spending and intervention to stop the spread of communism.35  Yet, 
while acknowledging the debate over America’s future in the 1970s, the majority of 
studies pass over the contribution of IPS to this conversation.36  By ignoring the 
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contributions of intellectuals at IPS, scholars have made it seem as though general 
agreement existed among intellectuals and policymakers that American hegemony could 
not end. In the process of diminishing IPS’s importance, furthermore, the popular 
narrative of liberalism’s and the New Left’s decline remains uncontested. This study 
rectifies the situation by offering the first complete study of IPS.37 
Though focusing on foreign policy issues during the Cold War, this study also 
demonstrates the importance of New Left ideas to the populist revival of the 1970s. As J. 
David Hoeveler has shown, a “shift of faith” occurred in the 1970s as conservatives 
looked “not [to] challenge the democratic priorities of American liberalism, but sought 
instead to reclaim them for its own.” Conservatives chose an opportune time to embrace 
populism due to the neglect of the issue by Cold War liberals, who offered instead an 
elitist democratic theory, and the failure of the New Left, with its participatory 
democracy, to appeal to a larger share of the American people. Dominic Sandbrook, too, 
has suggested that “partly as a reaction to Vietnam and Watergate, partly as a result of the 
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growth of individualism, the decline of institutions, and the conflict between liberalism 
and traditionalism,” a “new kind of populism” found a wide audience in America in the 
1970s.38 At the same time, particularly at the local level, there arose what historians have 
called a “New Populism” to describe the tremendous growth in community organizing by 
leftists in the 1970s.39  Whether coming from a conservative or radical liberal 
perspective, populism experienced a rebirth in the 1970s. No doubt due to the already 
mentioned tendency to equate the 1970s and 1980s with the rise of conservatism, IPS, 
whose fundamental purpose was to advance the ideal of participatory democracy, is 
nowhere to be found in the literature on populism in the 1970s. 
Further, this study demonstrates the role played by IPS in the growing opposition 
to neoliberalism in America and abroad. Whether leading the effort to expose the ways in 
which neoliberal economic policies led to human rights abuses in Chile or promoting the 
“common good” through participatory democracy, IPS stood at the forefront of the 
struggle against neoliberalism. With the rise tide of conservatism in politics, the nation 
increasingly turned to neoliberal solutions to deal with America’s declining economic 
fortunes.40  As defined by one of its critics, David Harvey, neoliberalism “proposes that 
human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms 
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and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property 
rights, free markets, and free trade.” Neoliberal theory holds, Harvey explains, that the 
state is necessary for its ability to issue currency, protect private property, and keep 
markets functioning freely or even create markets when necessary. States should not 
interfere with free markets because governments do not possess the requisite economic 
knowledge and interference by interest groups made government involvement in 
economic affairs chaotic.41 
What has the turn to neoliberalism done to American civic relations? By the 
1970s, according to the historian Howard Brick, the noneconomic society representative 
of post capitalist thought fell to the wayside as economics once again regained its 
position of dominance in American thought and society. With this turn came the 
acceptance of “the principle that only individuals exist and their sum, as ‘society,’ was 
purely a nominal aggregate and nothing real.” Thus, individualism came to be seen as 
more real than social groupings. Robert Putnam has offered evidence of what he views as 
the disappearance of “social capital” in America, which led to a concomitant decline in 
involvement by ordinary Americans in civic affairs.42  With economic principles 
emphasizing individualism reining supreme and voluntary associations losing their 
members, participatory democracy faced worsening conditions as the twentieth century 
came to a close. 
Further, this study sheds new light on the role New Left thinkers continued to 
play in the public sphere. Not all New Left activists left the streets for the lecture halls 
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and seminar rooms of academia. Nonetheless, many commentators and historians repeat 
the myth that New Left intellectuals, like the protestors on the streets, allowed Marxist 
dogma to cloud their thinking as they entered History and English departments at 
universities across the country. One chronicler of the American Left, offering what 
amounts to a declension narrative for New Left intellectuals, has argued that the New 
Left did not disappear in the 1980s but rather congregated in the ivory towers of 
America’s universities. Ex-New Leftists, he writes, took on the role of “Marxist and ex-
Marxist scholars who assign students books by authors who write of the ‘transition’ from 
the ‘commodity world’ of capitalism to the ‘moral economy’ of socialism to be read at a 
time when the world is moving in the opposite direction.” “With no constituency in the 
real world,” such intellectuals “had no choice but to ascend to the ivory towers of 
theory.” Influenced by Antonio Gramsci’s argument that “hegemony” by the 
“superstructure” over the masses required a greater focus on the higher-ups in society, the 
New Left sought to influence their middle and upper class students.43  Many 
conservatives, of course, made an argument similar to this that added to the culture wars 
of the 1960s through the 1980s.44  
One of the most famous, or perhaps infamous, books written on intellectuals is 
Russell Jacoby’s The Last Intellectuals. Compared to the intellectuals that came of age in 
the mid-twentieth century, the most recent incarnation arrived on the scene as “high-tech 
intellectuals, consultants and professors—anonymous souls, who may be competent, and 
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more than competent, but who do not enrich public life.” Confined to the university, 
academics “direct themselves to professional colleagues but are inaccessible and 
unknown to others,” he suggests. According to Jacoby, public individuals began 
disappearing in the 1960s, when “the universities virtually monopolized intellectual 
work” so that “intellectual life outside the campuses seemed quixotic.” Even the critics of 
the universities overcame their disillusionment with higher education and joined its ranks. 
Several prominent SDSers and student activists modified their views on the university 
and joined the ranks of academia. Though studying non-traditional topics, their ideas 
never transcended the university walls. Their writings became “unreadable communiques 
sweetened by thanks to colleagues and superiors,” but gibberish to the public.45 
More than any other feature of the academic intellectual, Jacoby derided the 
insularity of these figures. In comparison to past academics like C. Wright Mills, Marxist 
professors ignored their social surroundings in order to debate the meaning of texts and 
each other’s writings. As an example of this latter tendency, Jacoby points to Fredric 
Jameson’s laudatory remarks about the Bonaventure Hotel in Los Angeles, which paid no 
attention to how the structure seemed to limit access to the building, blocking the 
everyday person on the street from entering. Jacoby blames Marxists for a mode of 
thinking “that concentrates on texts, signs, and signifiers as the stuff of interpretation,” at 
the expense of a more socialized form of knowledge accessible to the layman.46  In 
essence, a community of academic scholars replaced the larger community. More 
                                                            
     45 Russell Jacoby, The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in the Age of Academe (New York: The 
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recently, Richard Posner has claimed that when university professors did leave the ivory 
tower, they became nothing more than mouthpieces for a particular cause.47    
What about those intellectuals who chose to work outside of academia? The 
number of think tanks in America during the last half of the twentieth century 
skyrocketed.48  While Posner describes “the modern American think tank” as “an 
important site of public-intellectual work,” he also points to certain characteristics that 
led him to question whether think tanks offered a base for public intellectuals. To begin 
with, their “output” usually had as its target audience government officials or other 
individuals involved in the political process. Posner also points to the fact that each think 
tank had its own political line. Moreover, think tanks often hired an intellectual to fill a 
particular niche and thus reified specialized knowledge. Therefore, Posner argues that he 
had “to regard the think-tank public intellectual as basically interchangeable with the 
academic public-intellectual.”49 
Thomas Medvetz, too, has a generally negative opinion of think tanks, blaming 
them for creating a less scientifically-oriented type of research. For instance, he links the 
rise of think tanks to “the de-autonomization of the scientific field.” Think tanks make it 
possible for politicians to ignore “autonomously produced social scientific knowledge” 
                                                            
     47 Richard A. Posner, Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2003), 148, 52, and 388-389. 
     48 In the early 1990s, James A. Smith put the number “policy research groups” located in the nation’s 
capital at about 100. By the mid-1990s, Lynn Hellebust claimed that as many as 1,200 think tanks were in 
operation in America. In 2004, Andrew Rich found 300 think tanks in America. The disparities between the 
various studies is likely due to the fact that what is and what is not a think tank is not entirely clear. For 
instance, while IPS is usually classified as a think tank in the literature, fellows at the Institute strongly 
disagreed with such a characterization. James Allen Smith, The Idea Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of 
the New Policy Elite (New York: Free Press, 1991), 214; Lynn Hellebust, ed., Think Tank Directory: A 
Guide to Nonprofit Public Policy Research Organizations (Topeka, KS: Government Research Service, 
1996); Andrew Rich, Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Expertise (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 4. 
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by making available an alternative type of research. Thus, Medvetz contends, think tanks 
have the “power” to bring into question actual autonomous science. Along similar lines, 
Donald Critchlow has blamed the “change in the ethos of think tanks” on the “breakup of 
the liberal consensus; to a reassessment, based on heightened ideological tension, of the 
classical notion of scientific objectivity, a recognition of social pluralism and 
philosophical relativism; and to the appearance of a new type of think-tank promoter who 
came out of government disillusioned with a particular policy line and determined to 
marshal information and theory to suggest a comprehensive shift in direction.”50  
In fact, a common theme throughout much of the scholarly literature on think 
tanks is that their output is less scholarly due to the need to appease financial and political 
benefactors who make it possible for the think tanks’ ideas to see the light of day. 
Looking for a historical precedent, David Ricci sees the philosophical origins of think 
tanks in the writings of Aristotle and John Locke, among others. Whereas Plato looked to 
“philosopher-kings” for guidance, Aristotle feared that limiting advice to so few men and 
depending strictly on facts made it far more likely that a totalitarian form of government 
would arise. In place of philosopher-kings, Aristotle called for a “marketplace of ideas,” 
in the words of Ricci, where the decision-making process took into account various 
opinions.51  By rendering think tanks part of a “marketplace of ideas,” Ricci ends up 
diminishing the ideas that came out of IPS. Because the ideas emanating from IPS too 
often sought to debunk the Cold War consensus, the Institute failed to grab a larger share 
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of the market. On the other hand, “responsibly liberal” think tanks, Ricci argues, played a 
far greater role in determining policy because these think tanks offered ideas appropriate 
to the existing “American system rather than on behalf of its fundamental 
transformation.”52 
By exploring the writings of IPS intellectuals, who were, in most cases, older than 
the predominantly college-age students usually associated with the New Left, this study 
recasts discussions about both the makeup of the New Left and what became of the 
movement after the halcyon days of the 1960s. Much of the scholarship on the New Left 
highlights the youth aspect of the New Left. In his discussion of the New Left, Michael 
Kazin has written, “That the New Left also heralded itself as a young left was critical to 
its growth—and to its ultimate political failure.” The New Left would grow, if for no 
other reason, due simply to demographics—the baby boom generation started coming of 
age and entered America’s universities. Yet the New Left’s youthfulness led to a general 
disregard for liberal visions of the future while never taking the time to formulate its own 
program. Kazin is correct in saying that the New Left identified itself as a youth 
movement, but as the 1960s progressed, aging activists made attempts to develop new 
programs and organizations to carry forward the ideals of the movement. Part of what 
Holly Scott calls the “deconstruction of the youth frame” involved the move to make the 
counterculture less age-restrictive. Thus, co-ops, community gardens, neighborhood 
health care centers, or the numerous other establishments run by local groups, rather than 
dress and music, signified the counterculture. These efforts represented a sort of 
pragmatic reasoning on the part of aging radicals. Such “alternative institutions,” Scott 
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suggests, “became a way to settle in for the long haul” and change society through means 
other than conflict and revolution.53 IPS itself represented one of the “alternative 
institutions” that served as a home for aging New Leftists.
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Chapter One: A History of IPS 
Before considering the intellectual output of the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), 
it is necessary to explore the rationale behind the Institute and the internal debates among 
fellows over the direction of IPS. With this in mind, this chapter provides background on 
IPS, focusing on its formation, who it intended to speak for, and how it expected to 
transmit its ideas to various groups in society. Influenced by their experiences in 
government and academia, the founders of IPS, perhaps naively, believed that the 
Institute could educate government officials and the larger American public to think 
differently about the Cold War. In the end, however, financial difficulties, obstinate 
government officials, and a poorly designed student education program greatly limited 
the ability of IPS to spread its ideas. 
Origins: The Men and Institutions That Came Before IPS 
Prior to coming together to form IPS in 1963, Marcus Raskin, Richard Barnet, 
and Arthur Waskow had already spent several years writing and thinking about the 
possible ways to bring an end to the Cold War and achieve disarmament. Raskin and 
Barnet, as advisors in the Kennedy administration, brought their unpopular views to the 
White House, and Waskow, a researcher at the Peace Research Institute (PRI), attempted 
to influence these same officials from outside of government. In the end, though, 
Waskow’s attempt to act as a go-between for starry-eyed pacifists and hard-nosed realists 
failed, with neither side willing to meet the other halfway. Likewise, both Raskin and 
Barnet found out that Washington policymakers frowned upon ideas that strayed too far 
from the Cold War consensus. 
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Arthur I. Waskow was born in Baltimore, Maryland in 1933. After earning his 
bachelor’s degree from Johns Hopkins University in 1954, he attended graduate school at 
the University of Wisconsin. Waskow received his doctorate in American history in 
1963, for which he wrote a dissertation on the 1919 race riots. While completing his 
dissertation, Waskow joined Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier’s office as a 
legislative aide in 1959, where he stayed until 1961. Another of Kastenmeier’s aides, 
Marcus Raskin, who had recently earned a law degree at the University of Chicago, 
worked with Waskow on a study for the congressman that investigated the training of 
U.S. military forces in biological warfare at Fort Detrick. The two aides also co-wrote a 
policy paper titled “Deterrence and Reality,” which became the basis for Waskow’s The 
Limits of Defense. In 1961, Waskow joined the Peace Research Institute as a Research 
Fellow. He stayed at PRI until it merged with IPS in 1963, where Waskow would become 
a resident fellow.1 
As Waskow battled Cold War liberalism from outside of the government, Barnet 
and Raskin joined the New Frontier, pinning their hopes for a fresh foreign policy 
perspective on the young President Kennedy. Born in Boston, Massachusetts on May 7, 
1929, Barnet graduated from Harvard University in 1952 and went on to earn a law 
degree at the school in 1954. He served as a U.S. Army officer in Europe in the Judge 
Advocate General’s Corps from 1955-1957, dealing with international law. After a three-
year stint at a private law firm, Barnet became a fellow at the Harvard Russian Research 
Center in 1960. From 1961 until 1963 he served as special assistant in the State 
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Department for disarmament issues, where he helped set up the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency (ACDA).2  As a fellow at the Russian Research Center, Barnet 
studied disarmament issues. His research eventually led to the publication in 1960 of Who 
Wants Disarmament? Looking at the various attempts made by the United States and the 
Soviet Union to secure a disarmament agreement, Barnet had mixed opinions about such 
efforts. 
The best hope for disarmament following World War II, the 1946 Baruch Plan, 
failed, according to Barnet, because Stalin realized that the Soviet Union’s refusal to 
follow through would not result in “ultimatums or a rain of bombs, but unending debate.” 
America demobilized its armed forces very soon after V-J Day and the Soviet Union 
seemed poised for great success in Europe, which offered fertile grounds for communist 
expansion. Furthermore, the plan itself offered no advantages for the Soviet Union, while, 
in the words of Barnet, “it was designed to be a riskless adventure” for America. In 
addition to allowing for the continued expansion of America’s nuclear arsenal, the 
Baruch Plan required, in the words of Barnet, “economic control by a group of capitalist 
nations” and used “moralistic talk” about punishing countries that refused inspection. 
Nonetheless, Barnet considered the Baruch plan significant if for no other reason than 
that it represented “the only time in the post-war period when the American government 
seriously considered giving up its nuclear stockpiles.”3 
Beginning in the mid-1950s, the United States, according to Barnet, dropped all 
pretense of wanting to disarm the world. When the Soviet Union uncharacteristically 
                                                            
     2 Richard J. Barnet Biographical Information, undated, Institute for Policy Studies Records (hereafter 
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      34 
 
 
accepted a plan put forth by the French and British in June 1954 that tied nuclear 
disarmament to a reduction in conventional forces, the United States suddenly backed 
down. Instead, beginning in 1956, it sought “ways to reduce the peculiar danger of 
modern weapons rather than the means to eliminate them entirely.”4  For at least the next 
thirty years, the United States, as well as the Soviet Union, limited discussions to arms 
control measures, and not disarmament. 
A good part of this reluctance by the United States to destroy its arsenal stemmed 
from ideological considerations and a particular view of Marxism held by U.S. officials, 
Barnet claimed. While at one time America’s concerns may have been valid, Barnet 
suggested that Marxist theory no longer had any bearing on the Soviet Union’s nuclear 
policies. Believing that all capitalist nations were militaristic by nature and only 
worldwide revolution would bring an end to capitalist wars, Lenin gave little thought to 
the idea of disarmament. In the view of Barnet, moreover, the atomic bomb made 
capitalist nations aware of their own vulnerability to attack, and thus somewhat restricted 
their expansionist tendencies.5 Too often, as Barnet and other IPS intellectuals would 
repeatedly lament in later years, the United States based its foreign policy on ideological 
calculations, which prevented officials from seeing how existing circumstances offered 
new opportunities for agreement. Although quite critical of the United States in his 
studies, Barnet received the attention of John J. McCloy, one of the foreign policy 
Establishment’s Wise Men and a disarmament advisor for President Kennedy.6  As an 
                                                            
     4 Barnet, Who Wants Disarmament?, 30, 38-40, 
     5 Barnet, Who Wants Disarmament?, 64-68.     6 Barnet admitted that disarmament faced many hurdles due, in large part, to the Soviet Union’s 
paranoid style and closed system. According to Barnet, the Soviet Union’s “anti-American propaganda” 
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aide to McCloy, Barnet attempted to bring new perspectives to the Kennedy 
administration during some of the tensest periods in the Cold War. 
As Raskin prepared to join the Kennedy administration, some of his past work 
under Kastenmeier came back to haunt the future IPS founder. During one of the many 
times that senate and congressional Republicans attacked The Liberal Papers and The 
Limits of Defense, Raskin’s name came up due to his position in the Kennedy White 
House. In an attempt to show how deeply entrenched were the ideas of The Liberal 
Papers in both the Democratic Party and the Kennedy administration, Representative 
Robert Stafford (VT-R) pointed to Raskin’s past involvement with the studies in question 
and his present role in the Kennedy administration. Stafford worried that Raskin, who 
“ha[d] an amazing record of illogical statements in the past,” including questioning 
America’s ability to defeat the Soviet Union and encouraging Americans to avoid 
military service. According to Stafford, Raskin’s position as a special staff member of the 
National Security Council put him “inside one of the more vital areas of our defense 
organization today.”7 
Providing further evidence of the infiltration of radical ideas into the White 
House, Stafford referred to a review of the offending book in the New York Times, which 
“rarely reviewed paperback publications,” but did so for The Liberal Papers. The 
congressman claimed that the reviewer’s other job as “cultural coordinator” in the White 
                                                            
secrets, Soviet leaders set limits on where inspectors could look. See Barnet, Who Wants Disarmament?, 
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House led him to review the book. His positive assessment of the book, therefore, might 
have been “an indication that the White House is not wholeheartedly in opposition to the 
proposals made in this publication,” according to Stafford. While denouncing The Liberal 
Papers, Stafford also sought to expose Raskin’s co-authorship of Waskow’s Limits of 
Defense. Stafford informed his fellow congressmen that Raskin and Waskow had written 
“Deterrence and Reality” while staffers for Kastenmeier. Upon further investigation, 
Stafford found that “a cursory check of the first 50 pages reveals not one difference in the 
wording of punctuation of even one sentence” from the earlier work. As a result, the 
congressman asked, “Will the real Marcus Raskin please do us a favor and stand up?”8 
Before going any further, it is necessary to take a step back and look briefly at 
Raskin’s early years and how he came to arrive at the White House. Born in Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin on April 30, 1934, by the age of sixteen he received an invitation to train at 
the Julliard School in New York. Although considered a piano prodigy, Raskin found 
politics more interesting, so he left Juilliard after a year to enter the University of 
Chicago. At Chicago, he took courses with New Dealer Rexford Tugwell and 
international law expert Quincy Wright. Raskin worked as legislative counsel for 
Kastenmeier and several other congressmen at the same time as he attended the 
University of Chicago. When several of the congressmen he served lost in the 1960 
election, Raskin began looking for a way to make up lost wages. David Riesman 
recommended Raskin to McGeorge Bundy. Agreeing to have Raskin join his staff, Bundy 
explained to Riesman, “Marc Raskin has a remarkably powerful and lively mind. We 
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shall probably have some disagreement, but I shall feel a lot better for knowing that 
certain problems have passed by his critical eye on their way to resolution.”9 
On his first day on the job, coming shortly after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, 
Raskin, in front of Walt W. Rostow, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and other advisors, 
questioned Bundy about whether America learned any lessons from overthrowing 
Guatemala’s Jacobo Arbenz in 1954. Soon thereafter, Raskin received a phone call from 
Bundy’s assistant telling him that he should no longer attend staff meetings, and that 
Bundy would meet with him alone at another time. Raskin, however, remained a thorn in 
the side of Bundy. In a memorandum written in early 1961, Raskin called for 
“fundamental changes” at Guantanamo in Cuba. While Raskin opposed ending U.S. 
occupation of the base, because it “would appear as an indication of weakness both at 
home and to the Communist world,” he thought the United States had to do something. 
“We might endeavor to turn it into a series of hospitals and technical institutions for the 
Cuban people, staffed by U.S. personnel. This will change the nature of the threat toward 
Cuba and make our presence there more palatable.”10  It did not bother Raskin that 
relations between the United States and Cuba were at their worst. Ironically, and 
unbeknownst to Raskin, administration officials were planning for the Bay of Pigs 
invasion at the same time as he wrote his memo. 
The subject matter of the memos sent by Raskin to his superior covered a range of 
subjects, including America’s disarmament policy and interventionism. In a 
memorandum to Bundy and Carl Kaysen, a Deputy National Security Advisor, Raskin, 
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who took part in a series of meetings between delegates from seventeen nations to discuss 
nuclear disarmament, advised against holding any additional meetings in the future. 
Raskin predicted that the recent decisions by the United States and the Soviet Union to 
resume nuclear testing meant that the disarmament conference would result in “group 
breast beating on nuclear testing and recrimination by others against the United States.” 
In place of the seventeen-nation talks, Raskin recommended that representatives from the 
United States and the Soviet Union meet privately, or else “the disarmament discussions 
will continue on a ritualistic and propaganda basis.” Around the same time, Raskin 
voiced his displeasure with a suggestion made by a British diplomat that the United 
States should retain indefinitely its trusteeships of certain nations. Reflecting on a 
conversation he had with Jonathan Bingham, United States Minister for the United 
Nations Trusteeship Council, Raskin admitted being “a bit taken aback” by the 
diplomat’s suggestion that the United States should oppose efforts by the U.N. to end 
America’s trusteeships. “Any maneuvers which would suggest to the world that we are 
going to keep people in a second class status with the United States acting as a classical 
‘imperial power’ would be a tragic error for the United States internationally,” Raskin 
wrote to Bundy.11 
During his time on the National Security Council staff, moreover, Raskin 
implored Kennedy, through Bundy, to take more seriously the protestors speaking out 
against nuclear testing. When the Student Peace Union (SPU) picketed in front of the 
White House in November 1961, Kennedy sent out his disarmament advisors to converse 
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with the students. The following February, SPU organized a “Washington Action” protest 
that brought five thousand concerned Americans to the capitol, during which President 
Kennedy famously sent out a pot of coffee for the marchers. Writing just prior to the 
February SPU action, Raskin suggested that the Kennedy administration needed to take 
seriously the student protestors associated with the February 1962 protests organized by 
Turn Toward Peace and the Student Peace Union. “To some extent the way this group 
will be treated by the Administration will decide whether this group and others like it will 
take a more violent turn,” Raskin wrote to Bundy. He also suggested that public protests 
might give Kennedy “greater flexibility in foreign policy matters in ways he otherwise 
feels he might not have.” As a result, Raskin believed the administration had “something 
to learn from these people” and wholeheartedly recommended that the protestors be 
“treated courteously, with sensitivity, with understanding” by all government officials.12  
Thus, the faith in the American people that Raskin and so many other intellectuals at IPS 
exhibited throughout the entire period of this study predated the construction of the 
Institute. 
The Philosophy Behind IPS 
Shortly after the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) held its national 
convention in Michigan, Raskin composed a letter to the president of Haverford College 
that offered a perspective of America remarkably similar to the outlook found in the 
recently written Port Huron statement from SDS. Raskin’s letter included a prospectus 
explaining the impetus behind the National Institute for Policy Studies. The future co-
director of IPS bemoaned government officials for exhibiting a “paralysis of will, 
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imagination and energy, a fatalistic conviction and assumption that nothing much can be 
done, an acceptance of the belief that to live is to be imprisoned.” The prospectus 
complained that a “philosophy of nihilism . . . serves as a backdrop for those who would 
rather shirk their social responsibilities than accept them.” IPS, as described in the 
prospectus, would seek to overcome this nihilism by carrying out “three principle 
objectives.” IPS pledged to “investigate the premises and implications of present and 
proposed policies and institutions in foreign and domestic matters, especially where the 
latter affects foreign policy; (2) to search for policies and institutional forms that will 
encourage the ethic of individual responsibility in group or social action, and (3) to create 
a kind of education which will not only arouse people’s concern for public problems, but 
show them how their intellectual training bears on the solution of these problems.” 
Analysis of government policies and programs, formulation of alternative plans and 
strategies, and educating citizens to play a greater role in their government would serve 
as guide posts for all future activities at IPS. Besides criticizing government officials for 
stale thinking and spelling out IPS’s plans, the prospectus castigated existing think tanks. 
Of the intellectuals at these think tanks and policy institutions, the prospectus explained, 
“But for the most part these men live by grace of the individuals or departments they 
advise, and therefore tend to confine their criticism and suggestions to making existing 
policy more ‘efficient,’ in terms of already accepted objectives. Their advice is almost 
always technical and procedural, and rarely ethical and substantial.”13 
Therefore, Raskin’s unfavorable view toward think tanks such as the RAND 
Corporation stemmed from his deeply felt belief that intellectual independence and 
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government funding were incompatible.14  As an example, in the twelve years preceding 
debate over the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system in 1968, the Pentagon spent $4.5 
billion for research conducted by think tanks. In addition to researching ABM systems, 
think tank intellectuals provided the government with various arguments for use in 
defending the ABM system.15  To protect against a similar outcome for IPS, the co-
directors put a clause in the IPS by-laws prohibiting the think tank and its fellows from 
taking government funds. As a result, Paul Dickson includes IPS in a group of “truly 
independent, nonprofit, self-determining think tanks” with “clients” coming from various 
“publics” rather than from the government.16 
While wanting to distance itself from Washington D.C. so that it could retain its 
intellectual freedom and speak “truth to power,” IPS nevertheless determined that in 
order to influence government officials, the Institute would have to operate in the nation’s 
capital. Not everyone agreed with the decision, however. Recounting a conversation he 
and Barnet had with William O. Douglas in early 1963 about their idea for a new 
institute, Raskin remembered the Supreme Court Justice saying, “It’s a good idea, but 
reason and truth are out of fashion in American life. If I were your age, I would not start 
an institute in Washington. I would start it in the Himalayas.”17  Why did Raskin and 
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Barnet feel so adamant about locating their think tank in Washington? A report from 
1963 referred to two “opposite deficiencies” in the relationship between government and 
academia. Academics working closely with the government, the report charged, became 
mouthpieces for whatever agency or department they worked for, and thus “are not—or 
do not feel—invited to challenge existing policy (especially the basic premises) much 
less to suggest or prepare alternatives.” Complete separation from the government, 
however, posed its own set of problems. Isolation from the workings of government led 
to “an out-of-date or largely theoretical picture of how policies are formed and how 
administrative and political forces really come into play.”18  IPS situated itself between 
the two “deficiencies,” hoping to avoid both. As discussed below in greater detail, the 
whole concept behind IPS, of putting ideas into action, could not have taken place, at 
least during the heyday of liberal governance in the early 1960s, anywhere else besides 
Washington D.C. 
Another proposal spoke of a “special need” for IPS in Washington D.C. First, the 
report stated that “decisions of defense and foreign policy are being made which have 
relevance and fundamental importance to the nation for extended periods of time.” For 
instance, the defense budget earmarked money for weapons development taking place 
over the next decade and included military aid for countries well into the future. The 
information used to determine the military budget and international relationships did not 
reach academics until months or years later. As a result, the report stated, “If the 
academic community in general is to bring the full power of its resources to bear on 
problems of first importance to the nation, it must have timely access to information” and 
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keep “its representatives in touch with the actual problems under consideration by 
decision makers.” The report envisioned IPS serving as a “new switchboard for the 
creative flow of policy debate” that would “provide a meaningful link between the 
University and policy making that does not now exist.” In explaining the role of the 
Institute as a center for education, the proposal stated that “it is an especially important 
responsibility of education to help reverse the trend toward separation of basic decision 
making from the citizenry.” IPS would strengthen the decision-making power of the 
American public by “increasing the institutional and geographical representation in 
Washington of the academic community,” by helping bring public policy issues into 
universities, and by making the subsequent research “available not only to policy makers 
but to the community at large.”19  It is no exaggeration to say, therefore, that IPS held its 
educative role in high esteem. In a manner similar to other think tanks, IPS sought to 
educate policymakers by bringing academics into closer contact with policymakers. Yet 
more important for IPS, and what distinguished it from other think tanks, was the 
Institute’s desire to educate the masses and prepare them for a larger role in decision-
making. 
IPS would eventually look outside the beltway for solutions to America’s 
problems, but in the early 1960s, IPS still considered Washington as the best hope for 
solving America’s problems.20 In an interview in the mid-1990s, Raskin admitted that 
IPS’s early efforts “to speak truth to power,” “was predicated on a particular liberal 
                                                            
     19 “Proposal for an Institute for Policy Studies,” no author, undated [likely 1963], AWP, WHS, box 6, 
folder 50. 
     20 IPS created three additional institutes in the late 1960s: the Cambridge Institute in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, the Bay Area Institute in San Francisco, California, and the Institute for Southern Studies 
out of Atlanta, Georgia. With the exception of the Cambridge Institute, IPS’s sister institutes faced dire 
financial circumstances. IPS found its greatest success with the Transnational Institute (TNI) in 
Amsterdam. 
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framework: the powerful being prepared to listen; the framework of the corporate-liberal 
world where people would engage in discussion on specific things, wanting to hear 
different kinds of ideas.” As the co-directors admitted, IPS came to realize in a very short 
time that the policymakers in Washington rarely sought an open dialogue.21 
In choosing Washington D.C. as its home base, IPS also had to contend with other 
think tanks with far more experience and years building relationships with government 
officials. Not ignorant of the possible difficulties ahead for IPS, Raskin met with officials 
from the Brookings Institution. During the meeting, Robert Calkins, the president of 
Brookings, questioned Raskin’s desire to create another think tank in Washington D.C. 
He pointed to the fact that the existing institutions already did not have “adequate 
financing, adequate manpower and none of which felt it was able to do an adequate job.” 
With these difficulties in mind, Calkins suggested that Raskin and his colleagues join 
Brookings or another think tank instead of starting anew. In an addendum to the minutes, 
Barnet and Robert B. Livingston described Calkins as “positively frightened by the 
competition” that would likely come from IPS due to the Brookings Institution’s 
“definitely lesser quality of personnel and product.” Barnet and Livingston offered a 
critical appraisal of the research coming out of Brookings, describing the reports as “a 
description of the state of affairs written in conspicuous detail but without much 
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evaluation.”22  Calkins’s counsel, therefore, served as additional proof for IPS’s founders 
of the timid approach of existing think tanks. 
Both contemporary and later critics of IPS generally agreed that IPS differed from 
traditional think tanks by following a clear ideological line. The characterization of IPS 
as an outcast in the world of policy institutes and think tanks, though, is not necessarily 
correct. As Thomas Medvetz has shown in his study of think tanks in America, these 
institutions have always acted ideologically. He rejects what he calls the “transformation 
thesis,” which posits that think tanks changed dramatically in the 1960s as their numbers 
swelled and the institutions readily publicized their ideological proclivities. Think tanks 
like Brookings did not change so much as become a think tank in the 1960s, Medvetz has 
argued, by taking part in the “genesis of the space of think tanks,” which involved 
replacing technical academic research with a form of knowledge understandable to the 
public. As for ideology, Medvetz has shown that think tanks always promoted a 
particular political cause, though these ideologies have changed.23 
As Raskin gauged the interest of educators and intellectuals regarding the 
possibility of a new institute, he and a group of his closest associates took the initial steps 
toward making IPS a reality. According to Waskow, conversations surrounding the 
formation of IPS originally took place among a group that included himself, Raskin, 
                                                            
     22 Minutes from meeting on November 8, 1962 between Richard J. Barnet, Robert B. Livingston, and 
Robert Calkins, Field Haviland, and George Graham of the Brookings Institute, AWP, WHS, box 6, folder 
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liberal after Calkins took over from Moulton in 1952. See Donald T. Critchlow, The Brookings Institution, 
1946-1952: Expertise and the Public Interest in a Democratic Society (De Kalb, IL: Northern Illinois 
University Press, 1985), especially 110, 123-124, and 129-135. 
     23 Thomas Medvetz, Think Tanks in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 112-113. 
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Barnet, Christopher Jencks of the New Republic, Gar Alperovitz, who had been working 
on the staff of Congressman Robert Kastenmeier, Robert Livingston of the National 
Institute of Mental Health, and PRI’s Donald Michael. According to Waskow, these early 
conversations envisioned IPS as being a “home for the kind of learning that I had in 
Kastenmeier’s office, or that Raskin had from Bundy’s office.” [Waskow crossed out this 
sentence in his draft of the letter]. In addition to the seven men above, Waskow explained 
that IPS would invite a “rotating group of about ten eminent men a year in the various 
social and behavioral sciences,” and then another “five to ten non-Established ‘elder 
statesmen’ around Washington—men like Rex Tugwell and James R. Newman.” While 
at IPS, these intellectuals would conduct “research in the basic problems of policy 
formation in the present world crisis, using Washington as a laboratory of sorts. . . .” 
Waskow also thought that IPS would invite fifty to sixty students to spend an academic 
year at the think tank. Besides taking part in policy research, students would work in 
congressional offices, lobby for groups such as SANE, or serve in executive offices.24   
It is significant to note that several of the figures with a hand in the creation of 
IPS previously worked as aides to congressmen or as lower-level bureaucrats. In a letter 
asking the historian C. Vann Woodward to join IPS as a visiting fellow, Waskow 
described himself and the six others involved in the early stages of IPS as “a league of 
frightened men.” These early IPS supporters, Waskow wrote, had “all been close enough 
to the government to realize how unable it is to examine itself or its policies clearly or 
carefully, and how impossible any change in direction will be without such a basic re-
                                                            
     24 Arthur Waskow to Anatol Rapoport, November 29, 1962, AWP, WHS, box 6, folder 49. 
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examination.”25  The past political experiences of the founders makes it all the more 
remarkable that these men felt that IPS could have a meaningful effect on government 
officials. 
IPS Fellows 
The previous section offered a glimpse into the thinking behind IPS as well as the 
strategic reasons for situating the Institute in the nation’s capital. Raskin, Barnet, 
Waskow, and the others, though, still had to deal with the operational issue of funding. 
Fortunately for IPS, economic hardships at PRI led that institute to seek a partnership or 
merger. Following the loss of a major foundation grant, Donald Michael, Director of 
Planning and Programs for PRI, sought a “transformation” of PRI by merging it with 
another research institute. Michael argued that the collapse of PRI would have an overall 
negative impact on the entire field of peace research. Trying to gain the support of the 
PRI board of directors for a merger with IPS, Michael claimed, “I cannot stress this point 
too much; the extent to which the community that has come to depend on PRI will be 
encouraged or discouraged in its own methods by PRI’s future affiliations and actions 
will depend very much on how quickly such a transformation is made.”26  PRI combined 
with IPS rather than another institute for a variety of reasons, but the relationships 
between Waskow, Michael, Raskin, and the other originators of IPS no doubt played a 
role in this outcome.  
                                                            
     25 Arthur Waskow to C. Vann Woodward, December 19, 1962, AWP, WHS, box 6, folder 49. 
Explaining that his new job at Yale University prevented him from accepting Waskow’s offer, Woodward 
called IPS “one of the most promising and bold ventures in American academic life in several years.” See 
C. Vann Woodward to Arthur Waskow, January 4, 1963, box 6, folder 50. In the mid-1960s, Waskow 
remembered Raskin as the “spark” that ignited discussion about forming a new institute in Washington 
D.C. See Arthur Waskow to Joy Matusky, September 1, 1966, AWP, WHS, box 1, folder 1. 
     26 Donald Michael to PRI Board of Directors, July 9, 1963, IPSR, WHS, box 89, folder 11. 
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Ultimately, the decision to have IPS absorb PRI resulted from another funding 
offer made to IPS. James P. Warburg, a financial advisor to President Franklin Roosevelt, 
and Philip Stern, heir to the Sears, Roebuck, and Company fortune, expressed the greatest 
interest in IPS early on. Stern, according to Waskow, “offered to give a big grant to IPS 
on two conditions: one was getting a letter from [John F.] Kennedy saying it was a good 
idea, the other was getting ‘x’ amount of money that he would match, I think it was 50 or 
75 or $100,000, something like that. So where was that match gonna come from? And it 
was not at all clear until finally what Don Michael and I proposed was that we convince 
the board of the Peace Research Institute that it wasn’t gonna go anywhere and that it 
should devote the rest of the money it had to making this match, getting IPS started, on 
the condition that Michael and I would become fellows of IPS. So the PRI board agreed 
to that, and that made the match and made possible the opening of IPS in 1963.27 
IPS filed its incorporation papers on November 29, 1962 and on November 3, 
1963 the Institute opened its doors.28 Barnet, Raskin, and David Riesman served as the 
founding trustees of IPS. In addition to these three individuals, the IPS board of trustees 
included Thurman Arnold, a former judge on the Court of Appeals and a senior partner at 
Arnold, Fortas, & Porter; David F. Cavers, professor of Law at Harvard Law School; 
Hans J. Morgenthau, professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago; Steven 
Muller, director of the Center for International Studies at Cornell University; Gerard Piel, 
publisher of the Scientific American; Freeman Dyson, physicist at the Institute for 
Advanced Studies in Princeton, New Jersey; and James Dixon, president of Antioch 
                                                            
     27 Arthur Waskow, telephone interview by author, October 16, 2014. 
     28 Board Minutes Index, IPSR, WHS, box 82, folder 1. 
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College. James P. Warburg and Philip M. Stern also served on the board of trustees. 29  
Barnet and Raskin held the position of co-directors of the Institute. 
Originally, intellectuals at IPS held any of three designations. Visiting fellows had 
a one-year appointment, with the possibility of an extension. Fellows in this category 
often came from universities, while others were “not chosen for their eminence or formal 
qualifications in a particular discipline, but for intellectual promise and for interests 
which can best be pursued at the institute.” When IPS began operations, several 
universities agreed to pay the salaries and administrative costs to have faculty join IPS as 
visiting fellows. These universities included Antioch College, Cornell University, 
Northwestern University, Rutgers University, and Wesleyan University. Associate 
fellows usually lived in Washington D.C. and held jobs as government officials, 
academics, or lawyers and worked part-time at IPS. Resident fellows at IPS held 
permanent positions and would take part in educating the students at the Institute and 
working on longer research projects.30  Resident fellows in 1963-1964 included Raskin, 
Barnet, Jencks, Waskow, Donald Michael, and Milton Kotler. David Bazelon, Paul 
Goodman, and David Riesman held the position of visiting fellows.31 
Getting By: IPS’s Tenuous Financial Existence 
The budget for the year 1963 to 1964 totaled just over $200,000. Early funding 
came from the Edgar Stern Foundation, which offered $40,000 for IPS’s first year with 
$30,000 each of the next two years. Another $32,500 came from the Peace Research 
                                                            
     29 Minutes of Organization Meeting of Trustees of Institute for Policy Studies, February 6, 1963, IPSR, 
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Institute for the first year, as did $50,000 from an anonymous source.32  By the end of the 
decade, the budget grew to almost $500,000. While IPS did not rake in big money, 
neither did it face major cash windfalls. Through March 1964, IPS received funds 
totaling $167,577.74, which included large grants from the Stern Family Fund, the Ford 
Foundation, the EDO Foundation and James Warburg. Three years later, Warburg 
donated $400,000 to IPS. The next largest donation in 1967, $25,000, came from the 
Samuel Rubin Foundation, followed by smaller contributions from Philip Stern and 
Irving Laucks of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. The largest 
contributions in 1968 came from Philip Stern, who gave IPS just over $91,000, in 
addition to another $11,000 from the Stern Family Fund. $30,000 came from the Samuel 
Rubin Foundation. The D.J. Bernstein Foundation contributed $50,000; donations of 
$17,000 came from the Carnegie Corporation; and the Field Foundation provided IPS 
with funds totaling $15,000.33 
Thus, throughout the 1960s, it appeared as if IPS’s creators made the correct 
choice when they decided to reject funding from the federal government, but conditions 
changed in the 1970s. The annual budget ending September 30, 1971 showed that IPS 
had overestimated its “projected contributions” by $200,000 and that expenses had gone 
$70,000 over budget. Matters improved somewhat the following year after IPS received 
$1,066,350 in assets from the estate of Daniel J. Bernstein, a wealthy Wall Street investor 
                                                            
     32 Facts About the Institute, undated [1963], AWP, WHS, box 6, folder 50; The Institute for Policy 
Studies Information Sheet, undated [1963], Ibid. 
     33 Annual Budget: 1964-1965: Budget totaled $199,200. Annual Budget: 1965-1966: Budget totaled 
$220,000. Annual Budget: 1966-1967: $239,800. Annual Budget: 1967-1968: $385,000. Annual Budget: 
1968-1969: $423,500. Annual Budget: 1969-1970: $483,700, IPSR, WHS, box 82, folder 5; Sources of 
Funds to the Institute, AWP, WHS, box 6, folder 51; Board of Trustees to Finance Committee, September 
27, 1967, AWP, WHS, box 1, folder 3; Contributions—1967, AWP, WHS, Box 7, Folder 23; 
Contributions—1968, Ibid. 
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and stockbroker. The Samuel Rubin Foundation gave IPS over $300,000 in 1974-1975, 
but $255,000 of that went to helping IPS create the Transnational Institute.34  By the time 
of the 1975-1976 budget, IPS had reduced its budget shortfall to $110,000, which the 
board considered “manageable.”35  Nonetheless, IPS faced a crisis in 1977 and 1978. 
IPS’s expenses ballooned to over one million dollars during these years. Recognizing the 
troubles that lay ahead, the IPS board of trustees decided that the “total authorized 
expenditure” for fiscal year 1977-1978 could not exceed $877,522. By February 1978, 
the IPS budget for fiscal year 1977-1978 had reached $1.5 million, with a projected 
income of only $833,800. Paying down the expected deficit meant that IPS investments, 
or endowments, would be “entirely depleted.” In addition to the “primary problem” of 
administrative costs being too high, intellectuals at IPS failed to secure outside funding.36 
Budgets, deficits, and foundation grants might seem trivial, but the financial 
difficulties experienced by IPS in the mid-1970s—a problem that would continue to 
haunt IPS through the entire period covered in this study—occurred as a result of larger 
forces both internally and externally. I analyze the outside factors here, while the 
discussion over how the internal dynamics of IPS led to the budget crisis receive attention 
later in the next chapter. Alice O’Conner has shown how conservative philanthropy and 
the foundations that dispensed their funds grew more structured and united in the 1970s. 
Additionally, within conservative circles there grew a fear of a liberal “new class” made 
                                                            
     34 Edgard Lockwood, Report of the Finance Committee, October 15, 1971, IPSR, WHS, box 82, folder 
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up of intellectuals and professionals who replaced business capitalists at the top of 
society. Worried that “new class” ideas threatened capitalism, conservatives issued a 
clarion call for conservative foundations to fund a “counterintelligentsia.”37 
Medvetz’s research on think tanks supports O’Conner’s argument. According to 
him, think tanks on the Left failed to reach the level of prominence achieved by their 
opponents on the Right because the former lacked funding from large corporations. 
Furthermore, Medvetz claims that government surveillance and the decision of many 
leftist intellectuals to go into academia weakened existing leftist think tanks and made 
them unattractive to funders. Whereas IPS received the majority of its financial support 
from the Samuel Rubin Foundation, a conservative think tank like the Heritage 
Foundation had more options. For instance, the Heritage Foundation’s “Heritage 10: 
Funding the Conservative Decade” in the 1980s brought in $37 million by 1986, most of 
it from corporations. During the campaign, 44 donors gave gifts of over $100,000.38  
Writing in the 1980s, journalist Sidney Blumenthal described this period of growth for 
conservative intellectuals in and out of think tanks as the birth of the conservative 
“counter-establishment.” Noting the recent realignment in politics, Blumenthal rejected 
the idea that the conservative resurgence had anything to do with a change in party 
structure. Rather, he argued that conservatives became the new “new class.” Conservative 
think tanks, foundations, journals, and newspapers grew in influence as campaigning 
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increasingly became non-stop and politicians required new ideas to defend their political 
positions.39 
Educating Washington’s Elites: IPS’s Seminars 
IPS’s creators decided to locate the think tank’s headquarters in Washington D.C. 
in order to play an educative role for government officials. Besides providing research to 
policymakers, IPS used seminars for congressional assistants, a practice carried over 
from the Peace Research Institute, as an educational forum. In a funding proposal, Barnet 
pointed to the ability of congressional seminars to introduce congressional assistants to 
the “subtleties” of legislation. According to Barnet, “the subtleties—which are the 
important factors in these matters—become clear only by careful study and most 
Congressmen and their assistants have not had the time for such study. (Indeed, many 
have not been aware of the existence of the subtleties.)”40 
No doubt informed by their own experiences as congressional assistants, some of 
the early fellows at IPS understood the influence aides had over congressmen. IPS held 
seminars for congressional assistants because, according to a proposal for a seminar on 
“Defense and Disarmament” in January 1964, “In almost all Congressional offices the 
legislative assistant is the person whose role it is to be the first to absorb new ideas, cope 
with new policy problems, and develop new legislative approaches.” Much like seminars 
held in college classrooms, congressional assistants would attend, over a period of ten 
weeks, seminars led by government officials and academics and discuss a set of common 
                                                            
     39 Sidney Blumenthal, The Rise of the Counter-Establishment: The Conservative Ascent to Political 
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readings. The twenty-three assistants enrolled in the program in 1965 completed readings 
related to disarmament. These seminars, Raskin explained, were intended to instill within 
the congressional assistants “a greater appreciation of why the disarmament context is a 
plausible and indeed, necessary context in which the U.S. should pursue its foreign 
policy.”41 
In its first academic year, 1963-1964, IPS also held six seminars for congressmen. 
Raskin and Barnet led a seminar titled “National Security Institutions and Disarmament;” 
Paul Goodman and Christopher Jencks conducted a seminar entitled “Innovation in 
American Education;” and Arthur Waskow and Paul Goodman organized a seminar on 
“The New Politics.”42  A little less than two years into the seminars, Raskin reported that 
about eight congressmen attended each session. He claimed that the congressmen were 
“generally enthusiastic” about the sessions and that IPS fellows “developed personal 
relationships with the Congressmen.” As a result of the “personal relationships,” IPS 
fellows were able “to initiate a variety of ideas through these members [of Congress].” 
Raskin specifically mentioned education and foreign policy as two areas in which IPS 
fellows had a hand in helping congressmen. In addition to meetings with congressmen, 
IPS held its seminars for congressional assistants. To illustrate the influence of IPS on 
Capitol Hill, Raskin quoted part of a speech given by congressman John Brademas (IN-
D), praising IPS. As a member of the Committee on Education and Labor, the 
congressman explained that his job required a level of expertise beyond the scope of his 
staff, so he turned to IPS and its seminars on education. IPS, according to Brademas, 
                                                            
     41 Proposal for IPS Seminar on “Defense and Disarmament,” no author, undated [1963], AWP, WHS, 
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provided him with “a first-class memorandum on the Administration’s education bill” 
that the congressman found to be so important that he included the information in an 
amendment that eventually passed both the Senate and the House of Representatives.43 
IPS’s congressional seminars, nonetheless, faced a series a problems that limited 
their reach. In a candid letter to Barnet, Raskin expressed his concern over the 
unwillingness of government officials to attend the seminars, or if they did attend, do the 
work required to gain valuable insight from the discussions during these events. 
Nonetheless, reflecting on the first year’s activities at the Institute, Raskin praised the 
seminars for bringing the work of the intellectuals at IPS to the attention of other 
intellectuals and government officials and often laying the groundwork for future studies. 
Attendance at the seminars, however, posed a problem. Faulting a promotional 
advertisement for offering too rosy of a picture of IPS, Donald Michael questioned the 
number of congressional names listed for a seminar conducted by the Institute. “We all 
well remember how we used to race around getting members of the Institute and good 
friends to fill up the empty seats so the couple of Congressmen that showed up wouldn’t 
feel imposed upon.” Even before Michael’s snide comment, the co-directors realized that 
IPS’s congressional seminars faced hurdles in regard to gaining the acceptance of 
government officials. “Any idea we had that busy government people or associate fellows 
would come and do serious thinking requiring study and preparation has proved to be 
misplaced,” Raskin explained. An open attendance policy, furthermore, led to the 
diminished stature of seminars. Claiming that “status considerations play an important 
part” for many when deciding whether to attend or not, Raskin argued, “One or two 
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obvious inferiors at the table are enough to send nervous GS 18’s and Assistant 
Secretaries running.” Raskin did not offer any solutions to the last point he made about 
who attended the seminars. It is surprising that given his views on democracy and 
education Raskin would even voice such a concern.44 
IPS continued to hold seminars for the rest of the 1960s, receiving positive 
reactions to the events from congressmen and their assistants.45 Republican Senator 
Charles Goodell’s legislative assistant wrote to Barnet in 1970 to tell him how much he 
“greatly appreciated the opportunity I have had to work with you on the Indochina issue” 
and mentioned that the senator, too, was “deeply grateful . . . for the invaluable advice 
and help you have given us.” Congressman John Dow (NY-D) praised IPS and 
proclaimed “we are better off to listen to the rather rare and unusual analyses that your 
group produces, which are not available elsewhere, because few others can offer that kind 
of thing.”46   
Despite the praise of congressmen and their aides, IPS abandoned the seminars in 
the early 1970s. When the Institute attempted to revive the seminars in the mid-1970s, 
Robert Borosage claimed that a “contradiction” existed between the goals of IPS and the 
attitudes of congressional staffers in regard to theory that created a lack of interest among 
for the seminars. Referring to the staffers, Borosage wrote, “They are not interested in 
                                                            
     44 Marcus Raskin to Richard Barnet, undated [likely 1964], IPSR, WHS, box 14, folder 43; Donald N. 
Michael to IPS Fellows, “Reactions to Draft Statement Describing the Institute for Policy Studies,” April 
11, 1966, AWP, WHS, box 10, folder 22. 
     45 A sampling of 1968 congressional assistants seminars included “The Impact of the Vietnam War on 
American Society,” with lectures by Raskin and Waskow; Arthur Kinoy on the “Impact of the War on Civil 
Liberties; Frank Smith of IPS speaking on “The War and the Ghetto”; Richard Barnet on “The War and the 
Mechanics of Government Policy-Making”; and David Halberstam on “The War and Politics.” See 
“Schedule for Annual Congressional Assistants Seminars,” 1968, IPSR, WHS, box 6, folder 53. 
     46 Andrew von Hirsch to Richard Barnet, December 23, 1970, IPSR, WHS, box 3, folder 3; John G. Dow 
to Marcus Raskin, December 15, 1970, IPSR, WHS, box 57, folder 8. 
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theoretical overviews, in change from the bottom or ideas which do not concern their role 
as ‘professionals.’”  Yet, as Borosage saw it, “We specifically sought to provide general 
overviews of different subjects, combined with the perspectives of activists working at a 
local level on the problem. The former tended to bore the assistants and the latter tended 
to appal [sic] them. Their notion of politics was those activities which involved elected 
officials, and they were antagonistic to those who acted outside of that framework.” 
However, trying to make the seminars more relevant by offering specific legislative 
proposals threatened IPS’s tax-exempt status.47  It is surprising that IPS attempted to 
revive the seminars at a moment in its history when, as Borosage’s comments reveal, 
many of the intellectuals at the Institute focused increasingly on issues of local 
governance. Thus, Borosage’s cautionary words offer an early glimpse into a question 
that would continue to plague IPS during these years:  should IPS intellectuals work with 
officials in the national government or concentrate their efforts on grassroots 
movements? 
Educating the Movement: IPS’s Educational Efforts 
 In addition to using seminars to educate congressmen and their assistants, IPS 
carried out its educative role by bringing students into the Institute to receive a form of 
training not available in the traditional university. IPS’s interest in education stemmed 
from its distrust of America’s educational system, which, in the opinion of IPS 
intellectuals, catered to America’s military-industrial complex. Taking education out of 
the classroom, IPS sought an educational program that, among other things, put students 
in contact with Washington policymakers instead of learning about politics through 
                                                            
     47 Robert Borosage to Richard Barnet and Marcus Raskin, 1973, IPSR, WHS, box 20, folder 30. 
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books. No doubt influenced by John Dewey’s perspective on education, IPS advocated 
active learning. In the end, IPS’s educational experiment suffered as a result of 
disorganization and a lack of interest in the project among IPS intellectuals. 
 The federal government and military, seeking scientific expertise during World 
War I, essentially drafted particular academicians rather than paying universities to 
conduct scientific research. In the 1920s, universities kept their guard up when it came to 
taking money from the federal government, relying on private philanthropies for funding. 
As private funding dried up during the Great Depression universities had to look 
elsewhere. Describing Vannevar Bush’s National Defense Research Committee (NDRC) 
as “a new generation of leadership in American science,” the historian Roger Geiger has 
shown how universities changed their outlook in the 1930s when it came to the 
relationship between the federal government and academic researchers. The NDRC took 
to “reconciling expert direction of defense research by civilian scientists with government 
funding and ultimate responsibility,” and the committee succeeded. As World War II 
drew to an end, proponents of federal funding of scientific research worried that the 
relationship between the federal government and universities would cease as well, but 
higher education continued to benefit from the largesse of the federal government for 
years to come. Geiger has referred to an “idealism toward science” that solidified the 
federal government’s role in university research funding. From the Korean War until the 
Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik, “programmatic” research, which served a specific 
military purpose, dominated the type of research conducted in universities.48 
                                                            
     48 For information on the growth of research universities during the twentieth century and the various 
kinds of research conducted at these universities, see Roger L. Geiger, Research and Relevant Knowledge: 
American Research Universities Since World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
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 Before considering IPS’s efforts to educate America’s youth outside the walls of 
academia, it is necessary to look at how IPS intellectuals judged the existing educational 
system. IPS intellectuals blamed many of the prevailing problems in society on 
universities that no longer produced knowledge for the betterment of society. As 
evidence of the “profound crisis and transformation” occurring in America, IPS’s “Five-
Year Development Plan” pointed a finger at the universities for reacting too slowly to 
America’s problems. The university could not meet the task because it was “so 
completely absorbed with the problems of its own self-preservation that it had ceased for 
all practical purposes to be a source of energy or ideas to meet the crisis of the society in 
a creative way.”49 
A part of this self-preservation, obtaining funding for research, required 
universities to conduct military research, obviously a more destructive than creative use 
of the knowledge and skills found on university campuses. Indicative of his aversion to 
defense-related research, Raskin resigned from the Panel on Educational Research and 
Development in 1965 over the panel’s lack of concern about the influence of the military 
on education. Raskin excoriated educators and researchers for serving as “handmaiden[s] 
to a program of national security which is based on thermonuclear weapons and napalm.” 
He called on the panel to “study the national security system, define what it has done to 
our education institutions . . . and redirect our energies to the reconstruction of our own 
society, which are predicated on scientific and humanistic values.”50  Waskow went so 
far as to propose reforming universities by enacting laws “distinguishing the criminal 
                                                            
     49 “A Five-Year Development Plan for the Institute for Policy Studies,” no author, undated [likely 1969], 
IPSR, WHS, box 6, folder 8. 
     50 Marcus Raskin to Donald Hornig, November 12, 1965, IPSR, WHS, box 57, folder 20. 
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from the permissible” when it came to an academic’s research. For instance, “research 
directly and clearly related to the killing of people (military, pollution-creating) is 
ethically forbidden to a scholar just as killing patients is ethically forbidden to a patient,” 
Waskow wrote. A “Court of Inquiry” would then make the determination after holding 
public hearings as to whether a professor’s research was ethical.51  Thus, lacking ethics 
and a concern for humanity, universities, in the eyes of IPS intellectuals, failed in their 
mission to both educate America’s youth and work for the betterment of society. 
 The response of the universities to the student protests of the 1960s also led IPS 
intellectuals to hold a very bleak view of these institutions of higher learning. The fact 
that universities, founded on the principle of free thought and independent inquiry, would 
limit the speech of student protestors seemed contradictory to certain IPS intellectuals. 
Explaining what he termed the “paradox” of higher education, Raskin wondered how the 
university, which depended on the rights guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution for its own 
scholarly mission, could deny students these same rights. He complained that the 
“University, which is dependent on these rights so that it can fulfill its intellectual and 
social functions to truth and civilization abrogates or cuts corners on them in practice.” 
Denied their right to free speech, Raskin wondered if it might have been more beneficial 
to let students leave the universities because “they would have more chance of freedom 
of intellectual possibility as mere citizens. . . .”52  Furthermore, as illustrated by the 
selective service system’s decision to rank students to determine eligibility for the draft, 
students lacked the ability to determine their own fate and to be included in a dialogue 
with the university about their future. In a letter to the University of Chicago Law School 
                                                            
     51 Arthur Waskow to Bob Ross, December 20, 1968, AWP, WHS, box 1, folder 10. 
     52 Marcus Raskin to William Matson Roth, December 7, 1964, IPSR, WHS, box 58, folder 10. 
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Dean, where he discusses the protests organized in 1966 and 1967 against the university’s 
decision to release its class rankings to the selective service, Raskin argued that “the 
university is not a closed system.” Raskin did not even question the use of the rankings as 
much as the complete refusal by university administrators to bring students into the 
conversation. “Powerful deans of great law schools should prepare for a changed reality 
which includes decision making power to students in those areas of their lives not 
specifically concerned with the classroom,” Raskin wrote.53   
Central to IPS’s disgust with America’s higher education system was the close 
relationship between universities and the state. Raskin derided universities for offering 
apologias for the government’s response to protests off and on campus. Whether 
revolution or reconstruction would occur depended, Raskin argued, on the position taken 
by the universities, especially the people working in these institutions, to outside events. 
In a sort of call to arms to the university community, Raskin wrote, “If the university 
class cannot distinguish existentially—and feel—between the repression of the police in 
Watts and the crying wail of misery of the Negro rioters, reconstruction cannot result, and 
it will become the velvet glove and rationalizing voice for the brutes who would manage 
the repression.”54  In other words, university professors could either stand with the 
American people or join the government in pushing back the people. If academics chose 
the latter course, revolution would ensue. 
 How did IPS propose to solve the problems of higher education? Raskin 
elucidated his thoughts on higher education in a report prepared for the American 
Council on Education in 1969. In the report, Raskin called for a much more student-
                                                            
     53 Marcus Raskin to Phil C. Neal, August 23, 1967, IPSR, WHS, box 58, folder 2. 
     54 Marcus Raskin, “Necessity and Change,” October 1966, IPSR, WHS, box 60, folder 36. 
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centered curriculum that took into account ethical judgments and, more generally, he 
demanded a university less dependent on the state. Despite a plethora of courses available 
to a student entering the university in 1969, certain requirements set by the university, 
which demanded the “tradition of scholarship or learning,” greatly limited the students’ 
options, Raskin argued. Forcing students to enroll in specific courses created “a tradition 
which says that if you want to go high in the organization, you must attach yourself to 
this particular course because the values of the corporate organization or academic guild 
are such as to demand that such courses are to be taken.”55  Raskin would later refer to 
this phenomenon as an example of the “channeling colony,” which tasked educators with 
circumscribing the occupations open to workers. 
Raskin offered several remedies for the problems plaguing American universities. 
He suggested that colleges allow a certain portion of students’ tuition to go toward hiring 
new faculty without the approval of the faculty and university administration. “The types 
of knowledges which would emerge from this group of teachers will be different from the 
kind which ordinarily come from the academic profession,” Raskin predicted. Beyond the 
hiring of new faculty, Raskin called for a total separation of the university from the state. 
Raskin, envisioned universities “operat[ing] according to rules of community which are 
written by all members who work and study within the community.” Greater coordination 
with the surrounding community would allow the university “to act outside of the needs 
of the state—but in the needs of the community.” From such a position outside of the 
state, Raskin explained, a “university would then acquire its own political purpose, which 
would be tied to the purpose of human inquiry and the solution of human problems.” The 
                                                            
     55 Marcus Raskin, “On the University,” Prepared for American Council on Education, 1969, IPSR, 
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inclusion of humane values into education would significantly alter the kinds of discourse 
currently found in most college classrooms and perhaps change society as well. “While it 
is true that teaching about violence does not mean advocating it, the fact of the matter is 
that virtually no university Social Sciences department or Government department has 
developed a program on nonviolence or nonviolent methods of relationships,” which 
slowed the process of creating “a new system of values which would show how groups 
and nations could relate to each other in associative, non-hierarchic, or non-violent 
ways.”56 
In the university conceived by Raskin, a new sort of calculus would determine 
what kind of research and teaching professors conducted. “Faculties and students will 
now have to think beyond specialized terms to ascertain the ethical value” of research. If 
universities failed to abandon specialized research and did not bring ethics into the 
classroom, Raskin doubted that a new type of knowledge would come out of universities. 
Nonetheless, he realized the difficulties involved with transforming higher education. As 
universities received the majority of their funding from the state and federal 
governments, Raskin conceded that “the likelihood of challenge by the university is small 
and consequently the development of new knowledge which brings forward a new system 
of values with the university as the source is not very great.”57 
 Dismayed by the current state of higher education, IPS chose to enter the fray, 
first cautiously and then to a greater degree. By early 1964 IPS had secured associations 
with three universities—Cornell University, Antioch College, and the University of 
Illinois. To be an Associated University, the college had to pay IPS $2,500 annually. 
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Association between IPS and the universities involved the university paying the salary for 
one of its faculty members while in residence at IPS, or having the faculty member obtain 
outside funding. A specified number of graduate students from the university would join 
the faculty member at the Institute. IPS fellows would, in return, give lectures at the 
associated universities and provide these universities with notes from the Institute’s 
seminars.58 
At the same time, IPS also took on “non-university-affiliated students.” In a 
memorandum written in late 1963, for instance, Waskow claimed that he, Bob Moses of 
the Mississippi SNCC office, and Bobbi Yancey of the Atlanta SNCC office “were 
actively moving ahead” with plans to have up to four SNCC field workers enter IPS as 
“non-university-affiliated students” for six months. Waskow declared that he “would be 
extremely unhappy for the Institute to back out of” taking on these students. “We need to 
confront their experience and understanding of what the South is,” Waskow wrote, “just 
as we need a [Paul] Goodman and a [David] Bazelon if we are not to dry up like the 
Brookings.” Waskow cautioned against IPS viewing “formal universities as the only 
educational institutions in the country.”59  Charles Sherrod of SNCC became a student at 
IPS, as did Jeremy Brecher of SDS, Charlotte Bunch-Weeks and several others. By 1967-
1968, the number of students at IPS grew to approximately twenty.60 
                                                            
     58 Richard Barnet to James G. Miller, February 24, 1964, IPSR, WHS, box 89, folder 30. 
     59 Arthur Waskow to Richard Barnet, Marcus Raskin, and Milton Kotler, December 2, 1963, AWP, 
WHS, box 8, folder 36. By late 1966, Tougaloo College, the University of California-Berkeley, and Reed 
College had become associated colleges. See Marcus Raskin to George A. Owens, October 17, 1966, IPSR, 
WHS, box 58, folder 5. 
     60 Arthur Waskow to Rena Leib, January 27, 1966, AWP, WHS, box 7, folder 2; Student List, undated 
[1966], AWP, WHS, box 7, folder 6; Institute Students, 1967-1968, AWP, WHS, box 8, folder 26. The 
majority of IPS alumni went into either academia or returned to Movement work. Out of the 44 IPS alums 
who responded to IPS’s inquiry, 13 continued to work in the Movement, either in the underground press or 
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IPS’s educational program sought to create an environment for students different 
from the traditional university. In describing the structure of IPS’s student program, a 
report noted an absence of “organized structure and predictability of most academic 
institutions,” which might “seem baffling and disturbing” to certain students. Rather than 
learning in the classroom, students received instruction through seminars with 
congressional staffers and government officials or during conversations over lunch. IPS’s 
distinctive view of students led the Institute to approach education in the manner it did. 
Waskow imagined students at IPS as “younger, less-experienced, less well-worked-out or 
worked-through ‘versions’ of the Fellows.” That being the case, Waskow favored 
“turning them loose.” Rather than teaching in the usual manner where the instructor 
provides the pupil with information, Waskow believed the purpose of the Institute was to 
provide students with “those opportunities for self-direction they have not had.”61 
While the structure of IPS’s educational program differed from ordinary 
institutions of higher learning, it did not, according to IPS intellectuals, affect the ability 
of students to learn. Waskow wrote to the American Association of University Professors 
(AAUP) in order to get IPS on the list of “approved” institutions of higher education and 
compared the “caliber of instruction” at IPS “to be at least equal” to what he experienced 
while an undergraduate at Johns Hopkins University and a graduate student at the 
University of Wisconsin. Furthermore, the level of academic freedom was, according to 
Waskow, “probably higher” at IPS than at any institution he had attended previously.62  
                                                            
that included research or writing; 4 remained at IPS; 6 began careers in various fields. “IPS Alumni—
Where They Are/What They’re Doing,” undated, AWP, box 7, folder 7. 
     61 Arthur Waskow, “Draft of IPS Annual Report,” April 20, 1966, AWP, WHS, box 7, folder 8; Arthur 
Waskow to All, “The Role of Students at the Institute,” February 28, 1967, AWP, WHS, box 7, folder 38. 
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Early on, at least, the students at IPS seemed to agree with Waskow. The three students 
enrolled at IPS in 1966, spoke glowingly about the Institute’s student program. One 
student liked being able to “get away from the academic bullshit and see what is really 
happening, which you do not get in school.” Additionally, the students reacted favorably 
to IPS’s ability to bring students into contact with exceptional personalities, the close 
relationship between tutors and students, and the many seminars, speakers, and 
conversations outside of the classroom that improved their “general education.” IPS came 
up short, however, according to one student, in getting New Left activists in the program. 
The student recommended that IPS “draw it [the student program] into immediate contact 
with a widened horizon of the New Left.”63 
Several students at IPS, however, found the program lacking. In February 1967, 
IPS student John Mitrisin, from Antioch College, offered a critique of IPS’s student 
program. Mitrisin explained that while he thought the “core seminar” led by the fellows 
“valuable,” it did not lead to the “interchange of ideas between fellows and students” as 
intended. Additionally, Mitrisin suggested limiting the number of students admitted to 
IPS to six to allow for closer relationships. In fact, already, by the fall of 1967, the 
educational role of IPS was in doubt, with a report describing the program as “in a 
muddle” by early 1968. “The Fellows,” a report noted, “did not have the time nor the 
desire to perform the teaching function that the students expected; the students, on the 
other hand, did not take the initiative to develop their own projects and research as the 
Fellows had expected.”64 
                                                            
     63 Students and the Institute, no author, undated [July 1966], AWP, WHS, box 8, folder 25. 
     64 John Mitrisin to Fellows, February 27, 1967, AWP, WHS, box 7, folder 5; “The Institute for Policy 
Studies, 1967-1968,” no author, undated, IPSR, WHS, box 105, folder 1. 
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 The promised open-ended dialogue praised by Waskow that supposedly went 
hand-in-hand with the unstructured setup of IPS’s student program did not occur. IPS 
fellows, perhaps not deliberately, simply did not perform their duties, leaving students at 
IPS isolated and without guidance. IPS’s botched attempt at creating a student program 
hampered the think tank’s ability to relate to young activist intellectuals. Had IPS fellows 
put greater effort into mentoring the young students at the Institute, the program might 
have acted as a way station for New Left activists and perhaps kept the movement, 
including IPS, going strong well into the 1970s. 
 Despite the failure of the student program, IPS set out to create a “decentralized 
Ph.D. program” at IPS in the early 1970s in a partnership with the Union Graduate 
School of Ohio.65  Otto Feinstein, the editor of New University Thought, encouraged IPS 
to create a Ph.D. program as far back as 1966. He proposed a program for those 
individuals in academia who were “left in an institutional and personal limbo in regard to 
their Ph.D.” Feinstein described many of these students as “promising types, often like 
ourselves but who would wish to function inside the usual academic structures for the 
principles of relevant inquiry which we represent.” An IPS Ph.D. would differ in that it 
would give students “the time to work on their original contribution without the course 
and other miky [sp] mouse that the bureaucratic educational institutions require.” The 
Ph.D. program existed as a partnership between IPS and Union Graduate School in 
Yellow Springs, OH and followed the thinking of Feinstein as it was “designed for the 
special kind of student who acquires knowledge and understanding in order to meet the 
                                                            
     65 Waskow described the program as such in a letter to Tema Kaiser, November 20, 1972, AWP, WHS, 
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urgent needs of the people of his society.” In addition to traditional students, the program 
welcomed workers from labor unions and community organizations.66 
Instead of basing a student’s progress toward degree on the number of courses he 
or she took, IPS looked at “the quality of the student’s work, the breadth and depth of his 
knowledge, and his ability to create and carry out projects of social value.”67  In short, 
IPS encouraged students to learn a type of knowledge applicable to society so that they 
could carry out “projects” rather than produce another manuscript destined to sit on a 
library shelf gathering dust. According to a report from the late 1970s, IPS created its 
Ph.D. program in order to increase the amount of research conducted at the Institute and 
maintain IPS’s links to the social movements that many of the students participated in 
when not in school. With this connection in mind, the report mentioned the goal of the 
Ph.D. program as “developing knowledge that is appropriate for the struggles waged by 
progressive forces, and developing ways of certifying what appropriate knowledge is.”68 
IPS’s Ph.D. program did relatively well in its first five years. By June 1975, the 
number of graduates had risen to nine out of a total of thirty-four admitted students. In 
addition to writing books, such as David Cortright’s Soldiers in Revolt, and producing 
films, graduates, a report claimed, “form a nationwide network conducting research and 
action projects from Boston to Appalachia to Detroit to Los Angeles.” Graduates of the 
program included Joseph Collins, Stanley Aronowitz, David Cortright, and Jeremy 
Brecher. By 1980, 25 students had received their doctorate from the UGS-IPS Ph.D. 
                                                            
     66 Otto Feinstein to Marcus Raskin, October 7, 1966, IPSR, WHS, box 57, folder 12; “The Ph.D. 
Program at the Institute for Policy Studies / Under the Auspices of the Union Graduate School,” undated 
[likely 1970], IPSR, WHS, box 82, folder 7. 
     67 “The Ph.D. Program at the Institute for Policy Studies / Under the Auspices of the Union Graduate 
School,” undated [likely 1970], IPSR, WHS, box 82, folder 7. 
     68 Robert Borosage, “The Institute in the Next Decade,” undated [likely 1979], IPSR, WHS, box 83, 
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program. Ph.D. awardees included Michael Klare, David Morris, Rita Mae Brown, and 
Lee Webb.69  IPS’s Ph.D. program, however, deteriorated in the late 1970s and into the 
1980s. Enrollment for 1979 totaled four students, with two more seeking acceptance into 
the program. A report predicted a total enrollment of only ten students in the coming 
years.70  Although IPS maintained its partnership with UGS, which continued to face 
accreditation issues, the former’s Ph.D. program never rebounded. For all intents and 
purposes, IPS’s Ph.D. program ceased to exist by 1985. 
Though IPS found some success with its congressional seminars and educational 
programs, both efforts ultimately came up short. In failing to keep its seminars and 
classes from going under, IPS greatly diminished its ability to reach its two most 
important audiences, congressman and their assistants and the nation’s youth. As the next 
chapter shows, IPS never could reach a decision regarding who its primary audience was, 
which greatly limited the Institute’s ability to transmit its ideas. 
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Chapter Two: A Think Tank on the Left? 
 Although this study refers to the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) as a think tank, 
and other studies on think tanks classify IPS as such, the intellectuals at the Institute 
vehemently rejected this label. Much of the work undertaken at IPS involved thinking 
and formulating ideas. At the same time, inspired by the likes of John Dewey, the 
Institute formulated ideas intended for society as a whole and not just other intellectuals. 
IPS intellectuals assessed an idea based on its relevance to society and the possibilities it 
offered for the actual reconstruction of America. Simply put, IPS did not want to replicate 
the stuffy and staid atmosphere of universities or follow the lead of think tanks that 
tailored their ideas to their sponsors. Nonetheless, IPS’s uncertain relationship with 
liberalism, and liberal politicians in power, greatly added to the Institute’s difficulties as 
it sought to devise a course of action that straddled the line between offering policy 
advice to officials in Washington and bringing ideas directly to the people. As the 1960s 
progressed, IPS found its influence waning among politicians while, simultaneously, the 
Institute found a new audience in the New Left. Thus, by the late 1960s, some 
intellectuals at IPS wondered if America needed a new political party that was more 
receptive to new ideas and the demands of the citizenry. This chapter has two sections. 
First I look at how IPS fellows understood their role as intellectuals, and then I turn to 
IPS’s relationship with liberalism. 
The Intellectual and Activist As One: The Public Scholar at IPS  
The hard sciences prospered in the 1930s due to high levels of federal funding. 
Social scientists, on the other hand, struggled to obtain the same sort of support from 
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government coffers. As Mark Solovey has shown, the social sciences took a backseat to 
the natural sciences from the 1930s up to World War II. Vannevar Bush’s role in 
formulating government guidelines for federal funding of research, particularly in a 
report for President Roosevelt, led to the diminished stature of the social sciences. 
Guided by the National Academy of Sciences, which tended to avoid social science 
research, Bush did not include the social sciences in his report to Roosevelt. Through 
World War II, according to Solovey, social scientists “were overshadowed by the 
wizardry of the ‘hard sciences.’”  Moreover, social scientists dominated the National 
Resources Planning Board, which researched ways to expand America’s social welfare 
programs. The involvement of social scientists on the planning board explained the lack 
of funding put aside for the social sciences. Conservatives linked social scientists to New 
Deal programs and derided social science research as unscientific, and therefore refused 
to allocate funds to such research. Yet Truman ultimately ignored Bush’s advice. Solovey 
has surmised that Truman made the decision in September 1945 to promote social 
science research because of his predecessor’s vocal support for many of the National 
Resources Planning Board’s ideas. Disdain for the social sciences, especially among 
conservatives, nonetheless, never disappeared and set the stage for later disputes. The 
National Science Foundation gave ever-larger amounts of funding for social science 
research by the early 1960s, but, according to Solovey, it was “always within well-
defined boundaries that emphasized the strictly scientific character of NSF-funded 
research.”1   
                                                            
     1 Mark Solovey, Shaky Foundations: The Politics-Patronage-Social Science Nexus in Cold War America 
(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2013), 24-26, 156. For information on the social sciences in 
America prior to the 1930s, see Dorothy Ross, The Origins of American Social Science (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
      72 
 
 
Seeking funds for their research, many social scientists turned to the military. In 
addition to their work at universities, social scientists conducted much of their research at 
institutes only loosely connected to an academic institution. One historian of these 
research institutes, Joy Rohde, has described them as existing within a “scholarly and 
bureaucratic gray area” between academia and the federal bureaucracy. Furthermore, it 
was “a physical institutional space” where academics could collaborate with military 
officials to solve military problems. At the same time, Rohde suggests, more abstractly, 
that places like the Special Operations Research Office at American University carried 
out their activities in “a cultural and intellectual space where military and scholarly 
worldviews, conventions, and ideas met, clashed, and merged.” Social scientists, 
furthermore, Rohde argues, advocated a “strict separation of means from ends,” which 
made it possible for them to claim neutrality in their work while ignoring how the U.S. 
military used their research. These scientists, as a result, by focusing on “methods” rather 
than “goals,” could ignore the fact that they served the interests of the national security 
state.2 
IPS, not surprisingly, held so-called defense intellectuals in low esteem. In fact, 
Raskin, in a New York Review of Books essay, set off a debate by labeling social scientists 
and other intellectuals working at the behest of the federal government “megadeath 
intellectuals.” Discussing the growth in government-funded military-related research 
                                                            
     2 Joy Rohde, Armed With Expertise: The Militarization of American Social Research During the Cold 
War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 23, 46. While the protests against defense-related studies at 
universities in the 1960s led to military research moving away from college campuses, this privatization 
had far more negative consequences for America. Freed from concerns over value-free research, and more 
willing to produce studies supportive of government defense policies to obtain limited funding, social 
scientists dropped any oppositional tendencies they once held. By the 1970s, according to Rohde, defense 
social scientists “became servants of power; they produced knowledge that by design openly and 
unquestionably affirmed the Cold War status quo.” See Rohde, 127. 
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among university professors, Raskin claimed “that their most important function is to 
justify and extend the existence of their employers.” Although professors had taken part 
in military research since the beginning of the Cold War, the use of scholarly studies to 
defend nuclear war and develop nuclear strategy reached a ground-swell during 
Eisenhower’s presidency. As nuclear weapons and missiles replaced conventional armies, 
Raskin argued that “military and industrial leaders needed some kind of theory to 
rationalize their use: they had to prove, in short, that nuclear war was a practical 
enterprise which could serve the political ends of the state.” Comparing these “specialists 
in violence” to “Madison Avenue hucksters,” Raskin explained the need for “examining 
the motives of the men” involved in defense-related research to get to the root cause of 
the arms race. Once these motivations came to the surface, Raskin argued, it would then, 
and only then, be possible to begin debate on arms control. “A useful arms debate,” he 
explained, “can take place only when we are willing to recognize who is capable of 
thinking independently and who is not, and why,” which, he claimed, did not yet exist.3 
Although the influence of foreign policy intellectuals grew to great heights during 
the Kennedy presidency with its “whiz kids,” critics called Raskin to task for his 
sweeping judgement of intellectuals. Albert Wohlstetter chided Raskin for his “self-
righteous chiliasm” and moralistic categorization of intellectuals. In reference to Raskin’s 
argument, Wohlstetter wrote, “There are only the good guys: Raskin, Waskow, and 
several others; and then there is a large conspiracy of the insane, the insincere and the 
impure, worthy not of refutation but only of exposure.” Wohlstetter pointed to 
intellectuals like Jerome Weisner and George Kistiakowsky, who either “consulted” or 
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“advised” the military, or “had investments of their own in defense industry” while 
speaking out against the arms race. For Wohlstetter, it was inconceivable to think that 
defense intellectuals formulated strategies for nuclear war solely as a cover for America’s 
expanding nuclear arsenals. “This fantasy,” he claimed, “has all the veracity of the 
Protocols of Zion and rather less than that of De la Hodde’s conspiratorial Histoire des 
Societes Secretes.”4 
Intellectuals at IPS saw it as their duty to counteract the type of research 
conducted by social scientists in universities and research centers. Raskin, for instance, 
pushed for the inclusion of values into social science research and an opening up of the 
discipline to allow for more diverse opinions. His thinking on the subject owed much to 
the student protests of the 1960s. “The social science of search and action, that is, a 
pragmatic social science which goes beyond numerical calculation and statistics has been 
strengthened greatly by the risk taking and populist formulations of the student and 
protest movements,” Raskin explained in 1966. He contended that participants in the new 
movements carried out their activities “in horizontal rather than vertical relationships.” 
The latter types of relationships, common in business, military, and government 
institutions, depended on a hierarchical structure with clear chains of command. The 
former, on the other hand, allowed for “human associations based on equality of 
membership and participation,” both of which were central tenets of democracy.5  Raskin 
wanted to bring the values he saw in the student movement into the social sciences. 
As a “five-year development plan” from the late 1960s suggested, IPS thought 
that it could serve as a leader in the movement for a new social science. IPS could “play a 
                                                            
     4 Albert Wohlstetter, “Letters: Arms Debate,” The New York Review of Books, December 26, 1963, 18. 
     5 Marcus Raskin, “Necessity and Change,” October 1966, IPSR, WHS, box 60, folder 36, 1-2. 
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unique role” in the social sciences because IPS fellows were “viewed by many in the 
social sciences as unmatched by any American university political science and 
government faculty. . . .” Secondly, the plan pointed out, “Both the established forces of 
the society and insurgent groups have used the Institute as a source of ideas.” 
Furthermore, referring to recent efforts to form a “praxis” combining existentialism and 
pragmatism, the plan made the bold assertion “that the next decade in the social sciences 
could be as exciting and inventive for the social sciences as was the period in the first 
part of the twentieth century for physics.”6 
Not surprisingly, given the fact that IPS partly owed its existence to the Peace 
Research Institute, the think tank considered itself a center for peace research. Yet IPS, 
for pragmatic reasons, avoided limiting its research to matters of peace. When Irving 
Laucks of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions asked for Waskow’s 
opinion on starting a research foundation devoted to peace and funded by wealthy 
businessmen, the latter offered words of caution. Several prominent businessmen 
opposed U.S. foreign policy, Waskow conceded, but they were usually “dubious about 
freewheeling research that comes up with unorthodox approaches or to be nervous about 
opposing their own government’s policies ‘in the crunch.’”  Waskow thought that IPS 
had an advantage in “being in the whole policy business, as against the peace-only 
business” so that “even during a foreign-policy crisis like Viet-Nam, somebody at the 
Institute is working on something that people in the government, businessmen, etc., 
like—so we are never all in bad at the same time.” In comparison, while at PRI during 
the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, “we all worked our heads off on that at 
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the same time,” Waskow explained, “and a lot of people therefore got mad at all of us at 
the same time.” Following the crisis, PRI had even more difficulty raising funds, which 
Waskow ascribed to the think tank’s disregard for issues beyond war and peace.7 
The way the Institute conducted research also distinguished IPS from traditional 
research centers. Noting the recent explosion of interest in peace research, one critic 
lambasted such studies. The Peace Research Movement, a term he borrowed from 
Kenneth Boulding, “created an informal but nevertheless useful counterweight in 
government circles to the New Civilian Militarists and their more saber-rattling allies,” 
but peace researchers also, he claimed, remained too attached to the Establishment. In 
particular, he lamented that peace researchers focused on political leaders at the expense 
of the “masses of people.” “Even when the masses are subjected to study . . . it is with a 
view to seeing how their opinions can be brought to bear on decision-makers, rather than 
how to intervene themselves, as people.” Concerned with “helping the elite adjust the 
system,” peace researchers tended to hide “the real roots of international conflict” and 
thus prevented disarmament, the commentator argued.8 
Waskow’s response to such criticism offers insight into how he and others at IPS 
saw their roles as public scholars. Referring to peace researchers, Waskow wrote that 
“these men do not think that just because they have refused to be whores of the 
Establishment they must undergo a shotgun wedding with one or another revolutionary 
party. Most peace researchers are not prepared to mouth anyone’s slogans. They demand 
to find out.” In order to show how peace research “would be made useful,” Waskow 
described the research techniques of scholars in the field. After coming up with a theory 
                                                            
     7 Arthur Waskow to Irving F. Laucks, August 5, 1965, AWP, WHS, box 5, folder 4. 
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or hypothesis, Waskow explained, peace researchers turned to “model-building” and 
“small-group research” as a means to surmise how officials would respond to particular 
events. Researchers then placed these models alongside historical events that mirrored the 
circumstances of the model to determine the likely success of the hypothetical plan. Once 
researchers obtained “considerably higher confidence” in their hypothesis, they could 
then begin “action experiments” where “particular small areas of the world would be 
disarmed according to the principles suggested by the peace research already done.” 
Following this trial run, it would then be “politically and intellectually possible to create 
new world policies.” Therefore, peace researchers could not simply offer their support for 
whatever revolutionary proposal was fashionable at the time.9  In other words, while IPS 
would not grovel before the government, neither would it pander to activists seeking any 
scholarly defense, regardless of its applicability, for their actions. Additionally, 
Waskow’s description of “action experiments” highlights how he and IPS planned on 
presenting their ideas to the public.  
The debate over peace research in the pages of Dissent is relevant to IPS because 
the Institute constantly deliberated over the fine line it walked between serving the 
government and the people. Barnet looked at the type of intellectual who joined IPS and 
found that the questions pursued by these scholars protected them from getting too close 
to the government. Speaking before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights in 
1971, Barnet distinguished the “public scholar” found at IPS from other kinds of 
researchers. “He is a trained observer and analyst of the operations of government who 
communicates his findings to the public,” Barnet explained. Not working directly for the 
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government or with funding from the government, the public scholar’s “constituency is 
not the government itself.” “Unlike the pure academic, the public scholar does not gather 
information or make analyses primarily to educate specialists or other scholars but to 
make available to all citizens information helpful to them in making up their own minds 
on critical public questions,” Barnet told the senators.10  The public scholar’s importance 
grew as society became more complex. 
Reminding the subcommittee of the founding fathers’ insistence that America 
have a protected free press, Barnet claimed that public scholars served in a similar 
capacity as journalists. In fact, as matters both domestic and foreign became more 
complicated, public scholars could offer a more thorough explication of events. “The 
operations of government have become so vast, the issues so intertwined that the 
investigative reporter with a daily headline cannot adequately serve the public’s right to 
know,” Barnet told the subcommittee. In these situations, therefore, the public scholar 
would be able to use his or her skills to keep the public informed of government 
activities.11  IPS clearly wanted to influence the thinking of government officials, but as 
Barnet’s description of public scholars makes clear, intellectuals at IPS had a duty to 
educate the public and enhance their ability to make informed decisions as citizens of a 
more democratic republic. 
Returning to the point made by Waskow in Dissent regarding “action 
experiments,” his description illustrates how Deweyan logic guided the research carried 
out at IPS and allowed for theory and practice to go hand in hand. Barnet, sounding very 
                                                            
     10 “Remarks of Richard J. Barnet Before Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights,” September 29, 
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much like Waskow, explained that the research conducted at IPS did not involve “idle 
concerns of the Academy divorced from the practical world, nor on the other hand does 
the Institute act as a servicer to the powerful.” Rather, IPS supported a type of education 
that valued “participation in the practical world using highly theoretical and very 
practical ideas.” At the same time, IPS saw itself acting as an intermediary for 
government officials and activists. In its early years, according to a 1987 discussion 
memo, IPS was “founded on the theory that ideas have their own legs, that challenging 
perspectives would draw interest and energy from liberal legislators and executive 
officers.” When the various social movements gained momentum in the 1960s, IPS 
“became a bridge between the demands of citizen movements and Washington.” Karl 
Hess explained the unique space IPS filled when he imagined how the Institute might 
have conducted itself during America’s revolutionary era. Highlighting the binary quality 
of IPS activities, he remarked, “If this were 1773, and the city were Boston, the Institute 
would be holding a seminar on British Imperialism. There would be tables and charts to 
show the injustice of the tax on tea. Probably somebody from the Governor’s office 
would be invited. Then, independent of the Institute, six or seven of the fellows would go 
out and dump a shipload of tea into Boston Harbor.”12  IPS sought to combine theory and 
activism, but, as internal debates and a near break-up of the Institute illustrated, the think 
tank faced an uphill battle. 
IPS always struggled to remain relevant in the halls of power while still speaking 
with and for the average citizen. Writing in the mid-1960s, Burlage expressed concern 
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“about making practical proposals to government without their emerging from and 
relative to political movement.” Working too closely with the government, Burlage 
feared would make IPS intellectuals more hesitant to offer innovative ideas and stray too 
far from the activists on the street. IPS needed the support of movement people because, 
Burlage asserted, “Without feet, ideas become the rhetoric of co-optation.” Moreover, 
Burlage offered an early word of caution against IPS becoming too intellectual and losing 
touch with everyday people. “We must declare our purpose to be the study and 
demonstration of the policy of publics, not Public Policy in the old, clogged, established 
channels which are at best only potential arenas if they relate to the people not vice 
versa,” Burlage explained. Hoping to prevent his own work from becoming too 
conventional, Burlage began a study on regional development in Appalachia and became 
actively involved in the region both intellectually and through activism. Don McKelvey 
agreed with Burlage when the former wrote in 1966 that “organizing people is more 
important than peddling ideas.” Rather than “developing ideas to bombard one or another 
(real or potential) elite,” McKelvey wanted to focus on organizing people, particularly the 
middle-class.13 
Some IPS fellows also worried that the Institute would cease to retain its radical 
edge if it did not bring in new blood. Writing in 1970, Waskow described IPS in its early 
years as “a White Male Uppermiddleclass Leader enclave” that eventually opened up its 
doors to “some Blacks but not women, the anti-military youth or middle-class, the 
Yippies, or consumers.” When he wrote the letter in 1970, Waskow noticed a return to 
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“the White Male Uppermiddleclass Leader syndrome.” The social makeup of the Institute 
had the effect of “getting so much out of touch with the newer movements that we do not 
understand them and cannot be of much use to them; and getting even more dangerously 
into High Analysis and out of touch with ourselves—i.e., our own situations, desires, and 
oppressions.” It was too late for IPS to allow intellectuals linked to these diverse groups 
into the think tank. So as an alternative Waskow recommended “analytical-political work 
in communities where we can easily identify with felt needs and oppressions, i.e. work 
not in the Super-Analysis of the Whole World . . . but work in Part of the World.” Such 
an approach, Waskow claimed, would allow for “reattachment to real life, real sufferings, 
and real empirical data.”14 
In other words, IPS, according to Waskow, had turned into an island of high-
minded thinkers who had little value to the average student, worker, minority, or any 
other abject soul in America. Waskow, as a result, even though he had expressed some 
misgivings about such an approach, began arguing for a greater female presence at the 
Institute. Additionally, and representative of a larger move within the Institute, Waskow 
advocated a move toward conducting research for activists at the local level, rather than 
attempting to provide a “Super-Analysis of the Whole World.” The growing interest in 
local activism at IPS served as a point of contention between the co-directors and their 
supporters and the fellows more interested in grassroots organizing. Eventually, the 
differences between the two groups led to the union struggles at IPS in the late 1970s. 
Borosage, while still working at the Center for National Security Studies and 
under consideration for a job as program director at IPS, offered his view on the debate at 
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IPS in the late 1970s. Borosage envisioned IPS’s role as something more than just an idea 
factory. “Unlike Marcus [Raskin],” Borosage wrote, “I am not convinced that ideas can 
create motion and politics in a society; intellectual work too often is for posterity rather 
than for use.” Borosage called on IPS to look beyond the “mainstream institutions” and 
pay greater attention to “citizen action,” “union insurgencies,” and alternatives to the 
Republican and Democratic Parties. Referring to the Left in its various forms, Borosage 
claimed that “IPS should now relate to [it], seeking to serve the needs of such groups for 
research and ideas, and helping to define an evolving vision and program for a 
democratic, locally controlled, civilian society at peace.” Describing IPS as “a place of 
intellectuals, not of researchers or policy analysts who relate to groups in motion,” 
Borosage suggested greater interaction with activist organizations. IPS, Borosage 
claimed, could “provide factual backup and program ideas to fit the needs of groups 
organizing in the country.”15   
The issue of IPS’s institutional identity came to a head in 1977 when a number of 
IPS fellows formed a union. Four years earlier, these same fellows expressed concerns 
that only grew larger and ultimately led to their decision to form a union. Though 
straying from the formula that had guided IPS since it opened in 1963, which saw the 
Institute as a center for creating new ideas for the government, the report claimed that the 
Institute had no choice but evolve to meet the changing circumstances in Washington. 
The difficulty for IPS had to do with the “transformation from an easily definable, highly 
focused group of people,” whether government officials or Movement leaders, to a less 
clear and more varied group of people. With each fellow dealing with one component of 
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these varied groups, the coherence that once existed at IPS had disappeared. As a result, 
the donors, hearing only what Barnet and Raskin were researching, “understood less and 
less of what was going on at IPS, and became less and less willing to give.” The report 
advised IPS against going the route of the New Left, which responded to the multifaceted 
nature of the Movement, the authors of the report claimed, by choosing to “retreat to 
vulgar Marxism,” which eventually “shattered SDS and other New Left organizational 
forms, while leaving people still coping with the variousness, but without any effective 
connections to each other.”16 With their concerns still unmet in late 1976, several IPS 
fellows announced the formation of the Union of Fellows and Faculty in affiliation with 
the American Federation of Teachers. The firings, salary reductions, and staff cuts 
proposed by the Board of Trustees and supported by the co-directors, the union members 
claimed, targeted the fellows “most involved with grassroots networks, communities, and 
movements, and with interconnecting them toward a process of social transformation” 
rather than traditional intellectual pursuits. Such activism could not be “easily shifted 
around to fit into the mercurial definition of Management’s program.”17   
The complaints over the dearth of women fellows at IPS, which also became an 
issue in the 1970s, served as evidence of the new direction that many intellectuals at IPS 
took in the 1970s. Women were described in the report as being “among the most vital 
and effective leaders in the new more decentral movements of all kinds that are emerging 
in the country, and IPS as a ‘bridge’ to these new energies looks and is of questionable 
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effectiveness because of its own strong male bias.” Though the authors of the report 
commended IPS for setting aside $7,000 to bring nine women to IPS as associate fellows 
for one or two-week periods, the report found IPS’s efforts generally “insufficient.”18  
The creation of the Transnational Institute only exacerbated the tension between 
proponents of a domestic program that emphasized decentralization in America and 
supporters of a more transnational perspective for IPS. “A Statement on Institute 
Priorities” circulated in 1976 lamented that “IPS will be an institution with not much 
more than a foreign-oriented program, with little domestic relevance.” While agreeing 
that IPS needed to retain its transnational identity, the statement cautioned that “there is 
an inherent danger in an institution such as ours become [sic] a single-interest 
transnational institution.” To focus entirely on international affairs would make IPS “ever 
more irrelevant to the political process in America.” Furthermore, completely ignoring 
domestic issues weakened IPS’s ability to influence foreign policy. “And the many 
groups who are struggling in their own communities for a better life will only support our 
efforts to alter American foreign policy if we have been working with them in support of 
their needs as well,” the statement explained.19 
Christopher Jencks, an original fellow, attempted to explain the larger 
ramifications behind the present debate over the budget and salaries in a letter to IPS 
trustee Peter Weiss. Dividing IPS into the “haves,” who easily found financial support 
outside of the Institute, and the “have-nots,” who found less success in such ventures, 
Jencks argued that the two groups also differed in more profound ways. Jencks described 
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the “haves” as being “almost entirely engaged in work on ‘public policy’ questions—
work of the kind that we originally expected everyone at IPS to do, and which led to the 
choice of its name.” By the late 1960s, though, many of the fellows at IPS offered a 
“competing notion” of the purpose of the think tank. The fellows associated with this 
group, Jencks wrote, “were not [to] be policy analysts who wrote books, ran seminars for 
Congressmen, held forth on TV, and generally tried to become intellectual celebrities 
with personal influence.” These fellows took a more activist approach as “political 
organizers” looking to make possible “bottom-up political change.” Such a division 
directly paralleled the dispute over fundraising and salaries. “The money raised for the 
Institute has been raised largely by those who saw themselves and the Institute primarily 
as a place for generating ideas rather than by those who saw the Institute as a center for 
political organizing,” Jencks wrote. While arguing “that the Institute is basically the 
Fellows, not the Trustees or the Co-Directors,” Jencks nonetheless sided with the co-
directors by claiming that the funding of political organizing projects had to come from 
outside sources, mainly the groups they sought to organize.20 
Speaking in terms of finances, the co-directors looked at the dispute as a 
fundraising issue. At the same time, their remarks about the union members offer 
evidence of a change in the perspectives of Barnet and Raskin regarding theory and 
action. IPS served as a refuge for both activists and scholars, with the two often 
collaborating in order to transform both the citizenry’s mind and society. By the late 
1970s, however, the co-directors reached the conclusion that activism had replaced the 
search for knowledge at IPS and caused the current financial difficulties at the Institute. 
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Barnet and Raskin blamed the “crisis” at IPS on differing philosophies about what 
purpose the Institute served in society. According to the co-directors, the “original 
model” had it that IPS would “concentrate on analysis and public education on the most 
crucial policy areas—foreign and military policy, development of economic alternatives, 
democratization of state bureaucracies, factories, neighborhoods, media and schools.” 
Recently, the co-directors lamented, IPS had failed to offer much of anything to 
policymakers. “We have access in the press, with the leadership in Congress and with 
many high officials in the new administration to do this but despite the enormous budget 
we don’t have the people who will work as a team to make it happen,” the co-directors 
remarked.21 
Noting the union’s preference for more action-oriented work, the co-directors 
explained that the “crisis” led them to a revised understanding of how IPS needed to 
function. The co-directors admitted that they had erred in thinking “that IPS could be 
infinitely eclectic, that organizers and scholars would enrich each other’s efforts, and that 
the same institution could carry on activities at the community as well as at the national 
level.” Following recent events, the co-directors reached the conclusion, “In theory that 
was correct. In practice it turned out to be ‘grandiose,’ as some of our critics said. We 
have limited amounts of money. We have very important things to do as an institution. 
We have to make choices.” To deal with the limitations, the co-directors suggested 
having Robert Borosage join IPS as a program director to create “a coherent, financially 
viable, program.” While claiming that such efforts would “sharpen the focus of IPS,” the 
co-directors, apparently without understanding why their comment might anger certain 
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fellows, explained that Borosage, following discussions with IPS fellows, came up with a 
compromise in which “non-priority matters,” under which they included “lesbian 
feminism and religious organizing” would receive a “reduced rate” of funding. The co-
directors portrayed the “crisis” as a “confrontation between unaccountable privilege and 
our common obligation as an Institute to serve the country.”22 
Raskin and Barnet did not absolve themselves when considering the Institute’s 
current state. They admitted that “we psychologically ran away, masking our feelings, 
encouraging levels of fantasy among them [the fellows] and ourselves, that did the 
Institute or themselves no good.” The co-directors also pointed to inadequacies in their 
leadership, which created a toxic environment at the Institute. “Distinguished scholars, 
intellectuals, and political leaders have been treated with suspicion, purity tests, or 
wrongheaded notions that nothing could be learned from ‘them.’  Instead, we embraced 
notions of constituency so that people began to see the Institute as a palace court where 
‘constituencies’ were represented . . . ,” Raskin and Barnet charged. In the process, 
Raskin and Barnet claimed, IPS “turned away some of the most gifted and creative, the 
most politically knowledgeable,” which had far reaching consequences both 
economically and otherwise for the Institute. Raskin and Barnet specifically mentioned 
Herbert Marcuse, Hannah Arendt, Erving Goffman, Francis Fox Piven, Karl Hess, and 
Angela Davis as intellectuals rejected as possible fellows. Blocking prominent 
intellectuals from joining the Institute, according to Raskin and Barnet, “resulted in our 
own deadening intellectually and an embracing of an increasingly sloganized or 
specialized political point of view which does not relate centrally to what we believe are 
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the critical questions of this time.” Additionally, certain fellows “encouraged a process 
which let people believe that we were involved in a Utopian experiment with few reality 
principles.” Without an overlapping vision and purpose, Barnet and Raskin believed that 
IPS “became the stopping-off place to pick up a check and gossip.” Moreover, the co-
directors lamented, “we acquiesced in talk about ‘organizing,’ using that term as if it 
were a term of art.”23 
Whereas the co-directors believed that activism diminished the quality of 
intellectual production at IPS, union members claimed that they, by fusing thought and 
action, they remained true to IPS’s roots. Using an argument employed by supporters of 
the New Politics, or identity politics, predominant within the Left in the late 1960s and 
1970s, members of the IPS union argued that, as originally construed, IPS “began as an 
amalgam of domestic and international policy, with a strong emphasis on social 
transformation and on work with citizen groups and movements. . . .” Raskin, Barnet, and 
certain other fellows, the union members claimed, wanted to end this “amalgam” in order 
to prioritize their “specialized work” at IPS. Noting the influence that IPS fellows had 
had on “Black, labor, feminist, Jewish, peace, religious, and natural resource activist 
communities,” the union argued that to “fire” fellows associated with such movements 
“would make its [IPS’s] own Fellows white-only, almost male-only, and elite-oriented.”24 
Years later, the co-directors, while cognizant of the need to link with social 
movements in order to remain relevant, cautioned that the Institute had to maintain a 
separate identity from protest groups. Barnet and Raskin repeatedly made it clear that 
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they did not want the tail, or social movements, to wag the dog, meaning IPS. During a 
“needs assessment” meeting in 1986, the minutes describe Raskin as saying, “IPS has 
been an island of freedom in the movements of the past two decades,” continually 
making itself available to activists. He pointed to “Aristotle’s Academy, the Frankfurt 
Institute in Weimar Germany, which failed because it didn’t really relate effectively to 
society.” Nonetheless, Raskin referred to a “tension between critical engagement and 
critical distance from those movements [that] will continue to be before us.” In fact, 
during an interview conducted in the late 1990s, Raskin reiterated the need for a healthy 
distance between IPS and the various social movements that sprung up during the 
Institute’s time in Washington. Raskin explained that “we viewed ourselves as not being 
of the movement, not being part of any particular movement.” Viewing the Institute with 
an eye towards the future, he portrayed social movements as temporary “fashions” that 
changed with the times. Therefore, he favored supporting such movements, but not at the 
expense of keeping IPS running. He explained “that you have to find a way of protecting 
them [IPS and other institutes], so that in fact those movements, and ones to come in the 
future, will have a place to be.” Barnet agreed, claiming that “the independence of the 
institute was the most critical factor” in deciding how to relate to the movements of the 
period. “If we were part of the movements, or ‘serving’ the movements, we would be 
hurting the institute, and ultimately we would be hurting the movement.”25 
                                                            
     25 “Easel Pad Notes from Needs Assessment Meeting,” January 31-February 1, 1986, IPSR, WHS, box 
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References to practicality and real world applicability pepper the work and 
correspondence of almost every intellectual at IPS. This aspect of IPS makes 
classification of the Institute as a think tank problematical. Writing in 1968, Waskow 
made a strong case for what differentiated IPS from other think tanks and academic 
settings. In comparison to other research institutes, IPS was “committed to the idea that to 
develop social theory one must be involved in social action and in social experiment. And 
therefore, the Institute stands on the bare edge of custom in the United States as to what 
an educational research institution is, as against what a political institution is. By standing 
on that bare edge, it creates tension.” In other words, Waskow did not believe that theory 
could exist on its own. Theory, once formulated, had to undergo experimentation to see if 
it stood up to reality. Tasked with carrying out its research in such a way, IPS separated 
itself from other institutes. As a result, “rather than going to universities and arguing for 
it, rather than going into foundations and suggesting that they set up study committees to 
create, we did it.” Once academics and politicians witnessed how IPS’s ideas played out 
in real world situations, they would have no choice but to accept the proposals put forth 
by the Institute, Waskow claimed.26 
Distressed by the current state of the social sciences, intellectuals at IPS also 
sought to distinguish the Institute as something other than a think tank. Waskow, as an 
example, held the word itself in disdain, claiming years later that it made IPS “mad” to be 
labeled as such. “The think tanks were political, very political,” he later remarked, “but 
                                                            
and political support for alternatives to the reactionary consensus, not on law suits and internal bickering.” 
When Borosage became director of IPS on January 1, 1978, Raskin and Barnet stayed on at IPS as 
Distinguished Fellows with “a university professor salary,” dependent on fundraising. See Richard J. 
Barnet to Mr. and Mrs. Philip Lilienthal, October 21, 1977, IPSR, WHS, box 5, folder 14; “Richard J 
Barnet Positions on Raskin Questions,” undated [likely 1977], IPSR, WHS, box 12, folder 26.  
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they were all in service of the government. The Brookings Institution was paid for with 
government contracts and grants. The Hudson Institute was the Air Force’s think tank—
they were a think tank—they thought on behalf of the Air Force, they were paid by the 
Air Force, the politics they did was all pro-Air Force.” Conversely, at IPS, Waskow said, 
“We were totally un-dependent on the government, we would not take money from the 
government. We were critical of the government and our constituency was basically the 
people, the Movement even more than the people.”27  While such blanket statements 
necessarily circumscribe the activities of think tanks, the fact that Waskow and other 
intellectuals felt the way they did goes a long way in explaining why IPS distanced itself 
from other research institutes. 
As later chapters show in greater detail, putting ideas into action, through the 
creation of what Raskin called “projects,” not only served as a way to differentiate IPS 
from other think tanks, but also accomplish IPS’s goal of reconstructing America. IPS 
intellectuals argued that ideas on their own rarely accomplished anything in the political 
realm. Changing society required putting ideas into action. Detailing IPS’s approach to 
“institutional reconstruction,” Barnet pointed to the construction of alternative institutions 
as the first step toward changing America. Once built, public support for the new 
structures would follow if they offered a viable alternative capable of solving America’s 
economic ills. In Barnet’s opinion, without “public support for an alternative vision I see 
no way of enlisting the political strength to unseat the obstructionists in Congress or to 
change the rules under which they perpetuate the collapsing status quo.” Taking ideas 
from the page and making them real, furthermore, prevented intellectuals from 
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developing outlandish theories with no practical application. Waskow argued that “if one 
imports into the present an image of the future so threateningly alien that it is not allowed 
to persist more than a week and a half, then one is not likely to have done much to change 
the future.” This does not sound like a revolutionary seeking the total destruction of 
America. Rather, Waskow’s thinking resonated with Deweyan pragmatism. In fact, 
Waskow claimed that his strategy was “like the process of science at its best: hypothesis, 
experiment, new hypothesis—always knowing that no theory is ‘the truth,’ but only a 
useful and beautiful way of understanding and reshaping the complex reality.” Therefore, 
pragmatism guided IPS intellectuals and kept the Institute from straying too far from the 
American grain. A 1968 promotional statement described IPS as “try[ing] to be radical in 
perceiving the need for change, visionary in conceiving alternatives to present policy, and 
practical in developing alternatives.”28   
Undergirded by a desire to create a more democratic society, the intellectuals at 
IPS often felt uncomfortable with their role as intellectuals and how they related to the 
citizenry. In this sense, IPS mirrored the attitude of C. Wright Mills. Referring to the 
sociologist, Kevin Mattson has argued that Mills avoided “vanguardism and Jamesian 
elitism” by having the intellectual exist between powerful leaders on the one end and 
democratic publics on the other. For Mills, intellectuals would provide the people with 
the knowledge to make their own decisions.29  Evincing a similar attitude, an IPS 
program report in the mid-1970s remarked that “political and social theory tends to be 
                                                            
     28 Richard Barnet to Howard Samuels, March 15, 1971, IPSR, WHS, box 88, folder 33; Arthur Waskow, 
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metaphysical unless it relates to practice,” but IPS could not push particular strategies on 
receptive subjects. For instance, the report explained, “Institute Fellows continue in the 
intellectual stimulation of new projects which start from the assumption that the only way 
to develop meaningful and lasting change is to encourage people to light their own flame 
and to develop projects and programs that will relate their work to the work of others.” 
The report offered several ways to accomplish this task. IPS would “bring forward new 
ideas and programs from the grassroots for managing local, national and transnational 
affairs,” with a particular emphasis on “a national network outside electoral politics 
which looks at issues in a critical and fundamental way,” distinct from beltway 
politicians. The changes advocated by IPS, though, required “a new form of democratic 
education” involving the citizenry.30 
Michael Maccoby specifically addressed the issue of vanguardism in 1975. He 
thought that IPS needed to initiate discussion on alternative policies for America rather 
than determining policies on its own. “This is not the time for manifestos asking 
everyone to sign onto the ideology of ‘vanguard’ intellectuals” Maccoby wrote. Though 
important, the expertise of intellectuals had to be, Maccoby claimed, combined with the 
insights of local citizens. Christopher Jencks, too, questioned whether IPS should attempt 
to guide the transformation of America by offering sage advice to the masses. Discussing 
the Institute’s future, Jencks argued that IPS should continue to follow the “traditional 
role of intellectuals,” which involved formulating strategy for “improving the lives of 
other people” while still allowing them to choose the route taken for transforming their 
lives. Jencks rejected the idea that IPS intellectuals should act as the “vanguard” for these 
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other groups. Instead, he believed that the Institute needed to “concentrate on what we 
can do for ourselves” and “focus on problems which we ourselves have helped create.” 
Among the problems listed by Jencks were foreign policy, “the organization of work,” 
particularly in universities and other professional jobs, and the “socialization of the 
young,” which included personal issues such as gender roles and familial relations.31  
Thus, Jencks went the furthest in arguing against the notion that IPS could speak for 
groups that differed greatly from the well-educated intellectuals who made up the 
majority of IPS fellows. 
Even though the very name itself, Institute for Policy Studies, signified a certain 
level of expertise and interest in setting, or at least influencing, policy, the co-directors, 
particularly Raskin, did not feel comfortable with the term policy sciences. Raskin 
scoffed at the pragmatism that gained prominence after World War II, which he labeled 
the “policy sciences.” According to Raskin, experts in “planning” and “futurology” used 
“the philosophical pragmatist’s tool[s] to forget about the past . . . [and] control the 
future.” By creating a “Faustian ‘as if’ world” where “human behavior is further 
channelized, mediated through assigned social roles which are objectified and 
rationalized,” planning prevented individuals from taking “political” action, due to their 
being unable to break free from their circumscribed roles. This “Faustian ‘as if” world” 
bothered Raskin because the future depicted by policy scientists ignored the “inner life of 
the person” and derived persons of their individual humanity. Government institutions 
that employed “planning” took part in “profilism” to categorize individuals so as to not 
“allow people to be judged by their unique qualities nor does it develop institutional 
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models which begin from principles of uniqueness,” Raskin complained. For Raskin, 
Herman Kahn represented the archetypal policy scientist with his ordered vision of the 
world after a nuclear war.32  IPS, in comparison to intellectuals like Kahn, would allow 
the average person greater agency to determine their own future. 
Although the powerbrokers in Washington and the activists on the streets both 
took notice of IPS’s ideas, the Institute never felt certain of its role. Doubts regarding 
IPS’s primary audience became more pronounced in the mid- to late 1960s when the 
federal government struggled to pass meaningful legislation. Christopher Jencks argued 
that Washington D.C. had become by 1966 “no longer ‘where the action is’ politically.” 
As a result, individuals interested in “radical” or even “reformist” change needed to “go 
back to the constituencies and begin building up another mandate” similar to the one that 
arose in the late 1950s and forced liberal politicians to support more far-reaching 
legislation. When IPS formed in 1963, the “possibility of changing America from the top 
down – from Washington,” did not seem unrealistic, but that was no longer the case. 
Thus Jencks offered two possibilities. IPS could try to interact more with persons and 
groups outside of the nation’s capital, “treating our location in Washington a mere 
accident with peripheral importance to most of our activities.” Or, Jencks suggested, “We 
can keep talking to the political establishment in Washington, playing the role of a ‘loyal 
(?) opposition’ and waiting for the political mood to change so that we once have a 
chance to influence events.” Failure to act, Jencks predicted, would lead to “despair” 
among the fellows and eventually cause their departure from IPS. By the late 1970s, 
some intellectuals at IPS began questioning whether IPS even had an audience. IPS 
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trustee Stanley Weiss described the Institute as “trying to mobilize a counter-elite to out-
sell the interventionists who have dominated American foreign policy for so long.” Yet 
he lamented that “we’ve never set out—or really been effective—in selling a 
comprehensive economic and political alternative to the conventional trinity of f—k the 
world isolationism, Henry Kissinger realpolitik and Woodrow Wilson-JFK activism.” 
Weiss feared that “unless we can harness the lingering discontent, the interventionists 
will label us ‘isolationists’ and whatever following we have will simply was away.” 
Therefore, Weiss explained that IPS trustees and intellectuals had to decide what kind of 
Institute they wanted, which involved thinking about possible collaborators and 
audiences, as well as how the Institute could best publicize its ideas. Weiss himself 
wanted to make IPS “a Brookings ‘with ‘balls,’” but he did not clarify what this meant. 
Nonetheless, he did not hide the fact that he supported creating a new institute to meet the 
changing conditions in and outside of Washington D.C.33 
IPS’s Uneasy Relationship with Liberalism 
Perhaps the lack of research on IPS stems from the fact that it does not easily 
conform to the rigid categories created by historians to describe the liberal activists and 
institutions that existed during the Cold War. Charles DeBenedetti and Charles Chatfield, 
for instance, begin their magisterial work on the antiwar movement of the Vietnam War 
by distinguishing “peace liberals” from “radical pacifists.” The former, prominent in the 
mid-1950 in such groups as the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy and 
Americans for Democratic Action, feared that America’s reliance on nuclear weapons 
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signified a retreat from democracy since the power to decide whether to use such a 
weapon rested in so few hands. Economic and technical assistance through international 
agencies, these liberals believed, offered the best hope for peace, especially in 
comparison to unilateral interventions by the United States. Peace liberals, moreover, 
thought contrasting ideologies did not close the door to peaceful relations between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. The peace liberals, furthermore, felt that working 
within the system would achieve better results than massive protests. As a whole, peace 
liberals represented the complete opposite of Cold War liberals. Radical pacifists, on the 
other hand, argued that America played as great a role as other nations in causing 
injustice and unrest around the world. These activists saw liberation and decentralization 
as more likely to bring about peace than internationalism, which depended on 
international agencies like the United Nations. Whereas liberals looked to politicians and 
used electoral pressure to promote peace and justice, radicals sought the complete 
destruction and renewal of society through non-violent civil disobedience.34  IPS, as the 
following chapters illustrate, shared many of the same sentiments as both liberals and 
radicals. Therefore, out of the various labels given to peace and antiwar activists 
discussed by historians, IPS fits most squarely within Charles Chatfield’s conception of 
“liberal pacifism.” Liberal pacifism, according to Chatfield, involved a recognition of 
“community.” As such, liberal pacifists, unlike internationalists, connected war to the 
injustices brought about by American institutions. Describing the communities 
                                                            
     34 Charles Debenedetti and Charles Chatfield, An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the 
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envisioned by liberal pacifists as “transnational and value oriented,” Chatfield has 
explained their ultimate goal as the large-scale reconstruction of the world.35 
Infighting among liberals was, of course, nothing new in the 1960s. In 1955, the 
political scientist Louis Hartz, in The Liberal Tradition in America, contended that 
America lacked any alternatives to liberalism. Yet, as Peter Berkowitz has written, “To 
maintain that liberalism constitutes our dominant moral and political traditional [sic] is 
not to deny the presence in America of competing traditions.” Berkowitz’s statement 
applies not only to conservatism but also to the many variants of liberalism. As an 
example, while liberals of progressive and libertarian persuasions both desired “freedom” 
for American citizens, the former argued that government served this end by ending 
“inequality” and the latter considered government the “chief menace” to this goal. Unlike 
the aforementioned groups, “conservative liberals” felt that “freedom” required neither 
too much nor too little government intervention.36  Thus by the middle of the twentieth 
century, liberalism took many forms. 
Some of the earliest New Left intellectuals, of course, represented the most 
erstwhile critics of liberalism. Considered by many historians the theoretical backbone of 
the early New Left, the journal Studies on the Left, started by graduate students at the 
University of Wisconsin in 1959, provided the most forceful criticism of liberalism. 
According to Mattson, an “unrelenting critique of liberalism” filled the journal’s pages. 
Most significantly, the periodical presented the earliest arguments against “corporate 
liberalism.” Martin Sklar and James Weinstein, both editors of the journal, published 
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articles on the concept in Studies and later went on to publish scholarly works on the 
subject. The concept of “corporate liberalism” held that liberals, since at least the 
Progressive Era, served the corporate interest by quelling domestic unrest with 
inconsequential reform and spreading markets to every corner of the Earth.37  IPS, as it 
turned out, touched on many of the same themes, deriding the technocratic solutions of 
liberals and their interventionist foreign policy. 
The intellectuals at IPS most closely resemble the type of liberals associated with 
what University of Michigan philosopher Arnold Kaufman described as “radical 
liberalism.”38  Believing that the radicals of the 1960s had gone too far in their 
denunciation of liberalism, Kaufman declared, “For the need to deepen and enrich the 
quality of the democratic process, to make it both more deliberative and more 
participatory flows directly from the central doctrines of liberalism,” which for him 
meant “liberty and rational choice.”39  At the same time, Kaufman found many of the 
current tendencies of liberalism distasteful and requiring alteration. As a result, he called 
for a more radical form of liberalism that he believed would come once politicians began 
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implementing the liberal programs they had promised but never delivered. “Thus, to the 
extent that the rhetoric of political leaders encourages sincere commitment to liberalism,” 
he explained, “it also fosters opposition to the illiberal allocation of America’s vast 
resources, and to the illiberal use of America’s vast power.”40  Put simply, Kaufman 
wanted the latter to conform to the tenets of the former. 
In order for liberal deeds to match liberal ideals, activists had to work side by side 
with the system, albeit in an oppositional manner. Kaufman dismissed “the politics of 
self-indulgence” favored by many in the New Left because “in rejecting the system he 
also forfeits access to institutional resources which he must control if liberal ideals are to 
be effectively pursued. Thus, he sacrifices the prospects of political success for the sake 
of his soul.” Why did he describe the Movement’s desire for “authenticity” as a form of 
“self-indulgence?”  Kaufman argued that “even if loss of authenticity were the inevitable 
result of the calculation and compromise that effective action requires, damage to one’s 
self ought to be balanced against the resulting sacrifices imposed on others.”41  IPS 
shared with the New Left a yearning for authenticity, but this did not prevent the former 
from working within the system. 
Yet placing IPS under the theoretical umbrella of radical liberalism is also 
problematical. As James Miller has shown, Tom Hayden, the primary author of the Port 
Huron statement and a leader of early SDS, came to his understanding of “participatory 
democracy” by taking Kaufman’s courses at Michigan. From Kaufman, according to 
Miller, Hayden came to see participatory democracy as involving a working relationship 
between the people and their representative bodies. The version of participatory 
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democracy espoused by Hayden, therefore, did not mean direct control by the people. 
Rather, it involved people obtaining a “civic education” that they could use to make 
informed decisions.42  While representative of the thinking at IPS in the 1960s, as 
intellectuals at the think tank eventually came to question the willingness of officials in 
Washington to change America’s foreign policy. As more fellows branched out into 
neighborhood organizing in the 1970s, they no longer shared the view of a receptive 
government open to persuasion by the public. 
Before discussing where IPS stands on the liberal-radical spectrum, it is 
advantageous to look at one of the original trustees of IPS, David Riesman, a professor of 
sociology at Harvard University and author of the monumentally successful The Lonely 
Crowd. Given Riesman’s attitude toward the Cold War, it is not surprising that he joined 
IPS as a trustee.43  One historian has described Riesman as “always more inclined to 
work within the system for reforms than were the young radicals,” as illustrated by his 
work with TOCSIN and the Committee of Correspondence. The latter group in particular 
“embraced a creative tension between liberalism and radicalism,” according to Daniel 
                                                            
     42 James Miller, Democracy Is in the Streets: From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 94-98. 
     43 A look at Riesman’s correspondence regarding the foreign policy decisions of Kennedy and his 
cabinet makes it clear that Riesman opposed the tenets of Cold War liberalism. In 1962 Riesman wrote that 
his experiences in Washington during the Berlin crisis of the previous year had greatly tarnished his view 
of liberals in the city. Riesman left Washington “feeling that the ex-New Dealers now in the government 
were like people at the court of Versailles, loving the parties and the excitement but not really worried 
about nuclear war.” Another time, trying to understand the influence of Dean Rusk on Kennedy’s foreign 
policy, Riesman opined that Rusk’s “influence has on the whole been bad.” Rusk’s inaction, Riesman 
believed, made it more likely that State Department officials would not be able to maintain “a sense of 
morale against the general American bellicosity. . . .” While Riesman did not consider Rusk a hawk in 
matters pertaining to foreign policy, the Secretary of State’s pragmatism worried him. Riesman grouped 
Rusk with other “bomber liberals,” or those “people whose good conscience about their liberalism, their 
relative sympathy with social democracy, makes it even more possible for them than for conservatives to be 
guilefully . . . anti-communist.” See David Riesman to Clifford Durr, April 6, 1962 and David Riesman to 
Cyril Dunn, February 28, 1962, both in IPSR, WHS, box 57, folder 6. 
      102 
 
 
Geary. The tension, however, became too much for Riesman when students protested 
against the UC-Berkeley administration during the Free Speech Movement in 1964.44 
Whereas 1964 represented a pivotal year in Riesman’s transition away from the 
New Left, and liberalism in general, the same could not be said of IPS, where Riesman 
remained a trustee until at least 1972.45  Much like the Committee of Correspondence, 
IPS existed between liberalism and radicalism. Far more than the committee, however, 
the Institute relished its ability to straddle both ends of the spectrum, even at the same 
time. For instance, the involvement of IPS intellectuals during the uprising at Berkeley in 
1964 is instructive when trying to understand IPS’s position on the liberal-radical scale. 
As the Free Speech Movement took over UC-Berkeley, three intellectuals from IPS 
visited the campus to speak to different segments of the university. “In fact, after the 
great free speech uprising, there were three of us at IPS who were invited to come to 
Berkeley by different elements of Berkeley,” Waskow has remembered. Christopher 
Jencks, an expert on educational issues, received an invitation from Clark Kerr, the 
president of the University of California system, to “brief the trustees, the regents, and 
upper administration folks. I was invited by the student government to come and speak to 
them. And Paul Goodman, anarchist and writer of Growing Up Absurd, was invited by 
the free speech movement itself. So there were these three levels of different political 
brands, you might say. Goodman was the most radical of us.”46  During the 1960s, at 
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least, the liberal Establishment, students, and radical activists all looked to IPS as the 
voice of reason. 
The area of the most profound discontent between IPS intellectuals and 
liberalism, at least in the early years of the Institute, existed in the realm of foreign 
affairs. Shortly after forming IPS, Raskin referred to the intellectuals within the Kennedy 
administration as “belligerent professors who used their intelligence and education to 
plan various degrees of genocide.” In particular, Raskin admonished Kennedy for 
elevated military spending that led to an enlarged nuclear arsenal in Europe and calls for 
greater levels of civil defense in America. “Liberalism,” as Raskin described it at another 
point, “became a theology that justified a generation of bureaucrats who wrung their 
hands at the tragic choices that they could not escape: And in the process they chose the 
lesser, but nevertheless evil, option. Like compound interest, these ‘lesser evil options’ 
accumulated until the body politic could no longer pay the cost.”47 
Arthur Waskow’s relationship with Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) 
offers a glimpse into the labored relationship between IPS thinkers and liberals. Asked by 
ADA to serve on its Foreign Policy Commission for its National Convention, Waskow 
accepted the invitation and wrote “Notes Toward an ADA Foreign Policy Resolution.” 
The resolution, however, failed to gain approval at the ADA convention. At this time, 
furthermore, Waskow refused to join ADA’s National Board for several reasons, 
including, as he explained to ADA president John Roche, his dismay with the ADA 
leadership for pushing through resolutions that the majority of the convention participants 
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did not fully grasp. ADA’s undemocratic methods “distressed” Waskow because they not 
only represented a form of chicanery but also, he wrote, “the constant warning that 
people would not accept this or that position on peace suggested to me that ADA’s real 
and deeply felt ‘gut’ reactions were quite different from mine.” In the end, Waskow did 
not think that ADA, despite its proclamations to the contrary, supported general and 
complete disarmament. “It will do as little good for ADA,” Waskow wrote, “to have an 
official position favoring world disarmament, but to reject and flee from its implications, 
as it already does for the Kennedy Administration to have the same official position and 
flee from putting it into effect in day-to-day policy.” In calling for “world-wide 
disarmament,” the ADA, according to Waskow, “blithely adopt[ed] the position that is 
furthest out in the future, and one that happens to be adopted at least rhetorically by the 
United States government, but refuses to adopt a no more difficult position that would be 
considerably more attainable in the near future.” Questioning the ADA’s ability to 
comprehend the complicated ideas inherent in military strategy, Waskow suggested that 
the ADA return to its “traditional concern with questions of economics,” particularly in 
relation to reconversion following disarmament. Still, Waskow described himself as “one 
of ‘the last liberals’—the last real ones, as against fake Kennedy liberals, New Dealers, 
bomber liberals, white-supremacy liberals, etc.”48 
Straddling both official Washington and the Movement, IPS often ended up 
angering both government officials and New Left protestors. In 1966, Waskow, noting 
how two columnists from the mainstream press described IPS as “the intellectual arsenal 
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of the New Left” while a student activist called the Institute “the vanguard of the status 
quo,” explained that he felt “proud of them both.”49  In spite of the sentiment expressed 
by the student activist, IPS considered American youth an important component of the 
Institute. As the frequent efforts by IPS to create a student program attest to, the Institute 
saw in the younger generation an ability to look at the world anew, free from Cold War 
dogma. In 1982, Barnet told the story of IPS’s creation and, in the process, confirmed the 
importance the Institute’s founders placed on youth. Barnet described the Center for the 
Study of Democratic Institutions as “something as a model for IPS,” though the 
Institute’s founders had in mind “starting something with younger, less distinguished, 
more activist, [and more of a] student character.” IPS intellectuals, furthermore, 
encouraged others to see America’s youth in a similar way. Commenting in 1966 on an 
early draft of a book written by James Warburg, Barnet tried to persuade him to focus on 
the younger generation. “You could make the point,” Barnet argued, “that it is the new 
generation that is in touch with reality around the world and it is the government, now in 
the hands of the older generation, which is out of step.” Barnet suggested that Warburg 
take a cue from the younger generation’s interest in equality at home and abroad, their 
distaste for the Cold Warrior mentality, their diminished sense of uneasiness, and their 
greater demand for volunteerism.50 
Making IPS attractive to young Americans sometimes became a factor in deciding 
what type of intellectuals to bring to the Institute. As one of the original trustees of IPS, 
David Riesman initially “thought the whole enterprise was chaotic, a series of brilliant 
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but often misguided improvisations, moving off into many directions at once.” Riesman, 
particularly due to Paul Goodman’s name being “magic” among the younger crowd, saw 
IPS as acting as “a center for discussion and influence among the young radical 
students.” IPS appealed to young radical students, Riesman explained, because the 
younger members of IPS were “close enough in outlook to the radical and dissident 
young to evoke their responsiveness” but also “help educate the young beyond some of 
the naïve paranoias [sp] they now hold about American society.” Of all the fellows, 
Waskow, Riesman surmised, had “a real feeling for the young people and close ties with 
them while, at the same time, he is more scholarly and detached.” According to Waskow, 
Raskin and Barnet were “more outside the new left” than others at IPS.51 
As it turned out, the New Left did take notice. Inquiring about the possibility of 
joining IPS for the fall of 1964, Tom Hayden confessed that he knew little about the 
Institute except the writings of certain fellows, but nonetheless liked “that it creates a new 
role opportunity for intellectuals to become involved in the process of social change 
while maintaining critical independence.” The president of SDS, Todd Gitlin, wrote to 
Raskin in 1964 asking for a recent article written by the co-director on the Vietnam War. 
Gitlin promised that Raskin’s piece would have wide coverage since, “we [SDS] have 
better access to the campus than almost all other student organizations, maybe all.” 
Gitlin’s successor as SDS president, Paul Potter, wrote to Waskow in 1965 suggesting 
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that IPS and SDS jointly sponsor an institute in the summer for SDS members that, 
according to Potter, “should be exactly the kind of thing that IPS would like to be 
involved in.” The idea for a summer institute stemmed from the “really deep concern 
among the leaders of many of the campus movements . . . that they find some opportunity 
to discuss and think about the various problems that their activity has forced them to deal 
with.” As envisioned by Potter, the summer institute would include “between 15 and 30 
students living at subsistence and working around a fairly loose curriculum” taught by 
IPS fellows or other intellectuals.52 
Several other SDS members inquired about joining IPS’s student program as well. 
In March 1966, Lee Webb, past National Secretary of SDS, wrote to Waskow and 
explained that he “would very much like” to enter the student program at IPS in the fall. 
Describing the letter as his “formal application,” Webb told Waskow that IPS appealed to 
him because the fellows and students were “complementary and stimulating” and the 
Institute allowed free thinking.53  Activists involved with the civil rights movement in the 
South also frequented IPS. Waskow recounted one particular seminar led by the Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee’s Charles Sherrod. 
And we got in good touch very soon with the SNCC people. So Bob Moses, 
Charles Sherrod, other folks, [like] Marion Berry, who became the mayor of 
Washington D.C.; those folks came to IPS almost as a place to catch their breath 
from the incredible intensity of what was happening in the South. So they came, 
we set up seminars for them. I remember an amazing, amazing moment when 
Charles Sherrod, who was a young minister, or acting like a minister, in 
Southwest Georgia, came and spent a month or two at IPS, and we arranged a 
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seminar in the evening for members of Congress to meet him and to hear what the 
civil rights movement really was, because they had not a clue. A bunch of them 
came, maybe even a dozen members of Congress, and Sherrod began in a fairly 
conventional seminar way to describe what they were doing in Georgia, 
Mississippi, and so on. And then, about 10-15 minutes into his talk, he kind of 
modulated into being a minister giving a freedom sermon at his congregation in 
Albany, Georgia. So none of them had ever heard anything like it. In fact, the IPS 
fellows, me, Marcus, etc., had never heard anything like it, it just mulled us over, 
absolutely, it was incredible. I think it was really important, for us for sure, but, I 
think for the members of Congress too, to actually have that experience, which 
was different from just hearing an academic seminar about the civil rights 
movement. Suddenly they found themselves in one of those churches that was 
doing the civil rights movement.54   
 
 New Left support for IPS swelled, for the most part, due to the latter’s stance on 
American foreign policy and Cold War liberalism. With this in mind, it is worthwhile to 
look at the thinkers who influenced IPS and encouraged the Institute’s controversial view 
of the Cold War. An individual who had a great influence on IPS’s co-directors was 
James Paul Warburg. In addition to serving as one of the original trustees of IPS, 
Warburg also gave the think tank hundreds of thousands of dollars of his own money to 
keep the Institute up and running. Yet beyond offering his time and money to the 
Institute, Warburg served as an intellectual inspiration to IPS. As one of Warburg’s 
biographers has noted, he situated his criticism of American foreign policy in a basic 
belief that the Soviet Union was not to blame, at least not solely, for the uncertainties of 
the post-World War II international scene. Instead, Warburg offered a more “complex 
reality” in which new balance of power relations, anti-colonialism in the Third World, 
advances in science and technology, and an unwillingness to commit to ideas put forth in 
the Atlantic Charter made the world ripe for international crises. Warburg perceived the 
Soviet Union as less of a military threat—he suggested that once it secured a buffer zone 
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around its borders it would become isolationist—than an ideological threat. Thus, in 
place of “an increasingly militarized and status-quo-oriented American foreign policy,” 
Warburg wanted “some form of social democracy complemented by what he felt was the 
only viable political alternative to the suicidal policies of the nation state: world 
federalism,” according to his biographer.55 
Warburg eventually came to question the feasibility of world government, but he 
continued to argue for an enlarged role for the United Nations. IPS intellectuals would 
put forth arguments similar to those made by Warburg. In fact, Raskin thought so highly 
of Warburg that he considered renaming IPS the “James Warburg Institute.” While 
Raskin saw the new name as a way to honor Warburg’s efforts at securing peace, he also 
recognized that using Warburg’s name offered certain financial incentives. Raskin 
confided to Barnet that “my commercial and Talmudic guess is that the Warburg name 
could be used as an instrument to get money for an endowment from the Warburgs 
themselves as well as such people as Land, McCloy, Stevenson, etc.”56  Putting aside the 
monetary value IPS placed on Warburg’s name, intellectuals associated with the Institute, 
especially the co-directors, owed much of their thinking to the ideas put forth by Warburg 
in the decades preceding IPS. 
 Another founding trustee, Hans Morgenthau, a professor of political science 
whose 1948 book Politics Among Nations served as the blueprint for political realism, 
also shaped the foreign policy perspectives of IPS’s co-founders. Claiming that “exposure 
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to Hans Morgenthau’s teaching at a crucial stage in my own development have been 
influential in shaping my own thinking,” Barnet noted several “conclusions” that he 
reached as a result of his ties to the political scientist. Barnet came to believe, for 
instance, that America represented the “latest of the modern world empires” and would 
remain so for only a “brief” moment, while the Soviet Union viewed itself as a “nation-
state” rather than “the embodiment of a revolutionary ideology.” Additionally, Barnet 
took from Morgenthau the idea that “national interest,” which the former took “to mean 
the welfare of the majority of citizens of the U.S.,” offered a “more reliable guide for 
policy than any ready to wear ideology,” whether economic or political.57 
IPS co-founder Raskin also looked to Morgenthau’s writings for inspiration and 
guidance. “The principal of logical and moral symmetry is crucial to the realist’s 
position,” Raskin wrote in an essay on Hans Morgenthau. Citing Morgenthau’s work as 
exemplary of this kind of thinking—especially Politics Among Nations, where 
Morgenthau calls on the United States to “judge other nations as we judge our own” and 
thus “respect the interests of other nations, while protecting and promoting those of our 
own”—Raskin lamented that other realists ignored this aspect of Morgenthau’s political 
theory. “Where symmetrical relations are not understood and practiced, the realist’s 
position is often perverted to mean expedient measures, gratuitous and dangerous. The 
practice of realism is reduced to what Power intends,” and therefore “without the moral 
underpinnings that Morgenthau has made clear are the underpinnings of the realist’s 
position. . . .”58  Critics of IPS often accused the think tank of presenting utopian fantasies 
that ignored real world conditions, but the co-directors’ familiarity with the writings of 
                                                            
     57 Richard J. Barnet, “In Search of the National Interest,” 1976, IPSR, WHS, box 1, folder 27, 1-2. 
     58 Raskin, “Morgenthau: The Idealism of a Realist,” 86-87. 
      111 
 
 
Morgenthau, as well as their yearning for pragmatic solutions, should give pause to such 
claims. 
IPS’s hostility towards liberalism was matched only by its contempt for the 
Democratic Party. In fact, IPS shared with large segments of the American populace a 
disdain for Democrats. As racial strife led to riots and as thousands marched against the 
war in Vietnam, support for President Johnson deteriorated. In such an environment, 
support grew for the “Dump Johnson” movement. Even after Johnson informed the 
nation in March 1968 that he would not seek re-election, the “Dump Johnson” movement 
continued to support Minnesota senator Eugene McCarthy over Vice President Hubert 
Humphrey.59  Others, including Raskin, questioned whether the Democratic Party could 
change. Thus, Raskin pushed for the creation of a new party. In explaining the need for a 
new party, Raskin explained that “the Hubert Humphrey of 1948 has won the liberal 
battle within the Democratic Party.” As a result, activists should temper any hopes about 
the Democrats undergoing any further transformations. Acknowledging that liberal 
reforms improved the circumstances of some Americans, Raskin claimed another more 
detrimental change occurred to American democracy. Writing in September 1968, Raskin 
compared Humphrey to “the right wing Social Democrats in Germany who espoused 
piddling social services through authoritarian bureaucracy while accepting the power and 
legitimacy of the military-corporate elites.” Therefore, an insurgent candidate like 
Eugene McCarthy, even if he had won the nomination in Chicago, would have faced 
several roadblocks in his efforts to change the Democratic Party as an insider. Raskin 
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believed that in order “to change the Democratic Party from within by ‘capturing’ it 
would require a purge of the entire congressional leadership in Congress—an event 
unknown in the history of American politics.”60 
Weary of the Democratic Party, Raskin claimed that only a new party could carry 
out a “structural analysis” of American society and pinpoint the necessary political and 
policy changes. Continuing to depend on the existing political parties would mean that 
“the revolutionary repressive situation will grow, and the final result will be the 
strengthening of the authoritarian aspects of the state—whether through revolution or 
repression,” Raskin predicted. In comparison, he saw the new party as “offering 
reconstructive alternatives to those people who are now disfranchised,” by a system 
where voting rarely led to fundamental changes in society and therefore encouraged non-
participation in elections. Raskin pointed to the existence of new party organizations in 
39 states and the fact that eighteen states allowed a new party candidate on their 
presidential ballots as proof of the widespread desire for a new political party.61 
For reasons of its own doing and because of the state of the Left in America since 
the 1960s, IPS never, with the possible exception of its close ties to the New Left in the 
1960s, spoke for a particular group on the Left. Borosage described IPS in 1983 as “an 
institute for the left that isn’t formed.” What he meant by this was that “no significant left 
or even social democratic party calls upon our work” and also that “IPS reflects a 
challenge to the old left—social democratic or state socialist now in significant crisis.” 
For Borosage, IPS represented “a new left which is unformed both politically and 
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ideologically.” As for what IPS had accomplished in such an environment, Borosage 
commented, “We have not been a consistent resource center for movements. We have not 
developed a political or intellectual school—hence the absence of a serious journal or 
journals.” Thus IPS influence came from “ideas which have their own force and through 
personalities with their own trajectory.”62  That IPS lacked a “political or intellectual 
school” should come as no surprise given the unorganized and sporadic nature of the 
Institute. Yet, IPS took pride in letting its fellows do their own work without following a 
particular style of thought.63 
Reading what conservatives have written on IPS, however, it would appear as if 
the Institute sought nothing short of a socialist takeover of America. In describing IPS to 
the readers of World Affairs, for instance, neoconservative Joshua Muravchik created an 
entirely new category for the think tank. He accused IPS of being “communophiles.” 
“Communophiles,” according to Muravchik, decried capitalism and called for its 
replacement with socialism. These “communophiles” did not belong to any communist 
party, nor did they want the world to follow the Soviet model of socialist development. 
Communist movements in the Third World, Muravchik claimed, appealed far more to 
“communophiles.”64  IPS intellectuals did, in fact, support certain aspects of socialism 
and Third World liberation movements, but they understood the repercussions of coming 
                                                            
     62 Robert Borosage, “Notes on a Five Year Projection,” May 12, 1983, IPSR, WHS, box 23, folder 17, 1-
2. 
     63 In a response to a letter highly critical of an article Eqbal Ahmad wrote for The Nation, Borosage 
explained that IPS respected the individual opinions of its fellows and noted that no fellows spoke for the 
Institute. Borosage described IPS as “both deeply divided and deeply troubled” over the Middle East. He 
referred to Peter Weiss who, in contrast to Ahmad’s pro-PLO stance, was a ZionistSee Shelly P. 
Koenigsberg to Robert Borosage, March 23, 1983, Borosage to Koenigsberg, April 7, 1983, both in IPSR, 
WHS, box 16, folder 35. 
     64 Joshua Muravchik, “‘Communophilism’ and the Institute for Policy Studies,” World Affairs 147, 
(Winter 1984-1985), 163-164. 
      114 
 
 
out too much in favor of socialist policies. Writing in 1977, Landau explained that he 
wanted TNI to “bring about a much more intense dialogue between Europeans and 
Americans and third worlders” and find a way for socialism and democracy to coexist. 
“Socialism began as an internationalism,” Landau wrote, “and in a sense the Institute can 
play the role right now and for the near future that the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Internationals 
used to, or were supposed to, have played.” Put simply, Landau wanted “an Institute 
devoted to the development of democratic socialism.” Only months earlier, one of IPS’s 
trustees, Stanley Weiss, asked Landau to temper his socialist rhetoric. Weiss cautioned 
Landau against “putting socialism on the masthead of IPS” for the very pragmatic reason 
that doing so would make it difficult for the Institute to raise money.65  Despite Weiss’s 
advice, Landau remained a fervent believer in socialism, primarily as it existed in Fidel 
Castro’s Cuba and in other Third World nations. 
While many IPS intellectuals supported Third World revolutions and proposed 
bringing certain elements of socialism into America, the think tank held largely negative 
views of the Soviet Union, especially in relation to the superpower’s human rights record. 
Writing about the Soviet dissident Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Raskin stated, “If socialism is 
to be a progressive social formation, it must consolidate the gains of past revolutions, not 
bury them.” In the Soviet Union, Raskin wrote, “Practical politics and revolutionary 
program, the Higher Principle, took the place of natural and decent feelings. And they 
believed that human relationships were secondary to something else, never understood 
and never defined.” Claiming that “Solzhenitsyn has thrown down the gauntlet to the 
world’s Left,” Raskin implored leftists to support the Soviet dissident’s efforts because 
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“he acts as an artist who is the custodian of the chain of our inner humanitarian spirit.”66  
Both capitalism and socialism, therefore, lacked the humane elements that Raskin and 
other IPS intellectuals desired in their economic and political systems. 
Never completely comfortable with liberalism, IPS, particularly Raskin, looked to 
an alternative mode of thought known as “progressive liberalism.” Raskin argued that a 
form of “progressive liberalism” could take hold in the 1980s if three major 
transformations occurred. First, Raskin wanted to replace the “America Incorporated 
mentality” with a model based on “worker participation.” Next Americans had to 
immobilize the national security state by advocating for arms limitation treaties and 
disarmament. Finally, Raskin argued that “the tasks of governments are best performed 
through participation,” which made possible “equity, dignity, cooperation and fairness in 
all aspects of our public life.” In its May 17, 1980 issue the Nation brought together 
several commentators to debate “What’s Left?”  Calling for a rebirth and reimagining of 
liberalism for the 1980s, Raskin argued that liberalism needed to eschew “the 
antipragmatic imperial discipline of geopolitics” in favor of a system of relations based 
on international law. Moreover, liberalism in the 1980s, he wrote, had to begin 
“formulating clear policies to deal with an economic system that is out of political and 
democratic control.” Raskin castigated intellectuals, such as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., for 
doing no more than simply calling for the revival of “vital center” liberalism for the new 
decade. The IPS co-director claimed that the center had become too conservative for it to 
serve the liberal cause.67 
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Searching for a liberalism more appropriate to the 1980s, Raskin turned his 
attention to two opposing “modes” of liberalism from earlier in the twentieth century. 
According to Raskin, “establishment liberalism” placed power in the hands of the 
executive, who acted as an arbitrator between the corporations and the American people. 
While regulating corporations, the president ensured continued economic growth through 
economic pump priming. At the same time, the president pushed for passage of social 
programs in the 1930s and 1960s in order “to stop ‘the unruly classes’ from burning 
down the cities.” Establishment liberalism succeeded so long as the economy prospered, 
which it did until the 1970s. A second form of liberalism, “progressive liberalism” also 
existed in America. Raskin described this alternative as “liberalism’s most vibrant form, 
suffused with the restless energy of Americans in pursuit of justice and happiness.” 
Progressive liberalism demanded “a dual-sector economy of cooperatives, public 
enterprise and small businesses” with a “noninterventionist and independent foreign 
policy.” The “philosophical roots” of progressive liberalism extended back to the 
“pragmatism of John Dewey, the politics of Robert La Follette Sr. and the legal thought 
of William O. Douglas.” Progressive liberalism continued the fight of Eugene Debs, 
Upton Sinclair, Walter Weyl, Charles Beard, Jane Addams, and John L. Lewis, “all of 
whom believed that workers should exercise control over their places of work, and 
evinced a deep suspicion toward unaccountable wealth privately held, unaccountable 
government and politicians who led their people into war or on imperial ventures.”68 
The Rebirth of McCarthyism: Conservative Attacks Against IPS 
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As Raskin attempted to create a reconstructed liberalism under a progressive 
label, conservatives initiated a concerted attack against the Institute. In spite of the 
tremendous success conservative intellectuals experienced in the 1970s and 1980s, a 
number of them spent an inordinate amount of time worrying about the activities of IPS. 
Writing in 1988, journalist Sidney Blumenthal argued that by 1976 IPS “was already well 
on the road to irrelevance.” Nevertheless, he noted that “as the IPS declined in actual 
influence, its stature grew in conservative demonology; it passed from influence to 
fable.”69  The extensive campaign against IPS orchestrated by conservatives illustrates 
the continued relevance of IPS and progressive ideas more generally into the 1980s. 
Many individuals and publications took part in the campaign against IPS, but the 
most unrelenting critiques came from the pen of Rael Jean Isaac. In a 1980 issue of 
Midstream, Isaac published an article entitled “The Institute for Policy Studies: Empire 
on the Left,” from which multiple excerpts appeared in other publications. She began her 
diatribe against the think tank by offering her readers a bit of surprising news. She wrote 
that “the Institute represents an unprecedented success story: the achievement of the New 
Left, after its supposed demise, in shaping United States policy.” In an attempt to 
illustrate IPS’s anti-American position, and thus strengthen her claim that the think tank 
wanted to bring America to its knees, Isaac analyzed IPS’s writings on the Soviet Union. 
According to Isaac, “What IPS Fellows never concede is that the Soviet Union poses any 
threat to the United States. Soviet behavior is invariably defined as ‘defensive’ in nature.” 
In addition to IPS’s favoritism towards the Soviets, Isaac derided the think tank for its 
ardent support of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). As evidence, she named 
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Joe Stork and Fred Halliday as editors of MERIP Reports, the Middle East Research and 
Information Project newsletter, which, Isaac claimed, “supports the major Middle East 
terrorist groups.” Isaac also implicated Eqbal Ahmad for raising funds for MERIP and 
other IPS fellows for speaking at the Association of Arab-American University Graduates 
and PLO conferences. Lastly, Isaac referred to an “internal IPS memo” from 1976 in 
which Saul Landau tried to encourage congressmen to meet with the PLO, IPS 
intellectuals, Arab-Americans, and “Jewish ‘doves’” to discuss ways to achieve peace.70 
While the claim that IPS shaped American policy was an overstatement, Isaac’s 
recognition of IPS as a remnant of the New Left conforms to the argument put forth in 
this study and explains why conservatives went to such great lengths to renounce IPS. 
Conservatives, not surprisingly, quoted generously from Isaac’s article and 
disseminated its arguments in various outlets without considering the validity of her 
allegations. These same conservatives viewed Isaac’s IPS article as a clarion call to 
prevent the overthrow of America. As the Worchester Telegram editorialized, “The Isaac 
article suggests how thoroughly we have been infiltrated on the ideological front and how 
imperative it is that the nation and its guardians wake up before the erosion becomes 
irreparable.”71  Recycling the arguments found in Isaac’s articles, conservatives spun a 
web of accusations against IPS. 
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One of the more infamous examples of the conservative fixation on IPS came 
with the publication in 1980 of Arnaud de Borchgrave’s and Robert Moss’s spy novel 
The Spike. The book described the Soviet Union’s efforts to divert attention in America 
away from Soviet activities around the world. Involved in this scheme were two 
institutes: the Institute for Progressive Reform in America and its international affiliate in 
Amsterdam, the Multinational Institute. In order to avoid a libel lawsuit from IPS, de 
Borchgrave and Moss agreed to change the names of the institutes as well as the location 
of the international center for the paperback edition of the novel.72  Both inside and 
outside of the Institute, commentators viewed The Spike as a barely concealed smearing 
of IPS. Noting the undeniable likeness of the novel’s institutes to IPS and TNI, one 
reviewer described it as “a kind of ‘Protocols of the Elders of the Institute for Policy 
Studies.’”  Peter Weiss went so far as to label The Spike “the ‘Mein Kampf’ of the crazy 
right for destroying everything to the left of itself” that posed a threat to conservative 
beliefs. Furthermore, Weiss pointed to the “grand design outlined in its pages” that 
represented “the kind of disinformation which the book is allegedly intended to expose.” 
Raskin described The Spike as “disinformation literature bordering on political 
pornography.” A brief conversation took place during the September 1988 board of 
trustees meeting regarding The Spike and Covert Cadre. Isabel Letelier, Orland Letelier’s 
widow and a fellow at IPS, looked at the books as an “indication of the significant impact 
which the IPS has made on US thought and political life.” Weiss asserted that IPS needed 
to have better public relations so that it could respond to its critics. Barnet agreed with 
Weiss, calling the failure to create a public relations office “a long-term shortcoming” for 
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the think tank. In response to these concerns, Katrina vanden Huevel explained to the 
board “that The Nation is eager to have a roster of IPS staff and the work they are 
engaged in so that IPS fellows can be more readily consulted for their opinion and 
contribution to the magazine.”73 
 IPS always struggled to find the correct balance between intellectual pursuits and 
activism. This uncertainty undoubtedly led to IPS’s erratic relationship with both official 
Washington and the social and political movements of the 1970s and 1980s. Despite the 
nebulousness of its audience, IPS never stopped trying to develop a new liberalism for 
America predicated upon democratic participation. While IPS continued to promote ideas 
usually associated with the New Left, intellectuals at the think tank also attempted, 
during an era known more for conservative dominance, to offer a new style of thinking 
under the label of “progressive liberalism. 
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Chapter Three: An Unnecessary Alliance: U.S., Europe, and NATO 
 Before zeroing on the Vietnam War, IPS confronted what it considered one of the 
pillars of the Cold War: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). IPS’s criticism 
of NATO stemmed from the Institute’s disagreement with the type of internationalism 
favored by liberal Cold Warriors. Beginning with President Truman, America carried out 
unilateral interventions outside of international organizations. Furthermore, as several 
historians have shown, liberal internationalists who had previously led the charge to first 
create and then strengthen the United Nations (U.N) fell in line behind the Democratic 
president. E. Timothy Smith has described liberal internationalists as “reluctant 
supporters” of NATO. The American Association for the U.N. (AAUN) eventually 
backed NATO after the State Department pressed upon the AAUN that the U.N. and 
NATO would collaborate on most issues. Even the United World Federalists gave their 
support to the military alliance, seeing NATO as just one “temporary” step toward world 
government.1  IPS intellectuals such as Barnet and Raskin charged U.S. officials with 
using NATO to prolong and militarize the Cold War. NATO, Barnet and Raskin, argued, 
would not ease East-West tensions. Therefore, IPS intellectuals called for replacing 
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NATO with regional alliance systems. While ambivalent about the U.N., intellectuals at 
IPS, particularly Waskow, looked to the organization as a means to end lethal warfare. 
 The decision to create NATO in 1949 came in response to the Soviet Union’s 
acquisition of nuclear weapons and the unresolved problem of Germany. As the historian 
Marc Trachtenberg has shown, the Soviet Union’s test of nuclear weapons in 1949 
crystallized for American officials the need to work closely with Western European 
nations. Without a nuclear advantage, the United States could not prevent the Soviets 
from invading non-communist European nations. As a result, Americans were far more 
willing to join with Britain and France in the protection of Western Europe. At the same 
time, the allies needed the support of West Germany due to the strategic importance of 
that nation. West Germany officially joined NATO in 1955, commencing an uneasy 
relationship between the military alliance and West Germany. Fearful of a NATO 
collapse, which could lead to West Germany rebuilding its military and posing a threat to 
Soviet security, the Soviets accepted the agreement. Though all sides embraced the 
military alliance, tensions always remained near the surface. Frictions over the number of 
conventional troops and nuclear weapons under NATO’s control made the relationship 
between America and Western Europe one of constant distress. According to NATO’s 
chronicler, European nations bemoaned their continued “impotence” well into the 1980s. 
Although ostensibly an alliance of equal partners, the United States dominated NATO. 
Furthermore, Europeans believed that America had not done enough to bring about 
détente with the Soviets, nor promote arms control, all while denying Europe a greater 
role in organizational decisions. Nonetheless, the two sides maintained their relationship 
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even as a more unified Europe felt, in the words of Lawrence Kaplan, a “sense of 
dependence” on America.2  Thus, the alliance remained in existence. 
IPS’s Battle Against a Pillar of the Militarized Cold War 
 While President Truman succeeded in gaining the backing of liberal 
internationalists for NATO, by the 1960s various individuals and groups voiced 
opposition to the military alliance. Senator J. William Fulbright, for instance, gave a 
speech in 1964 that, according to Kaplan, “implied that the organization certainly, and 
possibly the alliance as well, had lost its mission.” Two years earlier, Ronald Steel wrote 
The End of the Alliance: America and the Future of Europe that acknowledged the 
situation in Europe and therefore the diminished need for American assistance.3  Even 
before IPS opened its doors, Raskin wrote to his former boss expressing his distaste for 
NATO. Describing the ties between the United States and West European nations as “not 
pragmatic and almost wholly ideological,” Barnet, in this letter to McGeorge Bundy, 
called for U.S officials to work with their Soviet counterparts to find a way to remove the 
superpowers’ troops from the European continent. Barnet suggested that France could 
shoulder much more of the burden of European defense. A failure to act soon on the issue 
of NATO would leave America unprepared for the growing anti-NATO sentiment among 
the American people, Barnet claimed. He predicted that Americans would eventually turn 
against NATO as “isolationism, UNism, and the fact that a significant portion of the 
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American people, notably Negroes, will become more vocal and will show that they have 
little if any commitment to either the ideals or the goals of West Europe.”4 
The most comprehensive critique of NATO by IPS came in 1965 when Raskin 
and Barnet published After 20 Years: Alternatives to the Cold War in Europe. The co-
directors argued that by creating NATO the United States thwarted efforts by the 
Europeans to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union and end the Cold War. Barnet 
and Raskin accused the United States of extending the Cold War by treating the NATO 
alliance “as an end in itself” while the Europeans considered it merely “a temporary 
expedient.” Thus, according to the authors, while Europeans “accepted and occasionally 
repeated the rhetoric that fired American statesmen, most European statesmen thought it 
possible to be both against communism and for negotiations with Moscow” in order to 
reunite Europe. As evidence of America’s foot dragging, Raskin and Barnet pointed to 
the United States rejection of several proposals made by Stalin, including a plan that 
would have allowed for the reunification of Germany as a neutral self-governed nation 
outside of NATO, and later plans, like the 1957 Rapacki Plan, which would have made 
Germany and Poland a nuclear-free zone. The United States, according to the authors, 
feared that such plans “undermined the rationale of the Atlantic Community and might 
weaken the ties between the United States and Western Europe.”5 
Interference in German affairs by the United States also raised the indignation of 
Raskin and Barnet. IPS’s co-directors described American policy in Germany as “utterly 
irrational.” America’s claim that it stationed troops in Germany in order to prevent the 
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nation from becoming an aggressor or an ally of the Soviet Union made no sense 
whatsoever to the authors. As Barnet and Raskin explained, “We were arming Germany 
because we were afraid of her.” At the same time, as Barnet and Raskin wrote, “To 
appease the Germans, we avoided seeking a settlement of the very issues which German 
statesmen swore to their own people that they would one day find a way to resolve 
themselves.”6  In the end, therefore, according to Barnet and Raskin, the United States 
only made matters worse in Europe. Barnet made a similar argument in 1966 when he 
spoke before the Senate Foreign Relations committee. At the hearing, Barnet criticized 
American officials for failing to “offer a realistic basis for meeting the urgent needs of 
the United States, the several states of Europe, or the rest of mankind.” By ending 
American support for a divided Germany and reducing the number of conventional and 
nuclear forces in Europe, Barnet argued at the hearing, relations between Western and 
Eastern Europe would improve dramatically and make NATO unnecessary.7  In order to 
achieve peace on the European continent, in other words, America had to leave.8 
 Although criticism of NATO had become more common by the 1960s, foreign 
policy experts found After 20 Years too critical of American strategy in Europe. 
Reviewing the book for the New York Times, Henry Kissinger compared the claims made 
in After 20 Years to arguments of earlier critics like Henry Wallace and George Kennan. 
The more recent work by Barnet and Raskin, however, offered a far more pessimistic 
view of Europe under NATO. “The authors catalogue the price America paid for its 
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commitment to the Atlantic Alliance, but they do not discuss what other options were 
open; they refuse to admit that the freedom of Europe may be due to America’s Atlantic 
vision,” Kissinger exclaimed. Kissinger also berated the authors for not looking into 
whether the alliance led to the Soviet Union’s weakened condition. Instead, the authors 
used the Soviet Union’s diminished strength as evidence to support their claim that 
Europe did not need NATO to protect the continent against a Soviet invasion. 
Conversely, the authors, according to Kissinger, had a “tendency to base policy on the 
most favorable assumptions,” such as the trustworthiness of the Soviet Union in matters 
pertaining to arms control inspections.9 
IPS intellectuals recommended, at different times, either the complete dismantling 
of NATO or putting it under the purview of the U.N. In After 20 Years, for instance, 
Barnet and Raskin called for a “collective security arrangement” to replace NATO. 
Making a distinction between the two, the authors argued that with the former type of 
alliance, “the problem of European security would once again be treated as a political 
problem, not as a military one.” Transforming NATO into a political alliance, 
furthermore, would have more firmly put it under the control of the U.N. Envisioning 
such a relationship, the authors wrote, “Collective military action, unless taken under 
U.N. auspices, was authorized only as an extreme ad hoc measure in the case of gravest 
urgency.” Under this theory, NATO would limit its activities to non-military measures 
unless “deputized by the U.N.”10  As mentioned above, Truman and other advocates of 
NATO used various means to convince skeptics of NATO that the military alliance 
                                                            
     9 Henry Kissinger, “Answers Aren’t Easy,” New York Times Book Review, June 27, 1966, B3, B7. 
     10 Barnet and Raskin, After 20 Years, 168-171. 
      127 
 
 
existed as part of the U.N. Barnet and Raskin, though, wanted to make the relationship 
real, with the U.N. holding the senior position in the cooperative partnership. 
 Besides diminishing Cold War tensions, IPS intellectuals believed that breaking 
up the alliance would make it easier to achieve disarmament, both nuclear and 
conventional. For IPS intellectuals, a Soviet invasion of Europe seemed far less alarming 
than the Soviet Union’s stationing of troops in East Germany and the growing Soviet 
nuclear arsenal. Describing the latter two scenarios as NATO’s “real military problem,” 
Barnet called for a “mutual reductions of forces.” In addition to reducing the number of 
troops in West and East Germany, Barnet called on the superpowers to formulate plans 
for the reunification of a non-nuclear Germany. These initial steps would foster an 
environment more susceptible to nuclear disarmament in Europe, Barnet claimed. As 
European relations improved, Barnet predicted that “much of the incentive for the United 
States and the U.S.S.R to continue the nuclear arms race would be gone.” Barnet also 
called on the superpowers to stay out of the discussions over West and East Germany. 
Increased interactions between the residents of East and West Germany, Barnet 
suggested, would increase the chances of a non-Communist Germany since the West 
Germans possessed superior skills and numbers in comparison to East Germany. With the 
German question no longer an issue, Barnet foresaw a new “regional organization” taking 
shape in Europe where the United States, the Soviet Union, and all European nations 
“would be obligated to respond to any threat to European security from any direction,” 
both East and West. Such a security organization would, furthermore, provide the 
mechanisms for carrying out disarmament.11 
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 Barnet and other IPS intellectuals claimed that successful economies in Western 
European countries did more to prevent a Soviet invasion than a nation’s nuclear and 
military capabilities. Writing in the early 1980s, Barnet claimed that NATO served as “an 
elaborate insurance policy.” Yet he questioned the value of the insurance policy and its 
reliance on nuclear weapons. Barnet argued that “the only workable deterrent,” and one 
that, unlike the threat of nuclear retaliation, actually prevented a Soviet invasion of 
Europe, involved “the prospect of permanent popular resistance.” “A dynamic Europe 
that is modernizing its institutions, managing its economy and establishing mutually 
advantageous relations with resource-producing countries” would repel a Soviet invasion, 
Barnet claimed. A Europe that chose to ignore internal malaise in order to grow its 
nuclear arsenals, on the other hand, would “risk the same sort of social dissolution” as 
France in 1940, Barnet explained.12  As chapter 8 discusses in more detail, Barnet turned, 
in the 1980s, to the concept of “real security” in order to encourage officials in the United 
States to strengthen America’s economy. He contended that a robust economy would 
improve America’s standing in the world far more than an unwieldy and expensive 
nuclear arsenal that served no purpose. As the above illustrates, he applied this logic to 
Europe as well.  
Bringing Together East and West: IPS and Collective Security 
 While sometimes referred to by IPS intellectuals as “regional” blocs, Barnet and 
others sought, in reality, an organization encompassing nations far and wide and serving 
an auxiliary function to the U.N. Officials in Washington had, in fact, debated the size of 
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the U.N. during early discussions about the international body. As Gary Ostrower has 
shown, participants in the debate over the U.N. supported either regionalism or 
universalism. Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Leo Pasvolsky, a State Department 
official that played a key role in drafting the U.N. Charter, sought “a truly universal 
collective-security organization,” while Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, 
Winston Churchill, and even Roosevelt considered “a confederation of regional units” the 
better option.13  In a 1968 report for the U.N. Association Panel on Atlantic 
Relationships, Barnet discussed a proposal for the creation of a European Security 
Commission—composed of all European nations, America, and the Soviet Union—to 
replace NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The new alliance’s forces would be “aimed at no 
single enemy but at potential disturbers of the peace from either East or West.” European 
nations would play a much larger role than previously, making possible, Barnet claimed, 
a reduction in Soviet troops on European soil and an eventual cutback in American troops 
as well. Troop withdrawals would, however, depend on successfully ending the arms race 
and solving the problem of German reunification. Barnet accepted the fact that “regional 
organizations . . . have fallen considerably short of earlier expectations and hopes.” As 
evidence, he noted the unresolved tension between Greece and Turkey, the rising 
nationalism among countries like France, and West Germany’s resurgent nationalism 
despite financial aid and protection from Western Europe. Therefore, Barnet 
recommended that the European Security Commission “be integrated as closely as 
possible with the security concerns of the rest of mankind through the United Nations.”14   
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 Despite the growing discord within NATO and the continued criticism of the 
military alliance by intellectuals and commentators, the organization remained a fixture 
in Europe. Regardless, IPS and TNI continued pursuing East-West reconciliation and the 
dismantling of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, though the obstinacy of the superpowers 
made such efforts difficult. TNI, for instance, started a “New Europe Project,” which 
sought to bring West and East Europeans together and promote the withdrawal of outside 
forces. The project, needless to say, faced an uphill battle. Borosage claimed that a paper 
he presented at a conference, which dealt with the issue of superpower disengagement, 
caused “the Russians [to] hit the roof. They saw a European settlement as both 
impossible and undesirable.” America, too, according to IPS intellectuals, showed no 
inclination to dismantle NATO. Since American officials viewed NATO as “the least 
risky projection of American military power and the least difficult to justify,” Barnet 
realized that IPS faced a struggle to end NATO. By the late 1970s, certain IPS 
intellectuals believed that NATO found new life. During a private “consultation” held in 
Amsterdam in the late 1970s under the direction of IPS’s Militarism and Disarmament 
Project, Michael Klare opened the meeting by expressing his concern that the growing 
spotlight on NATO served the interests of supporters of a militaristic foreign policy. For 
instance, Klare argued, “Pro-military forces in the U.S. are using NATO as the cutting 
edge of a campaign to impose a New Cold War on American and European society.” As 
evidence of this hardening of Cold War wills, Klare pointed to Senator Scoop Jackson’s 
opposition to SALT II, which would have made it more difficult for the United States to 
transfer new weapons systems to its European allies. The Department of Defense and 
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weapons producers also repeatedly used NATO’s “alleged vulnerabilities” to garner 
support for greater military spending, Klare claimed.15 
NATO’s resurgence on the American political scene, according to Klare, owed 
itself to the United States failure in Vietnam. As a means to counter the “Vietnam 
syndrome” that diminished Americans’ support of an aggressive foreign policy, United 
States officials, Klare contended, “revived NATO as the raison d’etre of U.S. military 
planning.” Supporters of a strong military and assertive foreign policy used NATO as a 
way of “neutralizing the anti-military views of liberals” who considered NATO a 
“centrist, ‘democratic’ commitment,” unlike the “imperial ventures” undertaken by 
SEATO and CENTO. NATO’s stature rose, furthermore, due to a new understanding of 
geopolitics following the Vietnam War. NATO represented those “core areas,” as Klare 
called the states protected under the NATO umbrella, or “those geopolitical interests 
whose control by the West is considered essential to the survival of U.S. society in its 
present form.” These geopolitically important nations also faced a common enemy—the 
Soviet Union.16 
 During a congressional seminar in early 1965, IPS trustee James Warburg offered 
his opinion on the alliance. The historian E. Timothy Smith has described Warburg as 
among “the most articulate and well-known critics” of NATO. Warburg had no problem 
with an Atlantic alliance, but he worried that the present structure emphasized military 
rather than political solutions. Speaking in 1965, Warburg believed that Europe 
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represented the paramount issue of the Cold War. He concluded, therefore, that just as the 
Cold War started in Europe it would also end there, as soon as the superpowers resolved 
the issue of Germany. Warburg wanted to replace NATO with “a total European security 
agreement” including all European countries. Along with a new regional alliance system, 
Warburg thought that Europeans had to shift “from nationalism to some form of supra-
nationalism.” “If they all give up a certain amount of sovereignty,” Warburg predicted, 
“then it is in everybody’s interest to maintain the peace.”17  While many liberal 
internationalists turned away from world government in the late 1940s, Warburg clearly 
held out hope for such an outcome, at least in Europe. 
 Warburg’s suggestion that European nations had to accept limits to their 
sovereignty complimented IPS’s efforts to strengthen international law and the U.N. IPS 
intellectuals, particularly the co-directors, believed that international law, in combination 
with the U.N., could greatly reduce conflict in the world and bring about disarmament. 
Yet achieving the conditions necessary for international law to prevail required nation 
states to give up some of their sovereign rights, as Warburg acknowledged. Asked if “a 
corresponding decline of the nation-state” had to follow the strengthening of international 
law, Barnet responded in the affirmative. He argued that only through “a limitation on the 
rights of individual nation-states” would it become clear what path offered the best hope 
for each nation’s “security or for the promotion of their ‘national interests.’”  External 
events, moreover, weakened nation states and made them dispensable, Barnet claimed. 
By the early 1970s, he argued, various events made the nation-state “obsolete”—it could 
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not, for instance, protect its citizens against nuclear decimation, achieve “world order” 
through military or other means, promote development in foreign nations, or secure 
foreign markets. Barnet did not seem disturbed by the decline of the nation-state. While 
he feared that “managers of nation-states” would “become more frustrated by their 
inability to solve urgent problems” and thus use “authoritarian and militaristic methods” 
to try to retain influence, Barnet hoped that an alternative form of organization would 
eventually replace the nation-state. “Planetary survival will depend upon how quickly the 
power of the nation-state can be contained and a wider human identity can be 
established,” he argued18  Existing conditions, therefore, made it a particularly opportune 
time for an alternative alliance system to develop. 
At the same time, no one at IPS went so far as to call for the creation of a world 
government, which would have stripped states completely of their sovereignty, even 
though IPS intellectuals realized that international law would likely fail without some sort 
of world federalism. Raskin, for instance, accepted that treaties did not always bring 
about the desired results, but he rejected the suggestion that world government provided a 
total solution. Pointing to America’s Civil War nearly seventy years after the American 
Revolution, Raskin wondered if there “would not be a similar international civil war in 
the context of a world government.” Thus, even as Raskin and Joseph Duffey argued in 
1975 that “the U.N. could be the major forum for carrying out the business of foreign 
policy” and suggested that the United States could “take some responsibility in 
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folder 36; Richard J. Barnet, “Farewell to the Nation-State,” The New York Times, June 19, 1971, 27. 
      134 
 
 
developing a world common law,” world government did not appeal to the pragmatic 
minds at IPS.19 
Yet, as IPS encouraged the United States and its allies to dismantle NATO and 
form a new alliance under the control of the U.N., the international body, never popular 
in America, reached its lowest point. Looking at the U.N. at the start of Nixon’s 
presidency, one historian has concluded, “The love affair between the United States and 
the U.N. had surely ended by 1969.” Unable to overcome American intransigence and 
find a solution to the quagmire in Vietnam, as well as the inability of the United States to 
control the General Assembly as more nations critical of America joined the body, 
American officials showed even less interest in the organization.20 Furthermore, 
historians and political scientists have shown how international bodies like the U.N. 
served as tools of the most powerful nations to do their bidding. When the United States 
did go through the U.N., it followed the advice put forth by Dean Rusk, who, according 
to Mark Mazower, “believed the U.N. itself could be an effective instrument of anti-
Soviet pressure.” Furthermore, Rusk’s view of the U.N., as Mazower has argued, was 
that it had a “blend of idealism and military ambition.” Rusk believed that the U.N. 
played an important role in promoting international law but he also supported using 
America’s military to make certain that nations followed U.N. commands. Further 
bringing into question the ability of the U.N. to act as arbitrator of international law, 
political scientist G. John Ikenberry has suggested that powerful nations used 
“constitutional settlement,” i.e. supranational institutions like the U.N., as a cost-saving 
                                                            
     19 Marcus Raskin to Ellsworth P. Carrington, December 19, 1983, IPSR, WHS, box 59, folder 21; 
Marcus Raskin and Joseph Duffey, “Toward a Modern National Security State: Convention Background 
Paper,” Democratic Review (October/November 1975), IPSR, WHS, box 60, folder 45, 49. 
     20 Ostrower, The United Nations and the United States, 125. 
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measure. Constantly using force and coercion to maintain a position of dominance over 
other nations cost too much, Ikenberry has argued, while supranational institutions acted 
as “a form of hegemonic investment in the future” by gaining the approval of other 
nations for a longer time and without the use of force.21 
IPS’s Efforts to Bring Populism to the United Nations 
The dramatic growth of the U.N.’s General Assembly that began in the late 1960s 
and eventually led to America’s avoidance of the body found early support among IPS 
thinkers, especially Waskow. In a 1965 letter to Assistant Secretary of State Harlan 
Cleveland, Waskow argued that the U.N. needed to include in its General Assembly a 
“special role” for underdeveloped nations. He pointed to an “increasing possibility of 
hostility to the great powers, including the United States, on the part of the small and 
large but weak and poverty-stricken powers, as kind of ‘world populism’ that needs some 
sort of legitimating and peaceful focus if it is not to erupt in violence,” as it did in China 
in 1949. Waskow predicted that the inclusion of lesser powers in the U.N. matters “might 
provide a safety valve for this explosive ‘populism.’” At the same time, he cautioned 
against seeing increased power for the smaller, less developed nations as a threat to 
American leadership. American industry, Waskow explained using a historical analogy, 
survived despite the measures enacted by Populists in America in the late 1800s.22 
Waskow continued to pursue the issue in a conversation with Todd Gitlin. He 
proposed to the SDS leader that “one—just one—current line for those who care about 
the Third World is to focus support in this country for the General Assembly. . . .” 
                                                            
     21 Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), 241-
242; G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After 
Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 53-56. 
     22 Arthur Waskow to Harlan Cleveland, May 24, 1965, AWP, WHS, box 4, folder 17. 
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Waskow recognized that many nations distrusted the U.N. and saw it as an “instrument” 
of the United States, but he suggested that “the small, the weak, and the poor might 
respond to this challenge not by collapsing before it . . . but by turning the Assembly into 
their own instrument and ‘taking it away’ from the United States.” Waskow’s vision for 
the U.N. required, however, the presence of a “pro-small-and-poor, pro-Assembly, pro-
new-kind of U.N., pro-Third-World voice” in the United States.23 
Yet, even with an expanded roster of Third World nations in the General 
Assembly, the U.N.’s Security Council held much of the decision-making authority, 
especially in regard to settling international conflicts. Cognizant of this fact, Waskow 
sought a change in the way the U.N. decided when and where it would send its 
peacekeeping forces. His proposal to make the decision-making process in the U.N. more 
democratic involved tying who could vote on peacekeeping measures to the size of the 
peacekeeping force. Since each group of peacekeepers would be “a spectrum of different 
sizes,” Waskow suggested setting a particular “threshold” where the amount of money, 
the number of troops, and the type of weapons used in the mission would determine who 
could vote on whether to send a peacekeeping mission. Larger operations would require 
the approval and funding of the Security Council while small-scale operations would 
need the approval of just the General Assembly. In the latter case, all nations voting yes 
would pay for the mission. Such a process, Waskow claimed, would allow smaller 
nations to “pool their power” to stop even the actions of one of the Great Powers. 
Waskow predicted that his reforms would dramatically improve the functioning of the 
U.N. because his plan accepted the rise of a “world populism,” which he described as a 
                                                            
     23 Arthur Waskow (with Todd Gitlin), “Toward a Decent Manifest Destiny: An Exchange,” The 
Correspondent (Winter 1965), AWP, WHS, box 3, folder 2, 89-92. 
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“hostility to all the rich, whether capitalist or communists, and a fierce determination to 
resist them.” This attitude among Third World nations, he predicted, would grow in 
strength since detente had made interventions in the Third World by the superpowers 
more attractive because neither the Soviet Union nor the United States would risk nuclear 
war in order to stop the other side from intervening in the region. Waskow posed the 
question to the superpowers as a “choice . . . between proliferation of nuclear weapons to 
a dozen hungry nations, or the creation of a peacekeeping force that the hungry nations in 
the U.N. could use to protect themselves.”24 
Not surprisingly, American officials disagreed with Waskow’s ideas regarding 
“world populism.” The Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States, 
Ambassador Francis T.P. Plimpton, felt that Waskow ignored the major role played by 
the General Assembly, which had the authority to send troops so long as “there is no 
attempt to force anybody to do anything but to keep the peace. . . .” Plimpton’s comment 
referred to the ability of the General Assembly to send peacekeeping forces to countries 
only if a nation desired their presence within their borders. Waskow called this authority 
“practically useless” because nations that required the assistance of a peacekeeping 
mission often had several different opposition governments, making it difficult to gain 
approval. Also, in situations where a superpower invaded a smaller nation, the Security 
Council had the ability to overrule the General Assembly.25  Thus, truly changing the 
U.N. required that the General Assembly play a larger role in making policy at the 
                                                            
     24 Arthur I. Waskow, “Populism and Peacekeeping at the U.N.,” War/Peace Report 5 (May 1965), 8-9. 
     25 “The Future of the U.N.” Excerpts from War/Peace Report’s Conference on the Future of the U.N., 
War/Peace Report 5 (June 1965), 12-14. 
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international body, where Third World nations made up an increasing proportion of the 
body every year. 
Barnet did not go as far as Waskow in calling for the inclusion of underdeveloped 
countries into the U.N., but the IPS co-director suggested in 1968 that NATO, if it 
continued to exist, should look into the non-military related problems of the world. 
Barnet claimed that the decreased likelihood of a Soviet invasion of Europe and Western 
Europe’s economic revival, made it possible for the United States, the Soviet Union, and 
European nations “to devise an approach to a settlement that will not only deal with the 
problems of the last generation but will confront the problems of the next generation.” 
Increasingly, Barnet believed, economic and political problems took precedence over the 
military issues that dominated world affairs in the decades following World War II. In 
particular, Barnet argued that NATO needed to deal with “The crises of the industrialized 
world and the crises of underdevelopment.” Even though Western Europe experienced a 
spectacular economic resurgence, its citizens still lacked basic needs. Barnet linked both 
the “legitimacy” and “security” of a nation to its ability to keep its citizens well fed, 
working, and nourished in both mind and body. Massive military spending prevented a 
nation from caring for its citizens. The underdeveloped countries of the world, Barnet 
claimed, represented another security concern. Referring to the multitude of problems 
besetting these nations, Barnet wrote “that the grim reality of mass starvation, political 
oppression, and violent revolution is the Number One security problem of the next 
generation.” Demanding a separation of aid from Cold War considerations, Barnet called 
on America, European nations, and the Soviets “to reverse the present dangerous trends 
which threaten to keep major portions of the globe in a high state of tension and despair” 
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and threatened the developed world.26  As Barnet made these comments, the Third World 
joined together and demanded that the U.N. pay greater attention to the plight facing 
underdeveloped and developing nations on the periphery. 
An Isolationist Program? 
For the most part, then, IPS supported multilateral solutions to the world’s 
problems through an alliance of nations from both the East and West acting under the 
direction of the U.N. At other times, though, Barnet, at his most isolationist, called for the 
end of all alliances and for greater restraint in American foreign policy. During an 
interview in the mid-1970s, he called for “no formal alliances.” In place of the alliance 
system, Barnet wanted the United States to follow “a consistent policy of being a 
supporter, not a guarantor, of existing boundaries and then making clear that we have a 
very strong nonintervention policy on internal disorder,” which would prevent America 
from taking sides during a nation’s domestic disputes. America’s only concern would be 
with “the preservation of the existing territorial status quo or to some orderly peaceful 
change,” Barnet explained. The existing alliance system, Barnet claimed, involved 
“alliances with most countries to stabilize regimes in the face of internal subversion,” and 
rarely looked into aggression by a foreign power. Barnet and others at IPS sometimes 
spoke in favor of isolationism because they did not fear an upsurge in the number of 
communist states in Europe or elsewhere.27 
Perhaps the most libertarian thinker at IPS, Earl Ravenal embraced a “unilateral 
disengagement” of U.S. forces from Europe in order to decrease the military budget. 
                                                            
     26 Richard J. Barnet, “The United States, the United Nations, and a European Settlement,” 1968, IPSR, 
WHS, box 1, folder 9, 5-7. 
     27 “Richard J. Barnet Interview with Public Agenda Foundation,” Transcript, April 27, 1976, IPSR, 
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Arguing that restrictions on trade or a European trading “bloc” “might actually be more 
constructive for the international system,” Ravenal cautioned against the United States 
trying to thwart such outcomes. Furthermore, he acknowledged that communist 
governments would come to power in certain countries after an American withdrawal—
he listed Italy, France, Spain, and Portugal as likely countries for communist party 
advances in the future—but he suggested that the United States could “establish contacts” 
with the communists in these countries. For Ravenal, “unilateral disengagement” did not 
mean complete separation of America from Europe. He made it clear that financial, 
environmental, developmental, arms agreements, and the maintenance of peace would 
continue to tie America to Europe. The only difference would be that America would not 
be able to assert total control over its allies as it had done in the past. The dissolution of 
NATO involved nothing more than a recognition “of a new kind of international system 
with a different distribution of power and different patterns of interaction.”28  In calling 
for a reduced American role in European affairs, IPS intellectuals did not consider such 
propositions unrealistic, but commentators and officials who saw the world divided 
between democracy and communism would have difficulty accepting further advances 
for communism. 
Devoid of the concern usually evinced by IPS for democratic participation, 
Waskow offered a plan that he argued would curb American interventionism. According 
to notes from a disarmament and national security seminar held at IPS in 1964, Waskow 
                                                            
     28 Earl C. Ravenal, “The Dialectic of Military Spending,” in The Federal Budget and Social 
Reconstruction, ed. Marcus G. Raskin (Washington D.C.: IPS, 1978), 151-152. As a further note on the 
libertarian strain found in the writings of IPS intellectuals on matters pertaining to domestic and foreign 
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suggested creating a body resembling the U.S Supreme Court, which would “serve as a 
sort of national watchdog or goal-setter for American international policies.” In choosing 
the Supreme Court as his model, Waskow explained that it “often acts as if its job is to 
subject present reality to prospects for the future (30-50 years ahead) and to issue 
prescriptions as to the direction in which American society ought to move.” Not 
surprisingly, several participants in the seminar strongly disagreed with Waskow’s 
proposition. Raskin, for instance, questioned what he considered a total lack of 
democracy in having such a body rule over decisions that impacted all of society. 
“Raskin doesn’t think that the creation of a body of wise men invested with certain 
ceremonial as well as real power and who serve as the priests of the society for 
international matters is possible in a genuinely democratic society,” the notes to the 
meeting explained.29 
In calling for the replacement of NATO with regional collective security 
arrangements connected to the U.N., IPS intellectuals accepted the fact that America 
would lose its ability to control world affairs. Barnet, Raskin, and others at IPS would say 
                                                            
     29 “Disarmament Seminar,” April 1, 1964,” transcript found in Special Agent Charles M. Sawyer to 
WFO,” September 8, 1969, IPSR, WHS, box 25, folder 20, 1-2. Waskow, reminiscent of some of the 
earlier criticisms found in his studies conducted at PRI, came under attack for encouraging members of the 
body to look at how present decisions would affect America and the world decades later. Arthur Barber, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arms Control in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Security Affairs, expressed “serious reservations” about not only Waskow’s paper but the 
seminar itself. “Would the seminar merely be an occasion for intellectual gymnastics, or would there be a 
serious exchange of views in order to come up with ideas bearing at least some remote relation to political 
plausibility,” Barber declared as he questioned the feasibility of Waskow’s institution. Barber also 
characterized “Waskow’s insistence on a thirty-year goal for the American government” as “a nonsense 
statement lacking operational meaning.” While agreeing “future-oriented institutions” seemed far-fetched, 
Raskin still supported Waskow’s general idea that government and military officials needed to look for 
policies that, while beyond the pale presently, could offer hope in the future. As the notes for the meeting 
explained, “Raskin’s experience on the NSC convinced him that in order to come up with politically 
relevant ideas, and to avoid being forever rooted in dead center, it was necessary to have some free for all 
with respect to future goals and aspirations.” Nonetheless, Barber still bewailed the “abstract and frivolous 
discussion of future-futures,” much preferring that talk about the future stay limited to a period not 
exceeding one decade. See Ibid., 3-4, 6. 
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that America never held such power in the first place. Furthermore, IPS intellectuals 
openly acknowledged that their plans for a post-NATO world would do away with the 
tidy hierarchical structure of the present alliance system. Writing in the early 1970s, 
Barnet argued that America had to accept “a high degree of disorder and instability” in 
the world and allow nations to decide what political and economic system worked best 
for them. Furthermore, the United States, Barnet explained, needed to see itself as one 
member of a larger group of nations. He appealed to Americans “to identify with the 
people of other countries as members of the same species with the same basic problems,” 
and not “as abstractions to be manipulated for our own psychological and political needs 
and will continue to build our power on their suffering.”30 
Part of America coming to grips with its diminished power involved looking at 
the world in a new way. America would have to approach foreign affairs from a non-
ideological perspective. Solving America’s problems, Barnet claimed, required new 
labels to describe other nations. “Examining old habits of mind and passionate 
attachments to ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ would,” Barnet wrote, “enable the United States to 
bring commitments and resources into balance.” Furthermore, Barnet implored American 
officials to take a less reactionary approach to revolutions abroad. Officials needed to 
realize, Barnet claimed, that revolutions in the Third World did not threaten America’s 
security. Such events merely changed the dynamics of foreign relationships. “To live in 
security in a revolutionary world,” Barnet argued, “the U.S. will have to cope with the 
unpleasant truth that Americans cannot continue to grow richer while millions starve and 
still feel safe.” Moreover, if the United States refrained from looking at all world events 
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through its ideological prism, Barnet claimed that cooperation would be possible. Calling 
on the United States to “be much less ideological in relating to revolutionary nationalist 
regimes,” Barnet urged America to form economic partnerships with Third World 
nations, which he claimed, would “have a moderating influence on revolutionary 
governments” if based on equity.31 
In setting its sights on NATO and asserting that the military alliance no longer 
served a purpose, IPS sought to demolish a primary apparatus of the Cold War. Yet IPS 
tended to place too much of the blame for NATO’s existence on the United States. In 
spite of Europe’s constant complaining, European leaders still favored a close 
relationship with America. The Soviet Union, too, preferred NATO to the alternative, a 
unified and militarized Germany. In fact, IPS intellectuals, particularly Barnet, attached 
too little importance to the issue of German reunification, believing that both 
superpowers would accept whatever political and economic system a reunified Germany 
chose. Perhaps, as IPS argued, the unwillingness of the participants of the Cold War to 
move beyond the status quo explains the longevity of NATO. Unwilling to seek an 
                                                            
     31 Richard J. Barnet, “Reflections: Rethinking National Security,” The New Yorker, March 21, 1988, 
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alternative to NATO, both East and West preferred sticking with what they knew. 
Regarding the U.N, IPS, with the exception of Waskow’s plan that would have allowed 
the General Assembly to play a larger role in deciding when to send peacekeeping forces 
into troubled regions, offered few suggestions for how to deal with the Security Council. 
Whereas IPS sought to abolish NATO, trilateralists and liberal internationalists actually 
endorsed plans to strengthen NATO in the late 1970s, which led President Carter to put 
forth a plan to station Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe. 
Neoconservatives, too, supported efforts to bolster European defenses, even after the 
proposal to rearm NATO countries threatened the very existence of the military alliance. 
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Chapter Four: Vietnam: The War That Made IPS Famous 
For IPS, the Vietnam War represented everything that was wrong with America 
and its foreign policy. Still haunted by Adolf Hitler, the United States replaced the 
German leader with a new bogeyman, communism. Nonetheless, the same fear of 
appeasement drove American officials to view Vietnam as the next Cold War 
battleground. Even more disconcerting to IPS, America employed the same techniques, 
especially saturation bombing, in Vietnam as it did during World War II. Unlike 
American officials tasked with carrying out the Vietnam War, IPS intellectuals looked at 
the conflict as a political issue. As a result, IPS encouraged the United States to withdraw 
its troops from the region and pursue negotiations, even if such actions led to the entire 
country of Vietnam eventually becoming communist. A communist Vietnam bothered 
IPS far less than the immorality of continued American interference in the region. 
As Robert Tomes has shown in his study of American intellectuals and the 
Vietnam War, prior to 1963, only a small group of “selectivist liberal dissenters” 
questioned the wisdom of fighting communism across the globe. On Vietnam, 
intellectuals offered “vacillated” opinions and “contradictory” conclusions. Many 
liberals, Tomes suggests, could never accept a communist Vietnam as an ally of America. 
Thus, when Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1964, only the New 
Republic, the Nation, and the Progressive spoke out against the measure. Other 
historians, though, have shown the existence of dissent in both America and abroad in the 
years prior to America’s decision to intervene in Vietnam in 1965.1 President Johnson, 
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however, chose to ignore them. Fredrik Logevall has criticized previous scholarship for 
making it seem as though Johnson had no other options in Vietnam besides escalation 
and for overstating the amount of support the president received from Americans. 
Logevall shows that Johnson had several alternatives available to him. Noting a “fluidity 
in Establishment thinking about the war in the crucial months of decision,” Logevall 
points to the dismay felt by “midlevel bureaucrats” and among several prominent 
columnists and newspapers.2 
As for the general public, wholehearted support for the Vietnam War did not 
appear until Johnson had already committed American forces to Vietnam. Even in 
February 1965, as America prepared for Operation Rolling Thunder, there existed a 
“widespread antipathy” toward sending American troops to Vietnam and “broad support” 
for negotiations, according to Logevall. Likewise, Logevall has described the United 
States as “isolated” internationally as American allies offered only “tepid rhetorical 
support,” rather than soldiers, to the American war effort. Yet, even those individuals and 
groups calling for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam made sure not to make too much of 
America’s unwillingness to pursue talks with North Vietnam. Blaming domestic and 
international critics of the war for allowing “the Americanization of the Vietnam War” to 
take place “in a permissive context,” Logevall notes how the British and Senate 
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Democrats spoke up only so much while still allowing the Johnson administration “to 
escalate by stealth.”3 
President Johnson purposely kept American citizens in the dark about matters 
pertaining to Vietnam. According to Tom Wells, the president preferred not to give a 
“trumpet call” talk to the nation calling for mobilization of American troops, even though 
Daniel Ellsberg wrote a speech along those lines for Secretary of Defense McNamara. 
Johnson’s reluctance to publicize his decisions on Vietnam stemmed from the fact that he 
did not want to call up the national reserves. Doing so would have led to calls by Senate 
hawks to increase the bombing of North Vietnam and possibly lead to a McCarthy-like 
paranoia resurfacing in America. Large-scale mobilization, furthermore, the Johnson 
administration feared, would bring greater public attention to the government’s Vietnam 
policy, arousing the still relatively small antiwar movement and possibly encouraging 
congressional opponents of the war to speak out.4 
Hitler’s Ghost and America as an Imperial Hegemon 
IPS intellectuals held no compunction about condemning America’s actions in 
Vietnam, both publicly and privately, to government officials and the American people. 
In the months following the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, Raskin called not 
only for a negotiated settlement, but also for replacing the policymakers in Washington 
who fashioned American policy in Vietnam. Raskin also derided intellectuals for refusing 
to take a stand against the administration. In an unpublished “draft” written in November 
1964, Raskin proclaimed, “The silence on the part of American intellectuals regarding the 
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American tragedy is quite deafening.” Listing the many immoral and deadly acts 
committed against Vietnam by American troops, he lamented, “Like Sisyphus we work 
with stone so much we become stone ourselves.” As a solution to the mess in Vietnam, 
Raskin called on the United States, as well as its South Vietnamese allies, to “stop its 
brutality, its use of napalm, torture, and other crude un-American forms of behavior.” 
Raskin also insisted that President Johnson “call for the resignation … of Rostow, Taylor, 
Bill Bundy, Richardson, and others who have foisted this miserable situation on ourselves 
and others.” Lastly, Raskin proposed a meeting between the United States, France, China, 
and the Soviet Union to create the conditions necessary for a negotiated settlement in 
Vietnam. As part of agreement to end American military intervention in Vietnam, Raskin 
urged the United States to provide development aid to Southeast Asia.5 
In calling for the resignations of officials in the Johnson administration, Raskin 
hoped that bringing in new blood into the government would eliminate from 
policymaking circles the penchant for equating events in Vietnam with the years 
preceding World War II. President Johnson’s Assistant Secretary of State William P. 
Bundy, among others, warned against repeating the mistakes of World War II when 
American and British officials appeased Hitler. Responding to a paper written by Raskin 
on the Vietnam War, Bundy criticized him for dwelling on the atrocities committed by 
South Vietnam and ignoring North Vietnam’s use of the same harsh tactics. Bundy closed 
his letter by comparing Raskin’s views on Vietnam with similar complaints made against 
Europeans who tried to prevent Hitler’s expansionist policies in Europe in the 1930s. 
“Your whole handling of this aspect reminded me all too painfully of attitudes in Europe 
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in the 1930s that equated every police measure by Benes against the Sudetens morally to 
the whole course of Hitler’s conduct,” Bundy wrote. Raskin, in replying to Bundy’s 
criticisms, chided the assistant secretary of state for his use of “false historical parallels 
which are totally irrelevant.” Bundy’s all too familiar analogy of Vietnam as a domino 
poised to fall and bring communism to all of Southeast Asia, furthermore, seemed to 
Raskin “far too ideological, emotive, conclusive and reductive.” “The apocalyptic view 
saves us the trouble of forging a sophisticated foreign policy for Asia which requires 
diplomatic skill and prowess,” Raskin explained.6 
Critical of politicians who continued to use the Munich analogy to defend 
American actions in Vietnam, Barnet, writing in the late 1960s, again questioned the 
relevance of such a comparison. Barnet chided U.S. officials for overstating the threat 
communism posed to U.S. security. To think, Barnet wrote, “that the Castros of the future 
will muster an army of millions, transport them by sampan and burro, and loose them on 
our cities is nothing less than a psychotic phantasy, so absurd in fact that it is never 
explicitly stated, only hinted at in vague anxiety producing historical analogies” 
unconnected to present conditions. Looking for fictional enemies abroad led American 
officials to ignore the growing opposition to the war at home among certain segments of 
society, Barnet claimed. He argued that “the diversion of money and energy to fight 
which is supposed to keep Asian Communists from landing on our shores helps 
perpetuate the conditions which have created native insurgents and guerrilla warfare in 
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American cities.”7  In other words, if the United States truly wanted to stop communism 
from lurching forward, it needed to redirect some of the money it spent on defense to 
improve the lives of Third World citizens as well as its own. 
Whereas Raskin blamed American actions in Vietnam on an antiquated mindset 
and an ideological hatred that blinded policymakers to reality, Waskow saw a new 
attitude taking hold of America, one reminiscent of past hegemonies. Noting America’s 
refusal to go through the United Nations to end North Vietnamese infiltration into South 
Vietnam and the use of chemicals to destroy Vietnam’s crops, Waskow, speaking at the 
University of Michigan teach-in in March 1965, pointed to “the new American 
arrogance.” According to him, “The new American arrogance says that the ends we seek 
are so noble, so benign, that any means at all are legitimate to advance them.” At the 
same time, Waskow described the détente between America and the Soviet Union as “a 
corrupt deal” because it allowed America to be as “free to do as we like to these and 
similarly annoying underdeveloped countries whose people have skin colors different 
from ours and whose governments have a philosophy hostile to ours.” Since the United 
States would rather “shoot down any troublemaker who arise [sic] from that night of 
poverty and despair” than to allow him “to shout his hatred into our well-lit, well-
upholstered living rooms,” opportunities for dialogue disappeared, Waskow claimed.8  
America’s rise to hegemony allowed officials to disregard weaker nations. As a result, 
military action replaced talking. 
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While critical of American actions in Vietnam, Waskow did not support an 
isolationist foreign policy. In fact, Waskow warned the crowd at the teach-in not to allow 
a “neo-isolationist arrogance” to guide their thinking on foreign policy. Thus, he 
encouraged his listeners not to become “the man who simply shuts off his living room 
with walls and security locks, takes a cab to the office so as not to see the poor, and leave 
them to rot in their misery.” Rather, the United States, Waskow argued, returning to ideas 
he pursued earlier in his career, could fight communism with “Unarmed Forces,” like the 
Peace Corps, and “win unarmed victories for liberty.” However, since the American 
military decimated Vietnam, Waskow questioned whether America could win an 
“unarmed victory.” Therefore, he called for an immediate military withdrawal from 
Southeast Asia. In a 1966 letter to the War/Peace Report editors, Waskow demanded that 
the United States “withdraw militarily without conditions.” While many Americans 
might disagree with his call for immediate withdrawal, Waskow contended “we should 
accept a local defeat that resulted from our own stupidity and moral blindness, rather than 
make the Vietnamese pay for our stupidity by destroying what is left of their country.”9  
America, in other words, had so tarnished its image and caused such great physical 
destruction in Vietnam that it could never fix what it had done. Better then to leave with 
what little dignity America still possessed. 
In spite of the ineptitude of American policymakers and the destruction caused in 
Vietnam by American bombs, the United States continued its bombing campaign against 
the North Vietnamese. As the historian Robert Schulzinger has shown, the bombing 
strategy pursued by Johnson owed much to the thinking of Secretary of Defense Robert 
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McNamara. He believed that the bombing of North Vietnam served a single purpose: 
obtaining a stronger negotiating position for the United States. McNamara devised a 
bombing strategy meant to stop infiltration of the North Vietnamese into South Vietnam 
and included built-in pauses to encourage the North Vietnamese to enter into 
negotiations. When the United States adopted this strategy and initiated the first bombing 
pause in early 1966, the North Vietnamese refused to conduct negotiations with foreign 
nations on matters pertaining to the political system in Vietnam. Such defiance by the 
North Vietnamese actually increased support for the bombing in America and encouraged 
President Johnson to expand the bombing in the hope that it would end the war more 
quickly.10 
While the Johnson administration publicly berated the North Vietnamese for their 
unwillingness to meet at the bargaining table, IPS intellectuals questioned whether the 
United States really sought an end to the war. American officials, Ralph Stavins wrote in 
1971 with the aid of the as yet unreleased Pentagon Papers, began a policy of escalation 
in early 1965 not as a means to prevent a communist takeover in Southeast Asia, or even 
to protect America’s national security, Stavins argued. President Johnson decided to 
escalate the war in 1965 in order to preserve America’s status as “Number One Nation.” 
According to Stavins, McGeorge Bundy and other officials could accept the fact that 
aerial bombing failed to secure a military victory in Vietnam because the bombing 
allowed America to preserve its position as the world’s dominant nation. For Bundy, 
Stavins claimed, “the way he [America] plays the game becomes as important to him as 
the result of the game.” Claiming that Bundy advocated for the continued bombing of 
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Vietnam in order to preserve America’s domination of South Vietnam, Stavins described 
the National Security Advisor as “a gamester [seeking] to bring about an imperial goal.” 
Raskin made a nearly identical argument not long after the bombing of Vietnam began in 
earnest in February 1965. In his “A Citizen’s White Paper on American Policy in 
Vietnam and Southeast Asia,” Raskin suggested that how America appeared to the 
Chinese mattered more than the military benefits of bombing. Rather than resorting to 
bombing for military purposes, Raskin argued that America’s decision to bomb Vietnam 
came about as a result of being “goaded by Chinese propaganda and psychological 
feelings of impotence” and fears that America would appear “like paper tigers” to the 
Chinese.11 
As early as 1966, Waskow called for the immediate withdrawal of American 
troops from Vietnam, but the majority of intellectuals at IPS advocated negotiations, 
which included the staged withdrawal of American forces, and a greater role for the 
United Nations. Raskin, along with the well-known war correspondent Bernard B. Fall, 
who had previously supported the American war effort in Vietnam, offered the most 
elaborate plan for ending the American war in Southeast Asia in their 1965 edited 
collection of essays entitled The Viet-Nam Reader. The collection included the writings 
of such Establishment figures as Dean Acheson and Walt W. Rostow as well as 
documents from the National Liberation Front.12  At the end of The Viet-Nam Reader, 
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Raskin and Fall offered several proposals for ending the Vietnam War or, at the very 
least, reducing the carnage caused by the war. “All American servicemen in Viet-Nam,” 
the editors demanded, “are to be fully and clearly apprised that, as a minimum, the Hague 
and Geneva Conventions on land warfare and on the treatment of prisoners of war and 
war victims fully apply in combat operations in Viet-Nam.” The admittance of Red Cross 
officials, Raskin and Fall believed, would help improve conditions in Vietnam. Raskin 
and Fall also argued that America needed to drop its “ill-founded reasons” for not 
allowing the U.N. into Vietnam.13 
As for America’s bombing campaign, it neither succeeded in “break[ing] North 
Vietnamese morale,” nor did it “boast South Vietnamese morale,” so the editors called 
for bringing an end to the bombing. America, Raskin and Fall continued, needed to 
accept the “hard reality” that any coalition government in South Vietnam would have to 
include the National Liberation Front (NLF). This fact should not have concerned the 
United States, the editors believed, since “the NLF program does not, at least formally, 
clash with basic United States objectives.” Raskin and Fall also called for removing from 
South Vietnam all United States and North Vietnamese troops that arrived after February 
7, 1965. Troops that entered South Vietnam prior to that date would leave the country at a 
later date set by an international control commission. After the withdrawal of outside 
military forces, Raskin and Fall suggested that all sides sign a State Treaty similar to the 
Austrian State Treaty of 1955, which “has for the past decade satisfactorily governed the 
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relations of Austria with both power blocs and ensured the political stability of Central 
Europe.” The treaty included plans for the eventual unification of North and South 
Vietnam.14  Each “diplomatic alternative” offered by Raskin and Fall would serve as a 
blueprint for other intellectuals at IPS. 
Bombing might have allowed the United States to retain its credibility, but IPS 
thinkers strongly disagreed with the notion that Vietnam’s problems required military 
solutions. IPS intellectuals encouraged the United States to involve the U.N. and include 
in the negotiations the actual representatives of the Vietnamese people, the NLF. Before 
discussing IPS’s arguments in favor of negotiations, it is important to understand how 
intellectuals at IPS viewed the situation in Vietnam. IPS’s repeated calls for finding a 
legal solution to the Vietnam War stemmed from a specific understanding intellectuals at 
the Institute had of power. IPS intellectuals opposed the realist view of international 
relations as a game of power politics between nations. In their introduction to The Viet-
Nam Reader, Raskin and Fall offered a different definition of power. The editors 
advocated for a new conception of power that involved more than physical strength. 
“Power,” the authors wrote, “where it is used without wisdom and only in the name of 
one nation, will result in the ultimate corruption of the good ends that nation originally 
might have wished to achieve—and in the corruption of that nation itself.” The legalistic 
perspective held by IPS intellectuals became apparent as early as 1964 when an attack on 
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American naval ships supposedly occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin near Vietnam. Referring 
to the event, Raskin argued that the United Nations Charter prohibited reprisals unless 
they met a specific number of criteria. With limited or no damage done to American 
ships, and no American lives lost, Raskin wrote to the Washington Post, “I know of no 
legal doctrine, domestic or international which would conclude the action taken was 
proportionate to the illegal act committed by North Vietnam.”15 
The Viet-Nam Reader succeeded in capturing the attention of both government 
officials and student protestors. Raskin claimed that he and Fall received “a great number 
of letters” from university faculty and their students. “The book hardened up the lines, 
started people thinking about fundamental American policy,” Raskin noted regarding the 
success of the book. In fact, the reader served as the authoritative book at teach-ins on 
campuses across the nation. Raskin took part in several of these teach-ins, debating Abe 
Fortas, Walt Rostow, and other government officials.16  The Viet-Nam Reader achieved 
exactly what the co-directors had wanted for IPS publications. Raskin and Fall’s book 
offered an alternative source of information for policymakers while educating the masses 
about what went on inside and outside of the United States. 
IPS’s Efforts to Bring Law and Order to America Foreign Policy 
Feeling so strongly about the illegality of American action in Vietnam, Barnet 
wrote a 59-page “legal memorandum” in 1966 that provided a legal rationale for bringing 
officials in the United States to justice. In the memorandum, Barnet pointed to several 
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key articles in the U.N. Charter that the United States purposely ignored in its pursuit of 
victory in Vietnam. To begin with, Article 39 of the U.N. Charter, which dealt with the 
issue of the Security Council, represented, according to Barnet, “an attempt to substitute 
for the anarchy of self-judgment, a community standard for judging when force shall be 
used.” Barnet recognized that the Cold War hamstrung the Security Council, but this did 
not mean that nations could ignore it. He argued that “if we assume that the purpose of an 
international legal order is to build a world order in which both aggression and the use of 
force is contained, then the difficulties in using the machinery of Article 39 do not justify 
the United States decision to ignore the limitations on the use of force in the Charter.” 
The United States had a “clear obligation” to go before the Security Council before using 
force against Vietnam.17 
Barnet also rejected claims made by American officials that it acted in self-
defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter in Vietnam in response to North 
Vietnamese aggression. Noting that American troops arrived in Vietnam and began 
bombing North Vietnam well before the North Vietnamese entered South Vietnam or 
sent arms, Barnet argued that “the U.S., in invoking Article 51, must be prepared to claim 
either that the presence of fewer than 400 soldiers and a few weapons constitutes an 
‘armed attack’ justifying a counter-response of massive bombardment and a full scale 
ground war, or that the guerilla operations of the Viet Cong constitute an ‘armed attack’ 
by North Viet-Nam.” In referring to the first possible argument, Barnet claimed that it 
“not only stretches the obvious meaning of Article 51 beyond any reasonable limit but it 
also exposes the United States to retaliatory military operations for having sent large 
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military missions and vast quantities of arms to most of the nations of the world.” 
Neither, according to Barnet, did the argument that North Vietnam provided arms and 
other forms of assistance to the Viet Cong make America’s claim of self-defense viable. 
Explaining that over the last twenty years “guerrilla operations have been conducted on 
every continent” with support from foreign nations, Barnet pointed out that no nation, 
including the United States, or international body ever argued “that internal strife aided 
from abroad amounted to an ‘armed attack.’”18 
Even if the United States had ample reason to involve itself in the civil strife 
occurring in Vietnam, Barnet criticized American leaders for going it alone and, in the 
process, destroying Vietnam’s physical and political infrastructure. As for what type of 
law Barnet desired, he argued that “we must conclude that a rule which restricts rather 
than encourages outside intervention of single states is preferable not only for reducing 
the dangers of world war but also for promoting the political healing of peoples who have 
been torn apart by war.” America, he regretted, not only destroyed the landscape of 
Vietnam, but also its “political fabric,” making it more difficult to achieve peace. Nor 
could the United States contend that its actions in Vietnam represented a proportionate 
response to the North Vietnamese. As for the claims made by the State Department that 
the North Vietnamese violated the 1954 Geneva Agreements as much as the United 
States, Barnet called attention to the fact that only after the South refused to allow 
national elections did the North Vietnamese breach the treaty. Furthermore, Barnet wrote, 
“When the North did begin to commit major violations the scale, measured either in 
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troops involved, numbers of persons killed, property destroyed, never even approached 
the scale of violation undertaken by the United States and South Viet-Nam.”19 
Yet while calling for an enlarged role for the U.N., IPS intellectuals also 
understood that America, so intent, in the words of Rodberg, on remaining “Number One 
Nation,” would not allow an objective observer like the U.N. to determine its fate. Rather 
than resorting to force, Barnet argued that the United States should have gone to the U.N. 
Going through the U.N., he claimed, opened the door for a political solution by dealing 
individually with particular disagreements rather than all together, which made the 
problems seem insurmountable. Barnet castigated the United States for issuing “a series 
of indictments of the Viet-Cong,” and thus preventing American officials from treating 
them “as separate problems for political resolution.” Regardless, a willingness to allow 
international organizations to deliberate over disputes meant that America would have to 
accept decisions unfavorable to its interests, which seemed unlikely. A willingness to 
settle the dispute in the U.N. would show, Barnet argued, that America “implicitly agrees 
that the system is more important than the outcome of any particular dispute.” Barnet, 
though, understood that the United States would likely never accept U.N. arbitration of 
international conflicts because of America’s “global mission against communism.” 
Because the United States conflated each battle into a “global struggle” concluding in 
either “ultimate victory or defeat,” Barnet argued that “it [America] can believe in no 
system of order other than what it can impose on others.” In the process, according to 
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Barnet, America both defended its choice to go it alone in Vietnam and, at the same time, 
claimed that it had the support of the international community.20 
The United States justified its unilateralism, Barnet argued, on two grounds. 
Officials defended American intervention in Vietnam by pointing to outside interference 
in the country’s internal affairs that prevented harmonious relations among nations under 
U.N. direction. In the words of Barnet, “Once the enemies of freedom are defeated, then 
the U.S. can perhaps share some of its police responsibilities with others.” To prove that 
it did not, in fact, act unilaterally, the United States also highlighted its “reliance on 
nominal or subservient multilateral organizations” set up in various regions of the world 
and composed of relatively weak regional states. One had to look no further, Raskin 
argued, than America’s dependence on the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). 
While the West considered the U.N. “unwieldy and in need of much improvement,” in 
relation to Southeast Asia it had “done more to stabilize that region than either the 
SEATO arrangement or the American military intervention,” Raskin argued. He believed 
that even SEATO members recognized their organization had “absolutely no moral or 
political force behind it.” The inclusion of African, Asian, and Latin American nations 
also made the U.N. far more attractive to Southeast Asian peoples.21 
Unwilling to sit in judgment before other nations, many states, according to 
Barnet, formulated their own legal defenses for intervening, which, not surprisingly, did 
not lead to the most solid legal thinking. As a result, Barnet questioned the ability of 
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international law to solve the world’s disputes. Therefore, Barnet rejected the notion 
popular among some Americans in the late 1960s and early 1970s that international law, 
enforced by international institutions, would make the world more peaceful. For instance, 
he wrote that “powerful states are in fact claiming for themselves the legal right to make 
a greater number of decisions—and more far-reaching ones—than at any time in the last 
400 years.” America’s undeclared war in Vietnam and the Soviet Union’s invasion of 
Czechoslovakia proved that international law faced a number of hurdles. Faced with the 
possibility of life or death decisions related to foreign affairs, legal advisors to political 
leaders often, Barnet claimed, “stretch the law as far as possible to satisfy their clients” 
and employed a selective approach to international law.22  International law, as a result, 
became a farce, allowing any nation to do as it pleased using the flimsiest legal 
precedents to serve their purpose. 
Thus, making the world less violent did not require more international laws, but 
something far more fundamental, a change in the outlook of humankind. According to 
Barnet, international law would succeed only after an “expectation of violence” in 
international relations disappeared. Only by changing the “perception of the threat,” 
Barnet claimed, could the world’s citizens come to see international law as more 
constructive than violence. Past events, most notably the passage of the Limited Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty, succeeded in changing the mindset of the superpowers, bringing on a 
period of relaxed relations between the two sides. Following the treaty, American and 
Western European officials accepted that the Soviets would not invade Europe. 
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Acceptance of new expectations, however, required something more than an international 
police force. The new rules had to be, Barnet argued, “perceived not merely as the 
expression of power but as a source of obligation.” A sense of obligation to international 
law depended largely on individual governments. Since so many countries relied on 
“national security bureaucracies,” however, Barnet had doubts about the ability of the 
world leaders to look at other countries differently. For these countries, he wrote, were 
“in the hands of those who by tradition and professional experience see the pursuit of 
power by national states as the ultimate reality of international life.” Nonetheless, Barnet 
predicted that the influence of “nondefense bureaucracies,” which included transnational 
corporations and the Peace Corps, would grow as the national security bureaucracies 
committed one misstep after another. Nondefense bureaucracies, according to Barnet, 
saw “their own interests served by the development of cooperative transnational 
relationships rather than by the manipulation of violence.”23  No doubt, Barnet considered 
IPS one of these nondefense bureaucracies working to change, through education and 
other means, the American mindset regarding threats, security, and peace.  
Negotiations Now! IPS’s Promotion of Negotiations to End the Vietnam War 
When it became clear that America had to find a way to extricate itself from 
Vietnam, liberal opposition to the war generally split over the issue of what to do with 
American troops stationed in Vietnam. Whereas radicals called for the immediate 
withdrawal of American forces, liberals advocated for negotiations. Moreover, while 
radicals made their displeasure with the war known almost immediately after President 
Johnson introduced ground troops in Vietnam, liberals only came around to supporting 
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negotiations years later. As DeBenedetti and Chatfield have shown, most “elite critics,” 
and even antiwar protestors, sought “some middle ground between escalation and 
withdrawal.” Ordinary Americans, too, opposed both withdrawal and escalation. The 
majority of citizens stood between these two extremes, going so far as to support 
negotiations involving the Vietcong and the formation of a coalition government. Liberal 
support for negotiations materialized by 1967 with the creation of Negotiations Now! Its 
membership, “a liberal all-star team,” according to one historian, included Arthur 
Schlesinger Jr., John Kenneth Galbraith, and Joseph Rauh. Negotiations Now! called for 
a bombing halt as part of a general cease fire and negotiations will all elements of the 
Vietnamese leadership. American troops, however, would remain in the country.24 IPS 
stood somewhat in the middle on the matter of troop withdrawals and negotiations. While 
Waskow supported the immediate removal of American forces from Vietnam, other IPS 
intellectuals, most notably Barnet and Raskin, called for a staged withdrawal.  
For the length of the Vietnam War, IPS intellectuals urged the United States to 
not only hold negotiations, but, more importantly, open up a place at the bargaining table 
for the NLF. In the view of many IPS thinkers the NLF, and not the North Vietnamese, 
represented the only true voice of the revolutionaries. In calling for the United States to 
negotiate with the NLF, Raskin, in an unpublished paper, argued that carrying on the war 
would only strength the ideological bonds between the diverse groups under the NLF 
umbrella. On the other hand, beginning negotiations in 1966 would mean that “serious 
differences in the NLF will [still] show up,” and make it much less likely that the 
communists would control Vietnam, Raskin predicted. Therefore, he concluded that “in 
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order to end the war on terms which would have served the American national interest” 
required meeting with “the principal belligerents,” the NLF. To do otherwise “would be 
similar to Great Britain attempting to get peace during the American Revolution by 
negotiating with France since the revolution was supported and dominated by the 
French.” Until American officials acknowledged the actual participants in the war, the 
conflict would drag on in perpetuity. Barnet criticized the American understanding of 
“negotiation” because in refusing a role for the NLF, the North Vietnamese and the NLF 
“gain none of the objectives for which they have fought for more than 20 years—
essentially political power in South Vietnam and eventual reunification of the country.” 
Furthermore, Barnet contended that “the State Department’s whole script for 
‘negotiation’ takes on an air of fantasy” by thinking that Ho Chi Minh could say the word 
and the NLF guerrillas would end their war in the South—an attitude which Barnet 
blamed on a belief, wrongheaded he claimed, that the Vietnamese civil war might end as 
did the Greek civil war.25 
IPS intellectuals realized that the United States likely would never meet with NLF 
representatives because American officials did not want to appear weak before the Soviet 
Union or offer recognition for a revolutionary party. Writing toward the end of 1966, 
Waskow backed a permanent end to the bombing in both North and South Vietnam, 
followed by the removal of American combat ships from the region. Regarding American 
combat troops, Waskow proposed a unilateral cease-fire to remain in effect until the 
North Vietnamese fired on American troops. After carrying out the above steps, Waskow 
recommended negotiations between the United States and the NLF for the creation of a 
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coalition government to run Vietnam until elections. South Vietnam, in Waskow’s 
arrangement, would be demilitarized and neutralized until reunification with the North. 
Recognizing a “sticking point” in his proposal, Waskow conceded that negotiating with 
the NLF possibly meant “legitimating ‘illegitimate’ Communist revolutions everywhere,” 
but America had no other options. “If the USA ‘cannot’ accept a coalition government in 
South Vietnam, then there is no way to end the war,” Waskow wrote.26 
IPS could advocate for the inclusion of the NLF in negotiations because the 
Institute did not despair over the possibility of a communist government in Vietnam. 
While the United States refused to entertain the idea of allowing the NLF to join a 
coalition government in South Vietnam, Barnet believed that America had nothing to fear 
with the NLF in power. Barnet described the NLF’s “program” as “deliberately moderate 
and non-communist” due to the local conditions the NLF faced in South Vietnam. 
According to Barnet, the NLF understood that “their only hope of bringing effective rule 
to South Vietnam is to attract a coalition of the many diverse elements which make up 
what is, historically, a nation but, organizationally, a collection of duchies.” Barnet 
appreciated the State Department’s concern that the non-communist groups within South 
Vietnam did not possess enough strength to prevent an NLF takeover of the country, but 
he also blamed the United States for undermining non-communists in Vietnam. Barnet 
accused the United States of “undercutting the independent power of non-communist 
nationalists by giving full backing to the military junta.” Thus Barnet called on President 
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Johnson to make “[a] telephone call to President Thieu making clear that the U.S. now 
insists that the cabinet be made representative of opinion in South Vietnam and that 
negotiations be begun with all political elements,” whether nationalist or communist. In 
order for negotiations to succeed, however, the United States, Barnet contended, needed 
to initiate a “political withdrawal” as well as the removal of its troops in Vietnam. Only 
positive change would come from an American withdrawal, Barnet predicted. Revising 
the domino effect for his own use, Barnet claimed that American disengagement from the 
region would have a positive effect on the nations surrounding Vietnam. Using Thailand 
as an example, Barnet wrote that the Thai government would realize that it had to “follow 
a strategy of conciliation in dealing with the guerrillas rather than a strategy of pure 
repression.”27  In order to preserve its ties to America, other nations would change the 
way they dealt with internal opposition. 
The ability of the North Vietnamese to persevere in spite of American bombs 
raining down on them only increased the respect Barnet and others at IPS had for the 
people of that country. Following his trip to Hanoi in 1969, Barnet offered a glowing 
report of North Vietnamese society. Attempting to explain the tenacity of the North 
Vietnamese, Barnet wrote that “they know that in the severe trials to which they have 
already been subjected they have shown that they can take punishment and even thrive on 
it.” Though torn asunder by war, Barnet boasted that university enrollments in North 
Vietnam had grown, rice yields increased, and deaths from infectious diseases declined. 
Barnet also spoke highly of how the Vietnamese “decentralized” their industry, school 
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administration, agriculture, and health care. These “changes are popular and have raised 
morale,” Barnet reported. The North Vietnamese, in fact, expressed an “extraordinary 
spirit of determination and light heartedness,” in the opinion of Barnet. Explaining how 
the North Vietnamese “were concerned that the craters were becoming breeding grounds 
for mosquitos,” Barnet reached the conclusion that “Vietnam appears to be one of the 
countries in the world least vulnerable to massive air bombardment.”28 
IPS’s arguments in support of holding negotiations found few backers in 
Washington D.C. No matter their disdain for the war, White House officials could not 
accept the possibility that negotiations could open the door for a communist takeover of 
Vietnam. Pragmatists at IPS, however, realized that no other alternatives existed for 
America. Denied a political and military victory in Vietnam, Barnet argued in an 
unpublished article that “the U.S. must act in a way to make it credible that we are 
prepared to leave and to permit the play of local forces in Vietnam to determine their 
political future, even if it means a communist government.” Otherwise, America would 
hold negotiations for no other reason than “to outwait the patient warriors of Vietnam.” 
While underscoring the need for America to pressure Thieu to bring more non-
communists into his administration, Barnet did not hide the fact that the communists 
might still take over the South Vietnamese government. No matter how the United States 
withdrew its forces from Vietnam, Barnet, in reference to the possibility of a communist 
takeover, admitted that “we cannot prevent it if it should turn out that the non-Communist 
elements are too weak to play a significant independent role.” Still, Barnet claimed, if the 
United States stopped trying to obtain the “unattainable goal of determining the character 
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of the South Vietnamese Government,” Thieu’s government would be able to “better use 
its power to promote objectives that are both more in its own interest and more 
realistic.”29  In other words, America’s continued presence in Vietnam actually increased 
the chances of a communist conquest. 
Although Cold War liberalism came under increasing pressure from student 
protestors and other critics of American foreign policy to cut America’s loses in Vietnam, 
the idea that America should extricate itself from Vietnam knowing full well that the 
nation might go communist proved too much for many foreign policy officials. The 
intransigence of policymakers bewildered IPS intellectuals, who believed that the United 
States created the conditions that made a coalition government necessary. Invited by the 
North Vietnamese Jurist Association to visit Hanoi in December 1969, Barnet met with 
“former soldiers” from the South Vietnamese army and “middle class professionals.” 
“The destruction and uncontrolled inflation in Saigon are building a nationalist coalition 
for peace,” Barnet contended. Therefore, U.S. and South Vietnamese officials had to 
accept such a reality in order for the war to end. Yet part of the problem, according to 
Barnet, had to do with America’s understanding of the war, which differed dramatically 
from that of the North Vietnamese. Explaining that he had met with North Vietnam’s 
Prime Minister, Premier Pham Van Dong, during his trip to North Vietnam and later 
spoke to President Nixon’s National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and other 
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American officials upon his return to the United States, Barnet exclaimed that “it became 
clear to me that Hanoi and Washington are not fighting the same war.”30 
By not allowing the NLF at the bargaining table and mischaracterizing North 
Vietnamese demands, American officials demonstrated their unwillingness to carry out 
negotiations in good faith. Barnet criticized U.S. officials for offering several “false 
characterization[s]” of Hanoi’s negotiating position. For instance, Hanoi did not demand 
the immediate removal of all American troops, but rather 100,000 at the start of 
negotiations and then a “pledge” to extricate all other forces in the future. Nor did the 
North Vietnamese want to unify Vietnam prior to the start of negotiations. In fact, Barnet 
claimed, “They [North Vietnam] are willing to accept a government composed of men 
they consider authentic Vietnamese patriots even if they are anticommunists.” In order to 
overcome America’s efforts to hinder negotiations, Barnet suggested to the NLF that it 
create what the IPS co-director called a “peace cabinet,” which would include both 
communist and non-communist figures from the NLF and South Vietnam. Writing in 
February 1969 to Nguyen Thi Binh, who later served as the representative for the NLF 
during the Paris Peace Conference, Barnet proposed having an American delegation visit 
Vietnam to promote the “peace cabinet.” Barnet predicted that finding support in 
Vietnam for such a cabinet would make clear to the world “the real obstacles to 
negotiation and would help the public to understand that, if the U.S. wants peace in 
Vietnam, the Nixon administration must not continue to support puppets against the 
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desires of an ever growing majority of the Vietnamese people.” Moreover, Barnet 
believed that the mission to Vietnam would “make the issue of the war paramount again” 
and “get Americans to accept the demand that the U.S. withdraw all of her troops and 
dismantle her bases.”31 
IPS, especially co-director Barnet, continued to pursue the issue of negotiations in 
Vietnam throughout Nixon’s presidency. In an apparently unsent memorandum to Henry 
Kissinger, Barnet told Nixon’s National Security Advisor that he had a plan that would 
“provide the greatest possible self-determination and protection for all political elements 
in South Vietnam after the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces.” After removing 
Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker from his post in Vietnam and replacing him with someone 
“who is not identified with old policies and long association with the present Saigon 
leadership,” Barnet argued that America could immediately call back some of its troops. 
He recommended the withdrawal of 300,000 American troops by the end of 1970 and all 
remaining troops by the end of 1971. Barnet also called on Nixon to end all B-52 
bombing raids. Furthermore, the troop removals needed to be “final and irreversible 
assuming the VC and NVA do not harass the American troops as they leave or mount a 
major offensive against the ARVN forces.”32 
As the United States withdrew its troops and ended the bombing raids, Barnet 
argued that America could then put increased pressure on South Vietnamese President 
Thieu to begin negotiations with the NLF, when the presence of American troops still 
afforded him an advantage. Next, Barnet suggested that President Thieu create a 
                                                            
     31 Barnet, “How Hanoi Sees Nixon,” 382; Richard J. Barnet to Nguyen Thi Binh, February 20, 1969, 
IPSR, WHS, box 14, folder 20. 
     32 Richard Barnet, “Memorandum for Henry Kissinger,” undated [likely 1969], IPSR, WHS, box 12, 
folder 51. 
      171 
 
 
Provisional Commission for National Reconciliation. This commission, with the input of 
the NLF, Buddhists, Saigon government officials and citizens, and exiles would organize 
and plan for national elections. Barnet’s proposal limited America’s role in Vietnam to 
one of “insuring maximum participation and protection for all elements in South 
Vietnam” and “lend whatever support it can to demands from Vietnamese themselves for 
international inspection and specific assurances for amnesty.” Such a policy, however, 
would require President Nixon to “candidly tell the public that we cannot guarantee or 
even predict what the future political development of South Vietnam will be.”33 
With the onset of détente and President Nixon’s trip to China in 1972, Barnet 
could not fathom why the United States continued to pour money and troops into 
Southeast Asia. He rejected claims that America needed to stay in Vietnam in order 
prevent violent retaliations against America’s allies. The North Vietnamese, he claimed, 
had practiced “pragmatism” in their previous efforts “to survive by adjusting to political 
reality.” Barnet predicted that following the exodus of Americans from Vietnam, “their 
[North Vietnamese] political goal will be reconciliation and reconstruction of their 
tortured country.” Only an immediate withdrawal of American personnel and troops from 
the area, however, would allow the Vietnamese people to begin the process of 
forgiveness. Otherwise, Barnet claimed, “The more ‘our Vietnamese’ are identified with 
the brutality of the U.S. war effort and the longer the war goes on, the likelier targets of 
public anger they become.”34 
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Barnet continued to downplay the threat of a communist takeover in Vietnam 
once America left the region. North Vietnamese and NLF leaders both agreed that present 
political conditions in Vietnam made it highly unlikely that a reunified Vietnam would 
come under the control of a communist government. Such claims notwithstanding, Barnet 
wondered why the prospect of a communist Vietnam worried Americans. Unlikely to ally 
with either the Soviets or Chinese, Barnet claimed, “The successors to Ho Chi Minh 
would become the Tito of Asia and would in all likelihood court the friendship of the 
United States as counterweight to the nearby communist giants.” Furthermore, Barnet 
asked why, “when the President clinks glasses in the Kremlin and the Great Hall of 
Peking,” the United States should expend another dollar or cause an additional American 
to die, all in pursuit of a non-communist Vietnam. Barnet called on the United States to 
accept the Provisional Revolutionary Government’s (PRG) proposal to create a 
“government of national reconciliation,” which would include “any Vietnamese politician 
or political group who put national independence first.” According to Barnet, the PRG’s 
proposed government would be “two-thirds non-communist” and follow a “liberal, 
nationalist, and neutralist” program. The program would, moreover, follow a 
“deliberately moderate” approach in pursuit of “independence and neutrality” with 
continued “guarantees [for] private ownership of agricultural land and industrial 
property.”35 
Bringing the Nuremberg Trials to America: IPS’s Case for War Crimes Trials 
On November 12, 1969, Seymour Hersh, a roaming journalist, filed a cable for 
Dispatch News Service regarding the killing of 109 Vietnamese civilians in March 1968 
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by U.S. soldiers. A little more than one year later, the Vietnam Veterans Against War 
(VVAW) held its Winter Soldier Investigation, in which over one-hundred veterans 
spoke before the media in Detroit, Michigan about the war crimes they witnessed while 
on tour in Vietnam. Although both events led to a greater awareness of American 
atrocities in Vietnam, the media, and therefore a large percentage of the American public, 
paid little attention to the soldiers’ disclosures. In fact, Andrew Hunt, in his study of the 
VVAW, has concluded, regarding the Detroit event, that “the inquiry instantly became a 
case study for its failure to attract television and newspaper attention.”36  In a March 28, 
1971 article for the New York Times, “Should We Have War Crimes Trials?,” Neil 
Sheehan brought the issue of war crimes before the American public. After studying a 
number of recent books on American atrocities in Vietnam, Sheehan concluded, “If you 
credit as factual only a fraction of the information assembled . . . and if you apply the 
laws of war to American conduct there,” American officials, up to and including 
President Nixon, “may well be guilty of war crimes.” Likewise, Sheehan wondered 
whether “a moral and legal distinction [could] be drawn between those killings in World 
War II, for which General Yamashita paid with his life,” and the thousands of civilians 
killed as a result of the American bombings in Vietnam.37 
Years before Sheehan brought greater publicity to the issue of war crimes, Barnet 
offered, in the aforementioned unpublished 1966 “legal memorandum,” his thoughts on 
charging American officials with war crimes. The nature of the war in Vietnam, Barnet 
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argued, made it impossible for the United States to protect the rights of citizens 
established during previous war crimes trials. The simple act of refusing to leave a 
particular area did not make a Vietnamese peasant a guerrilla. Yet in reaching such a 
conclusion, “the U.S. is claiming the right to remove the status of ‘protected persons’ 
from a civilian population if they resist evacuation,” Barnet contended. He favored 
bringing American officials before a judge in the United States to rule on the legality of 
their actions during the course of the war in Vietnam. In order to prevent the law from 
becoming the “servant of the victor,” Barnet demanded that the war crimes trials begin 
immediately, while America still waged its war in Vietnam. To do otherwise would 
support the notion that “might makes right.” Moreover, war crimes trials conducted at the 
conclusion of a war more often than not allowed the victorious country to escape 
prosecution for war crimes. According to Barnet, not holding a war crimes trial before the 
end of a conflict would mean that “only the officials of weak states are likely to pay 
much attention to their jeopardy under international law, and it is rather the officials of 
powerful states who most need the guidelines and restraints of law.”38  The stronger 
nation, after all, expecting to win the war, would see no reason to abide by the rules of 
international law. 
Even if such trials failed to bring American officials accused of committing war 
crimes to justice, Barnet believed that putting officials before judges “could have an 
important long-term educational effect on the country.” Trials would force Americans to 
look more closely at the actions of their chosen leaders and at least consider the 
possibility that wrongs had been committed. “Conversely, if no serious moral opposition, 
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rooted in law, develops against the Viet-Nam war, and the public is left with the view that 
the only ones who raise these issues are Viet Cong sympathizers and the most radical 
critics of United States foreign policy, the next intervention will become that much easier 
to accept.” Barnet suggested going to court over the “conduct of the war” rather than 
trying to determine “the legality of the war itself.” As an example, Barnet mentioned that 
a soldier, refusing induction into the army or deployment to Vietnam, could go to court 
and claim that a fear of prosecution for war crimes precluded him from going. Even 
members of Congress could take part in such a case as an attorney or by filing an amicus 
curiae brief in support of the soldier.39 
Motivated by the recent court-martial of Army Captain Howard B. Levy at Fort 
Jackson, South Carolina after he refused to train Green Berets, Barnet and Richard Falk, 
a professor of international law at Princeton University, used the occasion to provide a 
summary of the various war crimes committed by U.S. troops in Vietnam. Barnet and 
Falk depicted America’s actions in Vietnam as “illegal” and “in flagrant violation” of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, especially in relation to the treatment of prisoners of war and 
protection of civilians. In all, Barnet and Falk found instances of at least “3,000 incidents 
in which it appears that the laws of war have been violated.” For example, American 
troops put prisoners of war under the watch of South Vietnamese soldiers who committed 
acts of torture, often with weapons supplied by the United States. As for Vietnamese 
civilians, Barnet and Falk contended that America followed a “basic strategy” requiring 
“removal of civilian villages on the theory that in a guerilla war the ‘people’ are 
indistinguishable from the ‘enemy’ is inherently illegal.” Claiming that the Vietnamese 
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may not have wanted to move because of historical ties to an area or in order to protect 
their crops, Barnet and Falk accused the United States of making “a unilateral 
determination that residents of Vietnamese villages who do not submit to Government 
demands for relocation cease to have any protection against loss of life and property.” 
Based on these facts, Barnet and Falk disagreed with the court-martial of Captain Levy.40 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, IPS considered setting up a “War Crime Task 
Force” to study the atrocities committed during the Vietnam War. Leonard Rodberg 
opposed the idea, seeing in it “an attempt to find scapegoats.” He claimed that the blame 
for the Vietnam War extended far beyond the president, the military, and even Congress. 
A large percentage of Americans, Rodberg claimed, supported the tactics used in 
Vietnam. Even more disconcerting to Rodberg was that the Left wanted to use war 
crimes trials as a means to “discredit the liberal establishment” rather than search for the 
reasons behind America’s predilection for violence and how to change the mentality that 
led to such actions. Thus a war crimes trial would involve selecting certain “guilty” 
officials while leaving countless others untouched. As a result, Rodberg castigated 
proponents of the war crimes trial for “kidding ourselves if we think that we can use the 
laws of the State to undermine the State.” Rodberg predicted that the “‘war crimes’ 
atmosphere” would end up harming the efforts of the opposition by making trials an 
acceptable mechanism to appoint blame for wrong doing. More importantly for Rodberg, 
the war crimes trials would not look at the American system in order to understand why 
America intervened in Vietnam. Making a distinction between “individual guilt” and 
“structural defects,” Rodberg feared that too many proponents of war crimes trials 
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ignored the difference, which would “lead to a reign of terror, fascism, or a civil war.”41  
It is somewhat surprising that the co-directors, Stavins, and others at IPS supported the 
idea of holding a war crimes trials given that so much of their work sought to reconstruct 
society’s institutions rather than the people staffing them. Yet, as the following 
paragraphs attest, IPS intellectuals did offer various suggestions for making the “State” 
more adept at prosecuting government official for wrongdoing. 
 While the historical record leaves little doubt about the atrocities committed by 
both sides in the Vietnam War, the arguments made in support of holding American 
officials criminally accountable by Barnet, Raskin, and other intellectuals at IPS looked 
at the issue too narrowly. While American officials ordered the bombing and other 
actions against the North Vietnamese and the NLF, there existed a strong contingent of 
pro-war Americans that insisted on escalation. Though the scholarship on the antiwar 
movement is vast, far fewer studies detail the pro-war movement waged by conservatives 
and other groups.42  IPS trustee David Riesman recognized the widespread support for the 
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war as well. Responding to Barnet’ article about war criminals that appeared in The 
Progressive, Riesman wondered how Barnet or anyone else could isolate public officials 
from the people whom they represented. He told Barnet that “the effort to find and, if not 
punish, then at least to exclude from public life the political leadership tends to hide from 
view the mammoth support they had or could have had from the public at large.” 
Riesman pointed to the public opinion polls in 1967 and 1968 that showed support not 
only for the war, but also escalation.43 
Like Barnet, Raskin often separated public officials from their constituents, and 
thus overlooked a possible explanation as to why a bureaucrat or congressman acted in a 
particular way. Even though Raskin felt that Congress needed to take on a much more 
prominent role in matters of foreign policy, he wanted congressmen to conform to 
international law as well. “If . . . you don’t think that covert operations are criminal, if it 
is the case that the bombings and the population removal programs are acceptable—that, 
in fact, they do reflect the point of view of the Congress of the United States because the 
majority of the Congress vote funds for these programs—then Congress is complicitous 
[sp].”44  What if, however, Congress acted as it did in response to the wishes of the 
American people? A tendency that re-emerges in much of the work coming out of IPS is 
an unwavering belief in the people. In all matters of life, IPS believed that an expanded 
participatory democracy would solve America’s problems, both domestically and 
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internationally. Yet sometimes, as Riesman recognized, Americans supported ideas 
inimical to IPS. 
 Raskin and other proponents of war crimes trials for American officials often 
referred back to the trials that took place in Germany and Japan following World War II. 
For instance, Raskin called for greater “personal responsibility” for American officials 
involved in the planning process for the Vietnam War. Embedding the ideal of “personal 
responsibility” into policymaking required following the steps taken in Germany and 
Japan after World War II. Noting the 1946 “Law for the Liberation from National 
Socialism and Militarism,” which created categories of responsibility and sentences 
ranging from death to the loss of employment, Raskin suggested applying a similar law in 
America. Successful application of “personal responsibility” laws would make possible 
“democratic reconstruction” and mitigate the need for a revolution in America.45 
 Raskin made the aforementioned statement about Congress during a conference 
held in Washington D.C. in mid-1971 that included both experts and congressmen to 
discuss the Pentagon Papers. Participants included Noam Chomsky, John Conyers (MI-
D), Donald Fraser (MN-D), Daniel Ellsberg, Ernest Gruening, and Robert Kastenmeier 
(WI-D). During the conference, Raskin laid out one of his more detailed plans for setting 
up a legal structure to punish American officials accused of war crimes. As a first step, 
Raskin supported creating “a legal office of the president” that would determine whether 
proposed national security policies passed legal muster, especially in relation to the 
standards set in the Uniform Code of Military Justice and at the trials held in Nuremberg 
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and Japan following World War II. Raskin also proposed setting up “a court of 
international law and security” for citizens to bring cases to when they believed that their 
country committed illegal acts. In Congress, Raskin suggested creating a position of 
“national security legal advisor” to make certain that legislation conformed to 
international law and the United Nations Charter and keep congressmen and senators 
informed of these laws. Finally, a “jury system” would guarantee implementation of the 
previous measures and if not, allow citizens to refuse taxation or induction into the armed 
forces. Raskin described his proposal as “a triple level of involvement.” After the first 
step of creating a law, a “second level would bring into operation a new legal system to 
oversee national security and foreign-policy affairs.” Raskin conceived the “third level” 
as a backup in case the government refused to abide by the decision reached by the court. 
At this last level, “the people themselves” would be able to review court decisions and 
then determine whether they as an American citizen should partake in tax refusal or 
“redirect their taxes away from the federal government.”46 
Raskin recognized that government officials would try to sidestep the laws 
suggested in his proposal, but he accepted this fact because of the alternative. Labeling 
his proposal a “middle course,” Raskin argued that to find government officials 
completely incapable of following his proposed “code” meant that revolution offered the 
only viable solution. He believed that his “code” would “set a stage for a value change in 
society, as, for example, did the civil rights laws.” While opponents of war crimes 
legislation and trials claimed that such efforts represented a second-round of 
McCarthyism, Raskin disagreed. Unlike the officials punished for “losing” China, Raskin 
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argued that officials involved with Vietnam were “being challenged not for their opinions 
but for the initiation of policies which had clearly been branded by American leaders 
some fifteen years earlier as criminal.”47   
The Pentagon Papers 
 An incident that on the surface seemed unrelated to the issue of war crimes ended 
up strengthening IPS’s conviction that American officials committed illegal acts in 
Vietnam. On June 13, 1971, Neil Sheehan of the New York Times wrote the first of 
several articles using information gleaned from the Pentagon Papers. Daniel Ellsberg, a 
scholar from the RAND Corporation who also worked under Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara and later Edward Lansdale in South Vietnam, photocopied portions of the 
study. Prior to the publication of the Pentagon Papers by the New York Times, Ellsberg 
actually leaked the documents to IPS. When Raskin first learned about the secret study he 
thought that the report would prove that American officials had indeed ordered the 
massive slaughter of innocent civilians in Vietnam. Raskin later told a reporter, “My 
hope, you see, was that the Papers would be treated as proof of war crimes.”48 
                                                            
     47 Krause, Anatomy of an Undeclared War, 167-168. Richard J. Barnet, “The War Planners: The Trouble 
With ‘The Best and the Brightest,’” The Progressive, (December 1971), 16. The idea of personal 
accountability for public officials caught the attention of at least one congressman. In 1973, and several 
times thereafter, Wisconsin congressman, and acquaintance of IPS, Robert W. Kastenmeier put forth a bill 
in the House of Representatives to punish officials found guilty of war crimes. During the opening hearings 
on the Official Accountability Act on February 2, 1976, Kastenmeier explained to his colleagues on the 
Hill that the legislation served as a continuation of previous efforts to prosecute perpetrators of war crimes. 
Trials in Nuremberg and Tokyo following World War II and the United Nations Charter, according to 
Kastenmeier, “all reflected the basic notion that a nation’s political leaders should be held personally 
accountable for criminal acts committed at their command.” Kastenmeier believed that stopping events like 
My Lai and the bombing of neutral nations like Cambodia required “embedding the fundamental principles 
of Nuremberg in our own national law.” For instance, the proposed legislation would have inserted the 
language of “international laws and customs of war” into the Federal Criminal Code and create an 
“institutional mechanism” to investigate and prosecute the laws.” Not surprisingly, Kastenmeier’s 
legislation faced a slow death in committee. See “Official Accountability Act H.R. 8388” (Washington 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 1-2. 
     48 Lacy MacAuley, “How the Institute for Policy Studies Helped Release the Pentagon Papers,” Foreign 
Policy in Focus Website, June 13, 2011, accessed on June 11, 2014, 
http://fpif.org/how_the_institute_for_policy_studies_helped_release_the_pentagon_papers/ 
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 Raskin first met Ellsberg during a meeting about nuclear policy when Raskin still 
worked for Bundy. When Ellsberg met with Raskin again in 1970, the former RAND 
intellectual, who by that time had soured on the Vietnam War, informed the IPS co-
director about the Pentagon Papers. After expressing interest, Raskin and IPS received 
somewhere between 2,000 and 5,000 pages from the report. Raskin and Barnet devoured 
the pages given to them by Ellsberg and, in the process, started thinking about possible 
outlets for the papers so that the public could learn about the duplicity of American 
officials. Raskin initially told a Newsweek reporter about the Pentagon Papers before 
bringing the study to Sheehan, whose previously mentioned review of the literature on 
war crimes caught the co-director’s attention. Intrigued by Raskin’s offer, Sheehan sent a 
New York Times reporter to pick up the papers from IPS’s offices. IPS also copied 4,100 
pages of the Pentagon Papers for Senator Mike Gravel (AK-D), who later inserted them 
into the Congressional Record.49  
Besides seeking an outlet for the Pentagon Papers, IPS also used its copy of the 
report to write its own analysis. In 1971, Raskin, Barnet, and Ralph Stavins co-authored 
Washington Plans an Aggressive War. While Barnet’s chapter dealt with the role of 
bureaucrats in the formulation of Vietnam policy and Raskin’s section offered a code of 
“personal responsibility,” Stavins began the study with a history of American activities in 
Vietnam prior to 1965 and documented how the United States interfered in a domestic 
civil war.50  As many observers did during the time of the Pentagon Papers release, it is 
necessary to question IPS’s decision to turn the secret study over to journalists and 
                                                            
     49 Lacy MacAuley, “How the Institute for Policy Studies Helped Release the Pentagon Papers.” 
     50 See Ralph Stavins, “Washington Determines the Fate of Vietnam: 1954-1965,” in Washington Plans 
An Aggressive War, eds. Ralph Stavins, Richard J. Barnet, and Marcus G. Raskin (New York: Random 
House, 1971). 
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Senator Gravel. Had it chosen not to immediately circulate the report, the Institute could 
have greatly enhanced its stature by waiting until its own study appeared to serve as the 
definitive account of American policy in Vietnam. Journalist Sanford J. Ungar, writing in 
1972, explained that after receiving a copy of the papers from Ellsberg, IPS made “free 
use” of them, even allowing others to look at the report. Ellsberg, according to Ungar, did 
not like the fact that IPS’s study of the Vietnam War, which used the Pentagon Papers, 
would not appear in print until mid-1971. Of this fact, Ungar wrote, that “this was not the 
kind of dramatic war-stopping disclosure that Ellsberg had in mind.”51 
The FBI, still investigating IPS, tried to answer this question as well. The FBI 
believed that IPS had the Pentagon Papers as early as 1969. Dating Ellsberg’s 
relationship with IPS members back to an initial encounter in 1967, the FBI argued that 
“IPS would have been a logical turning point and avenue of approach” for Ellsberg to 
release the Pentagon Papers. FBI officials, nonetheless, still found it difficult to explain 
why IPS, if the think tank had the papers for so long, did not rush to publish their study, 
Washington Plans an Aggressive War, before the New York Times printed the documents. 
The FBI surmised that IPS, following a meeting with its attorneys, feared legal action if 
they chose to print their study. If the New York Times printed the documents before IPS, 
then the “legal repercussions would be absorbed by the newspaper” and IPS could quote 
freely from the now public documents. In fact, previous FBI investigations into the 
leaking of the papers found that someone offered the documents to both CBS and ABC 
news after a court injunction prevented the New York Times from publishing additional 
information from the secret study. According to the FBI report, officials from CBS and 
                                                            
     51 Sanford J. Ungar, “Daniel Ellsberg: The Difficulties of Disclosure,” The Washington Post, April 30, 
1972, D1. 
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ABC claimed that the papers became available to their news organizations “on an 
immediate release basis from sources who were in a terrible rush to get these things 
published” despite the injunction against the New York Times. The FBI concluded that 
IPS officials were behind the leaks to the media, and “upon realizing that publication of 
their own study was imminent, steps were taken to insure that those portions of the study 
utilized in their book” became public first.52 
The Institute claimed that it allowed other outlets to release information from the 
Pentagon Papers because IPS intellectuals wanted to write a more analytical study about 
the secret report. A brief history of Washington Plans An Aggressive War explained that 
publishers initially did not want to publish the book because “the public is bored by the 
war and is immune to further shocks.” Other publishers showed an interest in the 
Pentagon Papers, but not the material that encouraged holding war crimes trials for 
American officials involved in the war planning. IPS intellectuals wanted to publish their 
research despite the appearance of the Pentagon Papers in the New York Times because 
additional information discovered through interviews and other means allowed the 
authors “to put the ‘Pentagon Papers’ in context.” Furthermore, they saw their book as 
“establishing a code of behavior under which our statesmen at long last will be held to the 
                                                            
     52 SAC WFO to FBI Director, November 5, 1971, FBI-IPS. In response to the WFO’s suggestion that 
IPS led the efforts to leak the Pentagon Papers to various news outfits, FBI officials in Boston ascertained 
that “no valid conclusion” could be reached in the matter of who contacted the various news sources. See 
SAC Boston to FBI Director, November 23, 1971, FBI-IPS. The Justice Department eventually went after 
several IPS intellectuals for their role in disseminating the Pentagon Papers. Leonard Rodberg, who edited 
Senator Mike Gravel’s edition of the Pentagon Papers, received a subpoena in August 1971. Ralph Stavins, 
who along with Noam Chomsky and Richard Falk received subpoenas to testify, charged the Justice 
Department with using illegal wiretaps, which led the judge in the case to rescind the subpoenas after the 
officials from that department failed to provide enough evidence that the government did not use wiretaps 
against Stavins and other IPS intellectuals. See Jeannette Smyth, “More Pentagon Papers,” The Washington 
Post, October 15, 1971, B4; Sanford J. Ungar, “Boston Probe is Suspended Upon Ellsberg’s Complaint,” 
The Washington Post, January 19, 1972, A2. 
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standards we demand of real estate salesmen and used car dealers.”53  Thus, while 
Washington Plans included great insight gleaned from the Pentagon Papers, IPS also 
wanted Americans both in and outside of government to learn from the leaked documents 
about what right and wrong looked like. 
Speaking for the Draft Resistance Movement 
     In no other war before or since have Americans spoken out in such large numbers 
as they did during the Vietnam War. Moreover, far more than in earlier wars, a 
significant proportion of America’s youth refused to fight. Opposition to the draft began 
in earnest with the burning of draft cards in 1964 and became more common as the war 
progressed.54 
 While a legislative assistant for Representative Robert Kastenmeier, Raskin 
authored a report on the draft law in advance of a pending congressional debate over the 
extension of the draft for an additional four years. Writing the report helped Raskin come 
to a larger realization about American society. Describing his moment of sudden 
awareness, Raskin explained, “The argument we had to beat was that if we don’t have 
permanent conscription our worldwide commitments will become meaningless. This was 
my first attempt to get at the issue. I began to see the draft as a mechanism to perpetuate a 
permanent warrior-like mentality in this country.”55  The Selective Service System’s 
decision in 1966 to end college deferments and require college students to take exams in 
order to determine their class ranking and eligibility for the draft, revived Raskin’s 
                                                            
     53 “Washington Plans An Aggressive War: How It Came to be Written,” no author, undated, AWP. 
WHS, box 8, folder 19. 
     54 On the origins of the Vietnam draft resistance, see Michael Ferber and Staughton Lynd, The 
Resistance (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971); Sherry Gershon Gottlieb, Hel No, We Won’t Go! Resisting the 
Draft During the Vietnam War (New York: Viking, 1991); Laurence M. Baskir and William A. Strauss, 
Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, the War, and the Vietnam Generation (New York: Knopf, 1978). 
     55 Quoted in Mitford, The Trial of Dr. Spock, 47. 
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interest in conscription. He joined the SDS National Secretary at a May 3, 1966 press 
conference in front of the Selective Service headquarters in Washington D.C., during 
which SDS introduced its National Vietnam Examination as an alternative exam for 
students seeking a college deferment.56 
In a memorandum to the Board of Trustees of Antioch College that Raskin wrote 
following the protests at various campuses in the spring of 1966 over student rankings, he 
offered alternatives to the selective service system. One option involved the creation of a 
volunteer army. “If the American Society wants a standing army it should be prepared to 
pay for it through the market mechanism,” Raskin argued. A draft lottery, otherwise, 
seemed “preferable to the present one,” yet such a system still allowed for “selective 
exceptions” in determining who would fight. Raskin supported having students take part 
in “national service” instead of military training and action, but with one caveat. He 
questioned going the route of national service if “the work to be done is chosen only by 
the ‘top’ and where the values that are transmitted are a quality of toughness and 
meanness of spirit.”57  In the meantime, Raskin and Waskow went to work on a 
manifesto that came to define the draft resistance movement and encourage thousands of 
Americans to join with the nation’s young in the movement to end the draft. 
 As Raskin and Waskow wrote “A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority” in 1967, 
they attempted to gather a group of influential intellectuals together in support of young 
draft resisters. Noting a “groundswell of revulsion against the war” in the aftermath of the 
                                                            
     56 “War Protestors Pose ‘Real Questions’ In Exam Challenging Deferment Test,” The Washington Post, 
May 4, 1966, A12. 
     57 Marcus Raskin, “Memorandum for the Board of Trustees of Antioch College on Selective Service 
Policy,” November 10, 1966, IPSR, WHS, box 60, folder 36, 3. After years of protest by the draft 
resistance movement, the government instituted a draft lottery and, ultimately, created an all-volunteer 
army. See Beth Bailey, America’s Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 
2009). 
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1967 Spring Mobilization against the Vietnam War, Waskow appealed to John R. Seeley 
of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions and famed linguist Noam Chomsky 
to join with other intellectuals in “a solemn act of civil disobedience by the nearest we 
have to moral leadership” in America. Explaining why he and Raskin targeted the 
Selective Service System, Waskow described it as “the tightest link between the war and 
people’s daily lives,” and he pointed to the already existing opposition to the draft at 
universities across the country. Without the participation of intellectuals, Waskow 
claimed, “there will be no one to speak for the legitimacy of draft resistance by the kids,” 
which weakened the draft resistance movement. Certain that arrests would follow the 
civil disobedience actions, Waskow intended to offer a defense for himself “on the 
grounds of the illegitimacy under international law and unconstitutionality under 
American law of the present uses of the draft, and therefore on the grounds that under 
Nuremberg there is a positive duty of good citizens to resist its operations.” Waskow and 
Raskin explained in another letter, this time to Herbert Marcuse, that they hoped to bring 
together at least fifty “rather well-known intellectuals” to take part in a sit-in at the 
Selective Service headquarters in Washington D.C. that could involve blocking the 
building’s entrances.58 Raskin’s and Waskow’s appeal to intellectuals to stand together 
and speak out against official wrongdoing conformed to the image of intellectuals that 
stood at the center of IPS since its beginnings. 
 Draft resistance existed prior to 1967, but, despite previous statements in support 
of such protests, the movement lacked a uniform declaration that offered a philosophical 
                                                            
     58 Arthur Waskow to John R. Seeley, April 20, 1967 & Arthur Waskow to Noam Chomsky, April 20, 
1967, both in AWP, WHS, box 14, folder 49; Arthur Waskow and Marcus Raskin to Herbert Marcuse, May 
9, 1967, AWP, WHS, box 6, folder 16. 
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rationale for the burning of draft cards and refusing induction into the armed services. 
This changed in 1967 with the publication in The New Republic and The New York 
Review of Books of “A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority,” written by Raskin and 
Waskow.59  Interviewed not long after he co-authored the “Call,” Raskin claimed that the 
idea to write the statement originated with Bernard Fall’s dissatisfaction with Americans’ 
response to the atrocities being committed in Vietnam. “His greatest anger was directed 
against the American left, their failure to become aroused over the torture of Vietnamese 
prisoners of war and the use of napalm. There seemed to be no one to speak out against it, 
as the French did on Algeria. This turned me on to thinking about something similar to 
the ‘Statement of the 121,’ the French intellectuals’ manifesto against the Algerian war,” 
Raskin explained as he described how Fall’s ideas encouraged his own decision to write 
the “Call.”60 
The “Call” denounced the Vietnam War from both a moral and legal standpoint. 
In regard to morality, the “Call” stated that America’s youth “are finding that the 
American war in Vietnam so outrages their deepest moral and religious sense that they 
cannot contribute to it in any way.” “We share their moral outrage,” the “Call” 
proclaimed. Regarding the legality and constitutionality of the Vietnam War, the “Call” 
castigated the president and Congress for leading the nation into an unconstitutional war 
that rejected the principles enshrined in the U.N. Charter. The Charter, the “Call” noted, 
“requires member states to exhaust every peaceful means of settling disputes and to 
                                                            
     59 In his study of the draft resistance movement, Foley has labeled the “Call” “the most successful and 
widely known” of the various “complicity statements,” as illustrated by the fact that 2,000 individuals 
signed their names to the document during the year following its publication. Michael S. Foley, 
Confronting the War Machine: Draft Resistance During the Vietnam War (Chapel Hill, University of North 
Carolina Press, 2003), 94. 
     60 Quoted in Mitford, The Trial of Dr. Spock, 49-50. 
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submit disputes which cannot be settled peacefully to the Security Council.” The United 
States, according to the “Call,” “systematically violated” the U.N. Charter. American 
military actions in Vietnam, furthermore, mirrored the “crimes against humanity for 
which individuals were to be held personally responsible . . . and for which Germans 
were sentenced at Nuremberg to long prison terms and death.” After stating the legal and 
constitutional arguments against the Vietnam War, the “Call” declared its intentions. 
“Therefore, we believe on all these grounds that every free man has a legal right and a 
moral duty to exert every effort to end this war, to avoid collusion with it, and encourage 
others to do the same,” the “Call” declared. Why use draft resistance as a means to voice 
their opposition to the Vietnam War? The “Call” claimed that such “open resistance” 
would “strengthen the moral resolve” of antiwar activists to end the draft and eventually 
the war.61  Blending legalism and moralism, the “Call” found support from a wide swath 
of the American public. 
 Hundreds of academics, professionals, clergy, and people from all walks of life 
signed the “Call” as it spread through informal channels and appeared in magazines. By 
mid-1967, signers of the “Call” included Howard Zinn, Richard Flacks, Gar Alperovitz, 
Paul Goodman, Benjamin Spock, Al Haber, Staughton Lynd, Sidney Lens, Allen 
Ginsberg, Dwight Macdonald, Gabriel Kolko, Susan Sontag, William Sloane Coffin, 
Herbert Marcuse, Noam Chomsky, Linus Pauling, and Carl Oglesby. By October 2, 1967, 
the “Call” had approximately 375 signers. More and more Americans signed their names 
to the “Call” as the war dragged on and the number of dead and wounded in Southeast 
                                                            
     61 Marcus Raskin and Arthur Waskow, “A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority,” RESIST pamphlet, no 
date, AWP, WHS, box 14, folder 49. A copy of the “Call” is also in the appendix of Mitford, The Trial of 
Dr. Spock, 255-259 
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Asia grew. Some prominent intellectuals, though, refused to sign the statement. Speaking 
for himself and Arnold Kaufman, both professors at the University of Michigan, Donald 
Michael, one of the original fellows at IPS, criticized the statement because in addition to 
supporting draft resisters “it gives the impression that signers want to incite youths to stay 
out [of Vietnam].” This seemed to Kaufman and Michael a questionable legal position for 
the signers to agree with. Furthermore, seeing the statement as one “of moral 
commitment rather than a political statement,” Kaufman and Michael advocated for 
making the latter point clearer. With these objections in mind, Kaufman and Michael 
refused to sign the statement.62  Michael proved prescient in his forewarning about the 
legal consequences of signing the “Call,” but Raskin and Waskow thought that 
intellectuals had to stick their heads out and not depend entirely on the bravery of 
America’s young. 
 Several other intellectuals that Raskin and Waskow contacted also disagreed with 
the methods suggested by the authors of the “Call.” The historian Howard Zinn, though, 
wholeheartedly supported the efforts of Raskin and Waskow. Responding to their appeal, 
Zinn wrote, “I am with your statement all the way.” As he explained in the letter, he 
wanted intellectuals to “engage in some act more demonstrative than a teach-in or ad, and 
I certainly would be willing to engage in any such actions with others.” Merle Curti, 
Waskow’s teacher at Wisconsin, disagreed, however, with his former student’s 
contention that American actions in Vietnam constituted an illegal act. President Johnson 
and military officials, Curti claimed, “could not have done what has been done without 
huge appropriations from Congress, which is the duly elected representative of the 
                                                            
     62 “Signers of ‘Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority,” July 9, 1967 & October 2, 1967, Donald Michael to 
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majority of voters.” In his own political estimation, Curti thought that most Americans 
would “react unfavorably to what might be regarded as civil disobedience or even to this 
kind of education,” and therefore he opposed draft resistance on those grounds. While 
expressing “emotional sympathy” for draft resistance and the antiwar movement in 
general, Curti argued that “unless there can be something like mass resistance, I think the 
effects are apt to be the opposite of those I would like to see; and I cannot believe that the 
country is going to move toward mass resistance.”63 
Perhaps the most prominent peace researcher in America, Kenneth Boulding, 
described the Selective Service as “a rather passive agency,” and stated his preference for 
electoral issues since “responsibility for the war in Vietnam lies . . . squarely at the door 
of the President.” Additionally, he could not offer his support publicly for the draft 
resistance because, in his opinion, Americans “ha[d] been indoctrinated for so long in the 
myth of national greatness established by military might that I am very much afraid a 
frontal attack on the draft would be unsuccessful.” With these prospects in mind, 
Boulding suggested beginning a “political movement” of Democrats that promised to 
vote against Democrats in the 1968 elections. Boulding favored this sort of strategy 
because “only defeat will make it [the Democratic Party] learn anything” and change 
their foreign policy.64  As earlier chapters have shown, IPS intellectuals gave up on 
reforming the Democratic Party, so Boulding’s suggestion obviously fell on deaf ears. 
                                                            
     63 Howard Zinn to Arthur Waskow and Marcus Raskin, May 17, 1967, Merle Curti to Arthur Waskow, 
May 30, 1967, both in  AWP, WHS, box 14, folder 49. 
     64 Kenneth E. Boulding to Marcus Raskin and Arthur Waskow, May 15, 1967, AWP, WHS, box 14, 
folder 49. 
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 On October 21, 1967, tens of thousands of protestors marched from the Lincoln 
Memorial to the Pentagon as part of the Stop the Draft Week.65  At the Pentagon protest, 
Raskin, Waskow, Benjamin Spock, William Sloan Coffin, and several other draft 
resisters took a briefcase filled with draft cards turned in by the protesters and brought 
them to the Assistant Attorney General John McDonough, who ultimately refused to take 
the briefcase, at the Justice Department. Both Raskin and Waskow added their cards to 
the collection. Explaining to David Riesman his reasons for turning in his draft card, 
Waskow wrote, “My feeling had been that it was a bad scene for ‘safe’ people to be 
encouraging resistance . . ., and returning the card was thus an attempt to step outside the 
charmed circle.” Despite being only eight months away from his thirty-fifth birthday, and 
thus no longer eligible for the draft, Waskow claimed that he could really “empathize” 
with draft resisters who had to consider “duty to family, to self, to the movement, [and] to 
country.”66 
 During the conspiracy trial for the charges brought against him and four others, 
Raskin offered his view of the draft card turn-in that occurred at the Pentagon in October 
1967. He described it as “silly” and that he “squirmed” when the group handed the 
assistant attorney general the briefcase containing the draft cards. Nonetheless, Raskin 
joined Waskow and the others so that he could speak directly to officials from the Justice 
Department about conducting an investigation into American atrocities committed in 
Vietnam. “I didn’t think that the draft-card-turn-in was the issue, in my view the issue 
                                                            
     65 For a unique, though less than scholarly, treatment of the Pentagon protest, see Norman Mailer, 
Armies of the Night (New York: New American Library, 1968). 
     66 Arthur Waskow to David Riesman, February 19, 1968, AWP, box 1, folder 6. Waskow’s actions at the 
Pentagon protest led to retribution by the Selective Service System, which changed his draft status from 4-F 
to 1-A. See Jared Stout, “Protestor: From 4-F to 1-A,” The Washington Post, September 13, 1968, 1A; 
“Draft Board Rejects Protestor’s Appeal,” The Washington Post, September 15, 1968, C2. 
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was the illegality of the war and the problem of war crimes,” Raskin told the court. 
During the brief exchange with the assistant attorney general, Raskin brought up the issue 
of war crimes in Vietnam and asked McDonough to speak to the attorney general about 
creating a “special committee” as a means “to ascertain whether or not war crimes had 
occurred in Vietnam and whether or not this was in violation of American law.”67  As he 
did in his earlier writings on the conflict in Southeast Asia and in the “Call,” Raskin 
based his opposition to the Vietnam War on moral and legalistic grounds, particularly the 
latter, as he called on America to maintain its ideals abroad. 
 Raskin’s statement before the court goes a long way toward explaining why he 
supported draft resistance. The co-founder of IPS considered it hypocritical of the federal 
courts to go on prosecuting young draft-resisters while allowing America’s leaders to go 
unpunished despite causing so much death and destruction in Vietnam. “It seems to me 
that we have to make clear to the courts and to the lawyers that there is no comparison 
between a series of misdemeanor violations or laws broken conscientiously by citizens 
where the basic laws of the nation are being systematically violated by its leaders,” 
Raskin claimed. Questioning the value of making draft resisters “martyrs,” Raskin 
encouraged supporters of the draft resistance to “put the entire legal apparatus to work in 
questioning itself, to the point that is has no choice but to confront the distinction 
between counseling not to kill, refusing to kill, and war crimes.” Though distinct from 
draft resisters, Raskin’s comments regarding draft evaders conveys a similar attitude. In 
recommending amnesty for the latter group, Raskin expressed outrage “that those who 
are carrying the conscience of this nation before the world should be imprisoned in a 
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society which can ill-afford to lose talent, judgment and concern to the jail keeper.” 
These “political prisoners,” as Raskin called the draft resisters, deserved amnesty for their 
actions, as France, Italy, and Great Britain did with its draft evaders after World War I.68  
For Raskin, Americans had a duty to voice their indignation over wrongdoing by 
government officials, and as the true best and brightest, they deserved protection when 
they spoke out against America’s failure to live up to its ideals. 
 On January 5, 1968, the United States District Court in Massachusetts issued 
indictments for William Sloane Coffin, Jr., Michael Ferber, Mitchell Goodman, Marcus 
Raskin, and Benjamin Spock. Inexplicably, Waskow, who personally handed the assistant 
attorney general the case with the draft cards at the Pentagon protest and whose name 
clearly appeared as one of the co-authors of the “Call,” avoided prosecution. The fact is 
even stranger considering that in the section of the indictment dealing with the “overt 
acts” committed by the defendants, overt act number one stated that Coffin and Spock 
“distributed and caused to be distributed” the “Call.” The district court based its 
indictment on a series of conspiracy charges against the defendants accusing them of 
conspiring to encourage, as well as aid and abet, draft resistance among America’s draft-
age youth.69  While the “Call” did undoubtedly influence many young Americans to 
either turn in or burn their draft cards, Michael Stewart Foley has found both then and 
now a tendency to exaggerate the impact of older activists like Raskin, Waskow, and 
Spock. According to him, “even a perfunctory review of the draft resistance movement 
should have indicated to government investigators that the resisters themselves were the 
                                                            
     68 Marcus Raskin to Monroe Friedman, October 17, 1968, IPSR, WHS, box 57, folder 12; Marcus 
Raskin to Sinclair Armstrong, June 21, 1968, AWP, WHS, box 1, folder 5. 
     69 The indictment is in the Appendix of Mitford, The Trial of Dr. Spock, 251-255. 
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leaders of the movement.” The younger draft resisters instigated the draft card turn-in at 
the Pentagon in October 1967. Only later did the older activists come to them asking to 
join the protest and gather all of the draft cards together so that they could bring them to 
the Attorney General. Older activists, Foley argues, offered the movement “an added air 
of credibility” and possessed “fund-raising abilities,” but the idea of a draft card turn-in 
was born in the minds of the young. Thus, only Michael Ferber, Foley contends, deserved 
the indictment handed down by the district court.70  In the end, Raskin avoided 
prosecution—the only defendant out of the five to do so—as a result of the minor role 
that he played in the whole affair. 
 IPS intellectuals opposed the Vietnam War due to the assumed immorality and 
illegality of the conflict. IPS intellectuals also accused American officials of irrationality. 
By refusing to conduct negotiations with the NLF, American officials were letting 
ideology blur reality. While IPS intellectuals called for diplomatic solutions to the crisis 
in Vietnam, either through greater cooperation with the U.N. or by opening up 
negotiations with the NLF, the bulk of the criticism related to America’s actions in 
Vietnam. Though not for the first time, and definitely not the last, America committed 
atrocities that so horrified IPS intellectuals that several intellectuals called on U.S. 
officials to appear before a war crimes tribunal. Criticism of American morality in 
Vietnam reappeared in much of IPS’s critical commentary on the Cold War, as Chapter 7 
illustrates. Therefore, in regard to negotiations, IPS stood somewhere in middle. The 
Institute did not support an immediate withdrawal of American troops, as radical 
demanded, but rather a staged removal of U.S. forces, which liberals considered ill-
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advised. At the same time, IPS’s calls for war crimes tribunals and the Institute’s frequent 
use of moral arguments separated the think tank from the majority of liberal intellectuals. 
One historian has explained that Schlesinger believed the conflict was a result of 
“specific errors in judgment, [and] not the inescapable product of a benighted system or 
the demonic creation of evil men,” as some critics claimed.71 
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Chapter Five: The National Security State and The Men Behind It 
 While some critics of the Vietnam War viewed the conflict as a one-time blunder 
caused by poor leadership and even worse decision-making by foreign policy officials in 
Washington, others, including intellectuals at IPS, blamed Vietnam on the institutional 
makeup of the American government. Removing the policymakers responsible for 
America’s various follies in Vietnam would not prevent future Vietnams, these critics 
claimed. Once the bureaucrats left Washington, others would take their place and devise 
similar policies. Richard Barnet and other IPS intellectuals bestowed upon the men filling 
foreign policy positions in government the title National Security Managers. Members of 
this elite non-elected group of bureaucrats preserved America’s national security state. 
Preventing future Vietnam-like wars, therefore, would require American leaders to 
disavow the national security state, along with the atmosphere of fear and secrecy that 
developed alongside it. Bringing an end to the national security state, furthermore, 
required allowing the American people a role in determining the nation’s foreign policy 
through frequent and open debate.1 
Since America’s founding, prominent political voices warned against American 
involvement in foreign wars. Such admonitions, however, fell to the wayside as America 
went to war against Mexico in the 1840s and by the end of the century, forswearing the 
cautionary dictates of George Washington and John Quincy Adams, fought in the 
Spanish-American War. The twentieth century, of course, brought far larger wars with 
greater American participation. What could account for America’s turn away from 
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isolationism and newfound zeal to act as the world’s policeman? Many academics and 
public intellectuals attempted to answer this question in the years during and after World 
War II when a state of permanent war ascended over America during the Cold War. In 
1941, Harold Lasswell, a sociologist and political scientist, famously wrote of America 
turning into a “garrison state.” For Lasswell, the “garrison state” came about due to a 
constant threat of total warfare. “With the socialization of danger as a permanent 
characteristic of modern violence the nation becomes one unified technical enterprise” 
run by a small group, he argued.2 
Who controlled the “garrison state?”  Writing in 1956, sociologist C. Wright Mills 
famously introduced Americans to the “power elite,” a group that included military 
leaders, corporation owners, and politicians. Forming an “interlocking directorate,” the 
“power elite” manipulated the American people into accepting the dictates of the 
military, corporate, and political leaders.3  Led by Mills’s “directorate,” America 
underwent fundamental changes as it transformed into what authors have variously called 
a “warfare state” and a “national security state.” The “warfare state” received its closest 
examination in Fred Cook’s 1962 book of the same title. For Cook, “propaganda” and 
“fear” drove Americans to accept the creation of a warfare state. “We must be taught to 
fear and to hate or we will not agree to regiment our lives, to bear the enormous burdens 
of ever heavier taxation to pay for ever more costly military hardware—and to do this at 
the expense of domestic programs like medical care and education and healthy urban 
                                                            
     2 Harold D. Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” The American Journal of Sociology,” 46 (Jan. 1941), 459. 
While pointing to the existence of a “garrison state,” Laswell, unlike the intellectuals at IPS, did not 
demand its dismantling. In a later book, National Security and Individual Freedom, he wrote that “the main 
problem confronting the American people as a result of the continuing crisis of national defense is not 
whether to have an American garrison but how much to include within it and how to organize it.” See 
Harold D. Lasswell, National Security and Individual Freedom (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950), 127-128. 
     3 C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (1956; reprint, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 6-9. 
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development,” he proclaimed. Thus, when “Dr. Win-the-War” replaced “Dr. New Deal” 
in late 1943, the latter never practiced again. By the time of the 1946 elections, according 
to Cook, both Democrats and Republicans agreed to rework the Keynesian formula by 
replacing social spending with higher military budgets to improve economic growth.4  
Out of this intellectual lineage, IPS attempted to formulate its own theoretical construct 
of what Marcus Raskin later described as the “national security state.” 
Before looking at how IPS intellectuals came to define the “national security 
state,” it is important to note that historians have long grappled with the question of 
whether the United States actually took on the characteristics described by commentators 
and intellectuals in the 1940s and beyond. Much of the historical literature deals with the 
issue by inspecting the growth, or lack thereof, of the federal government. James Sparrow 
has contended that the U.S. government used a bit of chicanery to convince the American 
public that the reach of the government did not expand, when it fact it had swelled 
greatly. Referencing the millions of volunteers who served in various capacities on the 
home front—as promoters of American war efforts, builders of “victory gardens,” and 
sellers of war bonds—Sparrow has argued that “the Roosevelt administration leaned 
heavily on both the practice and the ideal of voluntarism to run its war effort at the 
grassroots, but this made mass participation into more of a simulacrum of self-
government than the real thing.” Sparrow has suggested that an “imaginary of freedom” 
took shape that allowed for the existence at the local level of groups that could press the 
federal government for rights and, in the process, mollify any concerns that threatened 
                                                            
     4 Fred Cook, The Warfare State (New York: Collier, 1962), 100, 189. President Franklin Roosevelt 
referred to “Dr. Win-the-War” in a December 1943 press conference. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, Excerpts 
from the Press Conference, December 28, 1943, The American Presidency Project 
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the growing state. Moreover, according to Sparrow, the “imaginary of freedom” 
permitted America to take the lead in building postwar international institutions, such as 
the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank and avoid the 
fate that befell the League of Nations after World War I. Yet, alongside this “imaginary 
of freedom” there existed “a cultural logic of nationalism” that Sparrow has described as 
“a construct designed to obscure the coercions of a modern state capable of mobilizing 
for total war.” Thus, as citizens volunteered to support war mobilization, Americans 
faced diminished civil liberties and even imprisonment and internment for their political 
beliefs.5 
Other historians, however, have questioned whether the federal government 
actually augmented its powers and reach during the Cold War. As Aaron Friedberg has 
noted, “the imminent threat of war produced pressures for the permanent construction of 
a powerful central state.” At the same time, efforts to enlarge the government “were met 
and, to a degree, counterbalanced, by strong anti-statist influences that were deeply 
rooted in the circumstances of the nation’s founding.” Friedberg goes so far as to argue 
that the latter tendency in America led to the outcome of the Cold War in favor of the 
United States. Claiming that America’s anti-statist policies helped produce a growth 
economy and technological innovation, Friedberg suggests that such successes made it 
easier for Americans to support the Cold War. The dismantling of unpopular New Deal 
programs in the 1940s and 1950s, as well as the decision to not enact universal military 
training and limit civil defense, made possible what Friedberg has called a “strategic 
synthesis” in which “domestic components rested with relative ease on the nation’s 
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society and economy, and that could therefore be sustained” for the duration of the Cold 
War. Had officials and politicians not limited the number of federal programs and carried 
out more overt defense measures, Friedberg suggests that calls for isolationism would 
have spiked.6 
National Security Managers and American Democracy 
The “national security state” thrived due to the efforts of a collection of foreign 
policy officials that Barnet labeled the National Security Managers. Barnet and other IPS 
intellectuals blamed these bureaucrats for Vietnam and America’s other imperial 
ventures. As the American state grew and became more centralized, the administration of 
government, or bureaucracy, garnered much attention from intellectuals. C. Wright Mills 
and the intellectuals at IPS contributed to a long conversation about the growing 
centralized state. In fact, IPS’s critique of National Security Managers mirrored the 
growing anti-bureaucratic feeling of the 1960s. Howard Brick has pointed to a “mutation 
in the meaning of ‘control’” among radicals in the 1960s, due largely to the rise of 
totalitarianism in the 1930s and Max Weber’s writings on bureaucracy. Whereas 
reformers from previous eras used “social control” and top-down organization as a means 
to relieve society of its ills, 1960s activists and intellectuals opposed hierarchical 
structures that empowered a small group at the expense of society as a whole.7 
In addition to Weber, James Burnham, a Trotskyist who later turned sharply to the 
right, offered an important contribution to the idea of bureaucracy, which he called the 
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“managerial society.” Whereas the move from a feudal to a capitalist society led to the 
“localization of sovereignty” in parliamentary structures, Burnham pointed to another 
shift occurring with the rise of the “managerial society.” Sovereignty no longer resided in 
the parliament in managerial societies like Russia, where Burnham dated the demise of 
the parliament to before Lenin’s death. Thus, referring to Russia, Germany, and Italy, he 
argued that “the rules, regulations, laws, decrees, have more and more issued from an 
interconnected group of administrative boards, commissions, bureaus. . . .” Burnham 
recognized a similar change taking place in America with New Deal agencies like the 
NLRB, TVA, and AAA taking on more powers.8 
Yet even more than centralization, IPS intellectuals despised the rising fortunes of 
technocrats within the bureaucracy. Years before journalist David Halberstam wrote 
about the “whiz kids” of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, IPS intellectuals, 
primarily Barnet, pointed an accusatory finger at the faceless experts brought into 
government to formulate American foreign policy. Though focusing on corporations, 
John Kenneth Galbraith, put forth the most well-known portrait of the “technostructure,” 
as he called it, in his 1967 book The New Industrial State. The technocrats of the 
“technostructure” brought “specialized knowledge, talent or experience to group 
decision-making” and served as the “guiding intelligence—the brain—of the enterprise.”9 
National Security Managers, according to Barnet, carried out foreign policy with 
the same understanding of power that Raskin and Fall disparaged in The Viet-Nam 
                                                            
     8 See Max Weber, “Bureaucracy,” in From Max Weber, ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: 
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in the World (New York: John Day Co., 1941), 141-150. 
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Reader. The great power politics that dominated much of the Cold War created a great 
interest in the affairs of the Third World, with no comparable concern for the people 
living in these countries. The National Security Manager, who believed that “the 
acquisition of power is both a necessity and an end in itself,” furthered the outlook that 
led America to disregard the citizens of Third World nations, according to Barnet.10  For 
the National Security Managers all that mattered was that America gained an edge in the 
battle against the Soviet Union for Cold War supremacy. Such a mindset led to American 
interventions in the Third World and the support of totalitarian dictators. 
Barnet offered his harshest appraisal of the National Security Managers in his 
1972 book Roots of War: The Men and Institutions Behind U.S. Foreign Policy. Barnet 
bemoaned the “bureaucratization of homicide” as National Security Managers planned 
for massive bombings, defoliation missions, and assassinations without setting foot on 
the battleground. Barnet went so far as to compare American officials to Nazi leaders. 
Like Reinhard Heydrich and Adolph Eichmann, “The bureaucratic killer looks at an 
assigned homicidal task as a technical operation much like any other. He does not 
question its moral purpose,” Barnet wrote.11  Here again, the issue of morality served as a 
central component of IPS’s critique of the men tasked with forming American foreign 
policy. Schooled as technocrats, National Security Managers did not have the skills or 
patience necessary to devise sound political agreements capable of settling disputes well 
into the future, Barnet argued. Noting a growing “militarization of the civilian 
leadership,” Barnet blamed politicians more than the military for America’s tendency to 
                                                            
     10 Richard J. Barnet, Intervention and Revolution: America’s Confrontation with Insurgent Movements 
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rely on military force instead of diplomatic solutions. Claiming that the technocratic 
outlook of the National Security Managers resulted in America’s dependence on military 
strength, Barnet wrote, “Factors which can be fed into computers such as ‘kill ratio’ 
sound more persuasive than political analyses, which is hard to prepare and hard to 
comprehend.” Preferring the certainty of mathematical calculations, American officials 
avoided entering into unpredictable negotiations in Vietnam and elsewhere. Discussing 
the run-up to the Vietnam War, Barnet lamented, “No staff work of any consequence was 
devoted to the kind of peace settlement we ultimately wanted or had reasons to expect, 
and how we could get it,” which foreordained a military strategy in Vietnam. By breaking 
down the options available to the United States in Vietnam as either victory or surrender, 
the national security bureaucracy, Barnet claimed, “reduced a complex political reality to 
a test of the American will” in its fight against communism.12 
According to Barnet, National Security Managers thrived due to a culture of 
unaccountability and elite decision-making. Despite the numerous opportunities for peace 
in Vietnam—America rejected proposals by U Thant at the U.N., as well as offers by 
Hanoi and the Soviet Union—military solutions always took precedence over negotiated 
settlements. Bureaucrats ignored such peace feelers because “the rewards and incentives 
that operate on men when they became national security managers to the electorate 
provide language and ideology that has been developed to absolve men from personal 
responsibility for bureaucratic homicide all reinforce each other,” Barnet declared. In an 
earlier unpublished paper, Barnet depicted his National Security Managers as composing 
                                                            
     12 Richard J. Barnet, The Economy of Death (New York: Atheneum, 1969), 82, 84-85; Richard M. 
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a “separate government” that was “insulated from the people of the United States,” and 
not particularly responsive to their demands because they had no interest or experience in 
domestic matters.13 
Emphasizing the close ties between National Security Managers and private 
industry before and after their service in government, Barnet claimed that such 
relationships led to a militarized society. “We have built into our system a set of 
incentives for continuing the arms race by recruiting the National Security Managers 
from the weapons industry. The taxpayers have been paying for biased judgment,” Barnet 
complained. In the process, according to Barnet, America had become weaker. As “the 
National Security Managers have been piling up useless and obscene hardware . . . the 
cities rot and Americans turn on each other in frustration,” Barnet lamented. For this 
reason, Barnet called the National Security Managers “America’s number one problem.” 
Encouraged, or at least allowed, to carry out a ruthless foreign policy, bureaucrats, hidden 
from the public’s view, endorsed profligate spending on weapons systems because 
National Security Managers did not have to answer to the public. The constant revolving 
door in presidential administrations, furthermore, encouraged short-term thinking by 
bureaucrats who sought immediate successes that would improve their chances of 
obtaining a job once they left the administration. “The canny bureaucrat is sustained by 
the faith that when the policy collapses he will be somewhere else,” Barnet explained. 
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Thus the bureaucrat could promote military measures without taking into account the 
long-term likelihood of success or failure.14 
The National Security Managers concerned IPS intellectuals because of the great 
sway the bureaucrats had over presidents. Described by Barnet as “the bureaucratic 
model of reality,” presidents, he argued, rarely received advice that had not already been 
circumscribed and considered acceptable by the bureaucracy. Thus, instead of providing 
impartial advice, the bureaucrat offered policies developed with the interests of the 
bureaucracy in mind, and not what was best for America. Barnet reiterated this point in 
another essay when he argued that “the roots of the Vietnam failure lie more in the 
structure and organization of the national security bureaucracy than in the personality of 
the President or the idiosyncrasies” of his advisors. As a result, “The President may 
decide, but the bureaucracy structures the decisions by setting out the choices.” And 
given their connections to arms producers and corporations, National Security Managers 
rarely presented the president with policies favoring diplomatic solutions.15 
Though not yet known within IPS as National Security Managers, Raskin had a 
similarly negative view of foreign policy bureaucrats when he proposed several unlikely 
candidates to replace President Johnson’s advisors in 1964. “The President has been 
handed the type of advice which adds up to nothing but military strategies, banal 
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ideology, and weak psychology. Through such ‘advice’ bureaucracies thrive,” Raskin 
argued. Like Barnet, Raskin argued in late 1964 that the foreign policy bureaucracy, and 
not President Johnson, deserved much of the blame for America’s military actions in 
Vietnam. “Thus, if the President is to be faulted, it is that he allowed himself for a period 
of time to be sold a bill of goods by people who have no diplomatic or political abilities, 
no touch with our society or anyone else’s, and no sense of the rhythm of history and 
practical ideals of our nation,” Raskin explained. Therefore, he advised the president to 
fire his foreign policy advisors and replace them with people like Martin Luther King, 
James Farmer, George Kennan, Arthur Larson, Benjamin V. Cohen, or Telford Taylor.16 
While no president would likely ever include King or Farmer in their cabinet, 
Barnet offered a more plausible alternative in regard to the makeup of the National 
Security Council. “The National Security Council includes no one to argue for a 
distribution of resources other than what the Pentagon demands,” Barnet explained as he 
called for an expansion of the NSC to include a greater diversity of interests. Barnet 
wanted the NSC to be made over to include Secretaries from Transportation, Housing and 
Urban Development, Health, Education, and Welfare, and “other spokesmen for domestic 
interests” as well. Bringing non-military officials into the NSC would force proponents of 
military spending to explain why its programs should receive support and the money 
should not go to combat “such domestic threats as poverty, disease, ignorance, and the 
poisoning of the environment . . .,” Barnet claimed. Making a similar argument almost 
twenty years later, Barnet added that expanding the NSC would also guard against 
decisions made for short-term benefit. An enlarged NSC could “develop a long-range 
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national planning process which integrates economic, social, environmental, and military 
considerations” when creating proposals for the president.17  IPS hoped to gain the 
support of the American public by illustrating how National Security Managers 
dominated the foreign policy decision-making process, leading to an excessive emphasis 
on military strength at the expense of the nation’s social fabric. 
While identifying the consequences for America of depending too heavily on 
National Security Managers, Barnet also hoped to expose a deficiency in Marxist 
analyses of foreign affairs. Barnet criticized Marxists for “not explain[ing] the peculiar 
dynamics of American imperialism” at those moments when purely economic interests 
could not explain American foreign policy. For instance, Marxists could not explain why 
America continued to fight in Vietnam, which Barnet called “an economic loser” for the 
United States, if the war offered no financial benefits to the ruling classes. Barnet also 
begrudged Marxists for failing to take into account the National Security Managers who, 
he claimed, “do not think they are acting solely or primarily to protect private corporate 
interests.” In the end, National Security Managers did not always act “rationally” and to 
think that they did so in pursuit of purely economic expansion seemed to Barnet “overly 
optimistic” and too simple. “They often trade economic gain for such irrational 
intangibles as the thrill of domination and the mastery of paranoid fears,” Barnet wrote in 
reference to the National Security Managers.18 
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Several prominent intellectuals questioned Barnet’s singling out of a small group 
of advisors and charged IPS’s co-director with overstating the importance of National 
Security Managers. Claiming that Barnet exaggerated the influence of the National 
Security Managers, these critics also accused IPS’s co-director of ignoring obvious 
examples of bureaucrats speaking out against militarism. One reader criticized Barnet’s 
tendency to absolve all other groups in society of wrongdoing in order to place all of the 
blame on the National Security Managers. This reader, responding to a 1971 article by 
Barnet in Harper’s, pointed to the undue emphasis placed on national security managers 
in Barnet’s work without any mention of the role played by the American public, the 
Congress, and the North Vietnamese. Furthermore, the reader argued that in addition to 
escalating the war, the national security managers “were responsible for the war’s 
ultimate de-escalation.” Referring to evidence in the Pentagon papers, the reader offered 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara as an example of a national security manager 
who spoke out against continued fighting.19 
During a conference on Vietnam in 1968, Albert Wohlstetter, a nuclear strategist 
associated with the RAND Corporation, and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., a former advisor to 
President Kennedy, also took issue with Barnet’s narrow view of bureaucrats. They 
complained of Barnet’s unqualified statements regarding the belligerence of the National 
Security Managers and their ability to influence important foreign policy decisions. 
Wohlstetter criticized Barnet for making blanket statements about the national security 
bureaucracy that ignored the actual evidence. For instance, he pointed to examples when 
military officials “greatly overestimated enemy forces and as a result did not intervene,” 
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while Barnet claimed the opposite always occurred. Wohlstetter also questioned Barnet’s 
claim that the missile gap argument used by Kennedy against Eisenhower owed itself to 
the national security bureaucracy. Describing the missile gap myth as “a political gambit 
of the ‘outs’—the Democrats,” Wohlstetter claimed that Barnet too readily accepted “a 
very popular misunderstanding.”20  Politicians, not bureaucrats, advanced the missile gap 
myth. 
Arthur Schlesinger Jr. also felt that Barnet placed too great an emphasis on the 
National Security Council, leading to a paper containing “a certain amount of insight 
mingled with a great deal of extravagance and error.” Speaking of his own experience in 
the White House, Schlesinger claimed that Barnet’s National Security Managers “made 
no important decisions on anything” during Kennedy’s presidency. While Barnet saw 
Vietnam “as the model for every decision in foreign policy made since World War II,” 
Schlesinger considered the war a “culmination of error” specific to a unique set of 
circumstances. In fact, Schlesinger claimed, “the important things” following World War 
II achieved by the United States had been “political and economic rather than military in 
nature.” Schlesinger also questioned Barnet’s depiction of the national security 
bureaucracy as a “unified monolith,” which clashed with the former’s own experiences 
during the Cuban missile crisis and when differences between officials came to the 
surface. Schlesinger also highlighted the distinction between “those who give the 
advice,” the bureaucrats, and “those who take the advice” and use it to make the actual 
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decisions. Barnet, Schlesinger claimed, focused far too much on the former, which 
explained why he did not ask “why anyone listens to what they have to say.”21 
Perhaps if Barnet had clearly delineated just who or what bureaucratic positions 
he included among his National Security Managers he could have avoided making the 
sweeping indictments criticized by Wohlstetter and Schlesinger. Instead, his National 
Security Managers remained a faceless unit. Yet, for Barnet, the faces did not matter 
because whoever entered the bureaucracy lost their individuality and agency. During the 
conference, expressed concern over the fact that America’s “top civilian leadership” 
suddenly became more militaristic after entering the bureaucracy. Thus Barnet 
determined “that the problem may lie in institutional structures which generate pressures 
that influence men toward militarist analysis and militarist solutions.” Barnet disagreed 
with commentators who blamed war on biological tendencies instead of looking at 
American society and its social institutions. In Barnet’s view, an emphasis on biological 
rationales served to redeem the war makers. “If human beings . . . have biological urges 
to slaughter their own species at regular intervals there is nothing to be done,” Barnet 
exclaimed. By locating the “roots of war” in social institutions, however, activists could 
use domestic reform to limit war.22 
IPS and the National Security State 
The very phrase Cold War denotes the relative paucity of hot wars during the 
drawn out conflict that lasted for much of the second half of the twentieth century. Not to 
downplay the significance of the countless smaller conflicts that raged on across the 
globe, with the exception of the Korean War and the Vietnam War, American troops 
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stayed out of most of these minor conflagrations. Yet just because America avoided 
sending its military to certain regions of the world did not mean that America was at 
peace. Mary Dudziak has suggested that since World War II, America has not 
experienced a period free of actual combat or at least preparation for war. She argues that 
the tendency to create a “wartime frame” denoting the official start and end of war, or 
mobilization for combat, resulted in an inaccurate picture of just how much war affected 
society. In Dudziak’s opinion, “It works to restrict our study of the impact of war and 
militarization within certain exceptional moments, making it harder to see the ways that 
war has become part of the normal course of American life.” Thus, ignoring these so-
called “small wars,” and, in the case of Vietnam, circumscribing the length of wars, has 
allowed commentators, politicians, and other authorities to claim that peace existed 
during certain periods in American history when it really did not.23 
Never ending threats of a worldwide nuclear holocaust also made periods of 
supposed peace times of angst and anxiety, which allowed the national security state to 
thrive. The expansionist policies of the Soviet Union following World War II 
undoubtedly created much uncertainty and gave rise to the Cold War. Yet international 
affairs represented only one aspect of the Cold War. As historians Campbell Craig and 
Fredrik Logevall have shown, the Cold War required a domestic component as well. The 
popularization of Cold War studies from an international perspective has, according to 
Craig and Logevall, led historians to ignore or downplay the importance of domestic 
politics. As a result, the authors have called for an enlarged focus on the “intermestic,” or 
the ties between international events and domestic politics. Focusing in on the domestic 
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sources of the Cold War would, they argue, highlight the fact that America, despite 
statements made to the contrary by Cold Warriors, had little to fear from outside forces.24  
Regardless, Americans living through the Cold War believed that Soviet forces stood at 
the doorstep of the United States. As a result, the imagined Soviet threat made possible 
the creation of a national security state. 
As the aforementioned book written by journalist Fred Cook in 1962 correctly 
surmised, American politicians used the fear of a nuclear holocaust to keep the American 
public compliant. Yet as the numerous scholarly books on American culture in the Cold 
War era attest, the producers of culture also encouraged a less unruly public. For 
instance, Stephen J. Whitfield notes how the novels that came out after World War I—
including such books as Ernest Hemingway’s A Farewell to Arms and John Dos Passos’s 
Three Soldiers—praised individuality, but post-World War II novels showed characters 
bowing to authority. The Caine Mutiny, as an example, told the story of how, in the 
words of Whitfield, “defense of democracy” sometimes required following leaders no 
matter their deficiencies.25 
Whether talking about Vietnam or American intervention in Latin America in the 
1980s, the national security state stood at the center of the issues discussed by IPS 
intellectuals. Upon learning that IPS intended to turn its attention to domestic issues, 
Howard Romaine of the Institute for Southern Studies argued that one issue stood above 
all others in importance to IPS. “The central notion of the National Security State as the 
chief obstacle to a more democratic and decent society at home, and the major threat to a 
                                                            
     24 Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press, 2009), 8-11. 
     25 Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 
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more peaceful and economically equitable world, is what the Institute stands for in my 
eyes,” Romaine wrote in an attempt to dissuade the Institute from turning away from 
international issues.26  In fact, the intellectuals at IPS considered one of the primary 
strengths of the Institute its ability to speak broadly and show the relationship between 
domestic and international issues.27 
The national security state remained an area of central concern for IPS throughout 
the period under investigation in this study. In 1979, Raskin devoted an entire book, The 
Politics of National Security, to the subject. According to Raskin, the possibility of war, 
concern over the rising numbers of revolutions, frailties in the capitalist system, and 
advances in nuclear weapons and technology more generally caused the development of 
the national security states. At its most basic level, the national security state allowed 
“ruling elites to implement their imperial schemes and misplaced ideals,” according to 
Raskin. A growing bureaucracy and an all-powerful president who acted, Raskin claimed, 
“as a broker and legitimating instrument of national security activity,” aided in the 
creation of the national security state. Raskin pointed to NSC 68 as the “magna carta of 
the national security bureaucracy” because the policy paper laid the groundwork for the 
creation of a plethora of agencies that proved pivotal to the running of the national 
security state. Among them, Raskin included, corporations, police and military forces, 
                                                            
     26 Howard Romaine to Marcus Raskin, January 14, 1971, AWP, WHS, box 7, folder 27. 
     27 For instance, Borosage wrote encouragingly in 1979 of IPS’s wide-ranging studies, which represented 
another advantage the think tank had over other progressive organizations. According to Borosage, IPS’s 
reports and books on foreign policy, the federal budget, economic interactions between the First and Third 
World, and the role of knowledge in politics made possible a fuller understanding of what ailed America. 
Not only did IPS possess the knowledge to see the interconnectedness of many of America’s problems, but 
it also recognized the relationship between America’s troubles and the difficulties facing the nations of the 
world. “Domestic policy organizations simply cannot respond—even in the short-term—to the new global 
corporate dynamic,” Borosage exclaimed. See Robert Borosage, “The Institute in the Next Decade,” no 
date [1979], IPSR, WHS, box 83, folder 6, 5. 
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technicians, and labor leaders concerned with creating an American “empire making and 
preparing for war, and transforming nature into material processes for domination. . . .”28 
Before analyzing any further the theory behind the national security state, it is 
worth looking at when, chronologically speaking, IPS intellectuals detected the earliest 
signals of the transformation of America. Marking the genesis of the national security 
state as the moment Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947, Borosage 
claimed that the legislation forever changed American society. In his view, the bill 
“legitimated wartime institutions and priorities for the peacetime state” and “militarized” 
the civilians who controlled those institutions. While most historians, and, in fact, other 
intellectuals at IPS, point to Harry Truman as the president under which the national 
security state originated, Saul Landau argued that “the first modern national security 
state” appeared as early as Woodrow Wilson’s presidency. “A crisis mentality ruled, 
secrecy prevailed, and censorship and repression were widespread” during Wilson’s time 
in office, Landau claimed. 29  While IPS intellectuals did not agree on a hard and fast date 
for the beginning of the national security state, they concurred on its consequences for 
America. 
Despite looking to the early twentieth century for the creation of the national 
security state, Landau agreed with his colleagues at IPS that America’s government 
                                                            
     28 Marcus G. Raskin, The Politics of National Security (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1979), 
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national security state. “The State would use the young people by challenging and channeling them into 
accepting and prosecuting the imperial purpose,” Raskin explained. See Marcus Raskin, “The Kennedy 
Hawks Assume Power from the Eisenhower Vultures,” in The Pentagon Watchers: Students reports on the 
National Security State, eds. Leonard S. Rodberg and Derek Shearer (Garden City, NY: Double Day, 
1970), 96. 
     29 Robert Borosage, “The Making of the National Security State,” in The Pentagon Watchers: Students 
reports on the National Security State, eds. Leonard S. Rodberg and Derek Shearer (Garden City, NY: 
Double Day, 1970), 12; Saul Landau, The Dangerous Doctrine: National Security and U.S. Foreign Policy 
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underwent an important transformation in 1947. He claimed that the National Security 
Act passed that year created a “birfurcated state,” which he described as having one part 
“open and accessible to the U.S. public” with another section “a secret, suprastate entity 
whose agenda and inner workings had to be kept not only from the enemy, but from the 
state’s own citizens as well.” Such secrecy, Raskin argued earlier, led to the creation of a 
“para-law.” In the national security state, according to Raskin, “para-law” replaced older 
forms of law. As understood by Raskin, para-law did “not emerge from either legal 
decision, public debate, or congressional decision,” though the courts and legislature 
often approved it after the fact. The national security state’s para-law was “forged in 
private, outside the public forum, without public debate although it is made by public 
officials or executive proclamation.” Without “para-law,” Raskin claimed, the national 
security state could not have existed. In his view, “the daily activities of millions of 
people who without the color of some form of custom and justification would be forced 
to see their work as criminal. . . .”30 
Not only, as Dudziak notes, does the lack of war not necessarily mean peace, but, 
according to IPS intellectuals, the national security state depended on the absence of 
combat. Describing the national security state as a “nondynamic system,” Raskin argued 
that despite having as its purpose the “continuous preparation for war, the distortion of 
the economy, [and] the development of capitalists whose livelihood depends on the arms 
race and continuous covert and military engagement,” actual war could never occur. 
Kennedy threatened the survival of the national security state when he involved the 
United States in Vietnam, which led to massive protests. “What was once invisible about 
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imperialism became visible and costly,” Raskin wrote in reference to the Vietnam War 
and the antiwar movement. The threat of war, on the other hand, served the interests of 
America’s leaders because a constantly lurking and invisible menace led Americans to 
self-censorship. Noting “the loss of legitimacy of previous systems of social and political 
control”—for instance feudalism and aristocracy—Barnet illustrated how states, either 
through direct force or less visible methods, such as unequal economic systems and 
governmental surveillance, reclaimed legitimacy. When a state still failed “in maintaining 
social peace,” it often used “national security” as a way to keep its people in line. As a 
result, Barnet claimed, “A world of states run by regimes lacking legitimacy is a world at 
risk.” Creating enemies abroad in order to quell revolt at home, however, did not make 
much sense to IPS intellectuals, either militarily or economically.31 
For IPS intellectuals the national security state posed a dilemma because its very 
existence prevented the public from speaking out against it. In 1970, Barnet and Raskin 
argued that America’s constant preparation for war made it a “War Machine.” 
Controlling America’s economic, political, and military institutions, the “War Machine” 
created a state of “permanent war” even in times of peace. “It cannot respond to popular 
pressure for peace or for a different set of priorities because it cannot stop itself,” Barnet 
and Raskin declared. Raskin still held out hope that a crack in the foundation of the 
national security state would open it up to the will of the people. Raskin argued that the 
national security state was a “synthesis of state power and capitalism,” but within the 
system there existed a “contradiction.” “It was,” he explained, “that continuous 
preparation for war, the distortion of the economy, the development of capitalists whose 
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livelihood depends on the arms race and continuous covert and military engagement 
would not be contained as a self-enclosed bureaucratic process.” The constant war 
footing and involvement of the United States in worldwide conflagrations caused harm to 
the economy and would eventually lead the American public to question intervention.32 
Opening Up the National Security State to the American People 
In addition to employing the legal system to protect against abuses of power by 
government officials, IPS, as it did on so many matters, turned to the American people. 
Albert Wohlstetter, during the aforementioned 1968 conference on Vietnam, claimed that 
Barnet’s views on the bureaucracy “lead us so directly to genocide, nothing remains 
except a prayer that the world can be broken up into very small self-subsistent units in 
which contacts are face to face.” Even then, fighting still broke out between the Greek 
city-states, so Wohlstetter claimed that Barnet’s argument “cannot be taken literally.”33 
While IPS intellectuals supported greater local autonomy on certain matters, they 
also suggested that Congress, with some changes, represented one of the best hopes for 
the preservation of democracy. Referring to Congress’s inability to stop a president’s 
march to war once the journey commenced, Raskin called on America’s legislative body 
to look elsewhere for its “legitimacy.” He argued that congressmen “must find their 
legitimacy in the people who will act as citizens to determine their interests and purposes 
in confrontation with the present corporate structures.” With “its roots in the people,” 
Raskin suggested at another time, Congress represented the best means through which to 
                                                            
     32 Richard J. Barnet and Marcus G. Raskin, An American Manifesto: What’s Wrong With America and 
What Can We Do About It (New York: Signet, 1970), 30; Marcus G. Raskin, “The American Political 
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destroy the national security state. Congress, he believed, could open up a dialogue with 
the citizenry and begin the process of bringing to an end the national security state’s 
“mythicizing [of] people,” which distorted American democracy by making it appear as 
though Americans supported their nation’s foreign policy. According to Raskin, the 
social movements of the 1960s and 1970s already “demythiciz[ed] people and forc[ed] 
dialogue among those who refused to see one another except as abstract entities,” and 
thus made democracy real.34  In other words, Raskin wanted “We The People” to stand 
for something and serve as more than patriotic propaganda. 
In order to strengthen the relationship between Congress and the American 
people, Raskin suggested a return to a custom of the eighteenth century. Looking at the 
implementation of the grand jury in America at that time, Raskin explained that it “was 
used to find out the problems of government and to institutionalize citizen control and 
participation.” Re-instituting grand juries would “open the way to the emergence of a 
participatory nation in which citizenship would become the linchpin of a modern 
American democracy,” Raskin claimed. The grand juries would “investigate the major 
public institutions” and “address the content and direction of governing in the districts” to 
remove the “barriers” that existed between Congress and the people, Raskin explained. 
Additionally, the grand juries would do many of the same things as Congress, but with 
greater participation by the people. In Raskin’s grand jury system, each congressman 
would be responsible to several juries in his or her district. Raskin proposed having one 
jury for every 50,000 citizens in his or her district. Each jury would have 24 citizens 
serving two-year terms. Congressmen, as required by law, would have to meet with their 
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jury for one week at the end of each legislative session.35  At their most basic levels, 
grand juries made possible greater collaboration between Congress and its constituents on 
all matters, not just foreign policy. 
The favorable view that certain IPS intellectuals had of Congress worried other 
fellows at the think tank who pointed to Congress’s inability to weaken the national 
security state. Landau, referring to the recent congressional hearings on Iran-Contra in the 
1980s, had little confidence in the ability of Congress to halt the growing national 
security state. Rather than confront the national security ideology during the Iran-Contra 
hearings, Landau accused the legislature of focusing on the “narrow issue, as if nothing 
had really changed in the basic partition of powers that the Founding Fathers had meted 
out to each branch.” The Congress could have asked the “question of whether or not the 
United States could continue to function as a republic and as an empire,” but instead 
focused on the president’s role in the scandal. Thus, Landau concluded, “So ingrained has 
anti-Sovietism become that candidates and Congress members chant its tenets like 
catechism.”36 
Even proponents of a strengthened Congress periodically expressed 
disillusionment with the legislative body. Raskin denounced Congress in 1969 for not 
stopping the national security state from carrying out its policies. The national security 
state, according to Raskin, turned Congress into “a permanent talk group which arrives at 
no decisions and effects no changes in terms of the actual direction of the society.” Often, 
Raskin argued at another point, the Executive gave Congress the opportunity to use its 
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constitutional powers only after he had already ensnared America so deep into a war that 
to deny the president a declaration of war would do irreparable harm to the country and 
the Executive. Raskin claimed that by asserting its constitutional right to declare war, 
Congress would make the Executive branch look like “a band of thieves who up that 
point had engaged in a criminal enterprise” by not seeking congressional approval. The 
refusal by Congress to rubber stamp the president’s plans for war would lead the 
American people to demand the president’s ouster, thus threatening the very fabric of 
American society. “Members of Congress will comply rather than risk internal revolution 
to stop a war abroad,” Raskin suggested.37 
As IPS intellectuals looked more broadly at the national security state, discussion 
of the National Security Managers gave way to talk of abuses of presidential power by 
the Commander in Chief. More and more, it appeared as if an “imperial presidency” had 
overtaken America.38  Presidents used claims of national security to boost their authority 
during times of actual and imaginary crises, IPS intellectuals argued. Decrying the long 
list of secrets held under the cover of national security, Landau claimed that many 
“national security secrets were known to the enemy. The real reason for classifying them 
was to keep them from the American public.” Furthermore, the term national security 
                                                            
     37 Marcus G. Raskin, “From Imperial War-Making to a Code of Personal Responsibility,” in Washington 
Plans An Aggressive War, eds. Ralph Stavins, Richard J. Barnet, and Marcus G. Raskin (New York: 
Random House, 1971), 282. 
     38 Historian and advisor to President John F. Kennedy, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., brought attention to the 
idea of an “imperial presidency” with the publication of his book of the same name in 1973. Viewing 
history as one long, back-and-forth battle between Congress and the Executive for power, Schlesinger, not 
surprisingly, found Richard Nixon as a paragon of the “imperial presidency.” Schlesinger argued, “Nixon 
was carrying the imperial presidency toward its ultimate form in the plebiscitary Presidency” in which—
with the President accountable only once every four years, shielded in the years between elections from 
congressional and public harassment, empowered by his mandate to make war or to make peace, to spend 
or to impound, to give out information or to hold it back, superseding congressional legislation by 
executive order, all in the name of a majority” that after the election had to remain supportive of the 
president. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency (New York: popular Library, 1974), 
247-248. 
      222 
 
 
served only to protect whoever occupied the Oval Office. “Instead of making us more 
secure as a nation, the national security doctrine has led to international tensions and 
consistent abuse of executive privilege,” Landau wrote. If America hoped to prevent 
another Watergate or Iran-Contra scandal, it had to move beyond dealing with such crises 
after the fact, Landau argued. In his opinion, Congress had to move “beyond its 
restorationalist role” and determine “what national security really means” so that 
presidents could not use the term to circumvent democratic decision-making.39 
Beginning with the National Security Managers and then turning their attention to 
the more extensive national security state, IPS intellectuals found in these two concepts 
an explanation for America’s various missteps both at home and abroad. The National 
Security Managers not only lacked a moral compass, but their very existence precluded 
the involvement of the American public in decisions of national import. They existed, 
furthermore, as part of a much larger and more encompassing national security state, 
which worked to nullify public worries over the activities of the National Security 
Managers by embedding within the American psyche a constant fear of attack from the 
enemy. As they would with so many other issues, IPS intellectuals looked to the 
American people as the savior, albeit, this time, speaking through a Congress brought 
closer to the citizenry through the holding of grand juries. In the end, however, IPS 
intellectuals never advanced their argument beyond the claim that Congress, through 
closer contact with the people, offered the best possibility for the restoration of American 
democracy. 
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Chapter Six: Solidarity: IPS and the Third World 
Blaming America’s frequent interventions in Latin America on realpolitik and an 
ideological egotism that rejected any belief system other than democratic capitalism, IPS 
sought to construct a new path for America in its relations with the Third World. The new 
role IPS envisioned for America involved a greater consideration of the aspirations of 
Latin Americans, in regard to both ideological and economic concerns. However, the 
constant fear of Soviet expansionism led America to sell arms to Third World dictators 
and, on the home front, treat Latin America as a proving ground after the failure in 
Vietnam. For IPS, America represented the only threat in Central America as the former 
sought to overturn popular revolutions in Nicaragua and elsewhere.  
Historians have long debated the charge leveled against the United States by its 
detractors that it represented the new imperial power after the fall of the British Empire 
following World War II. Some historians have looked for evidence of an American 
empire going back even earlier to the nation’s first years. Writing in the late 1950s, 
William Appleman Williams located support for expansionism in the writings of James 
Madison. According to the University of Wisconsin historian, “Americans thought of 
themselves as an empire at the very outset of their national existence,” as exemplified by 
the thinking of America’s early political leaders. Madison, Williams argued, promoted 
expansion as a way to prevent self-interested groups from obtaining too much power. 
Thus, Williams contended, Madison’s thinking on the subject represented a precursor to 
Frederick Jackson Turner’s frontier thesis of a century later. More recently, Michael Hunt 
has suggested that the ideology of foreign policy underwent a tremendous change in the 
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years following Thomas Jefferson’s presidency. America’s third president and his 
successors no longer saw the Republican ideal of liberty as contradictory to Alexander 
Hamilton’s calls for American greatness through a strong government. A powerful 
centralized government would allow the United States to expand further West and 
preserve liberty by acquiring lands for people to farm and maintain their virtuosity.1 
Histories of the Cold War, especially the more recent studies of the conflict, have 
attempted to bring attention to the Third World and move the spotlight away from the 
battle between the United States and the Soviet Union over Europe. A number of studies 
that look at the Cold War in the Third World refute the charge of imperialism by the 
superpowers. Arguing for a somewhat softer view of superpower interventions in the 
region, Odd Arne Westad suggests that “while imperialism got its social consciousness 
almost as an afterthought, in the Cold War it was inherent from the very beginning.” Both 
Washington and Moscow claimed that they sought “control and improvement” of Third 
World nations and acted with the interests of each particular nation in mind. Not looking 
to manipulate the political systems or take the resources of Third World nations, the 
United States and the Soviet Union genuinely sought the best for their non-European 
allies, as evidenced by the willingness of the superpowers to sacrifice life and treasure 
during wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan, Westad claims. Another historian, Hal Brands, 
has suggested that Third World countries possessed far more agency than they are usually 
given credit for. He has argued that anti-communism grew organically in the region and 
Latin American leaders did not require much persuasion from America to go after 
communists. Brands argues fervently against the common historical portrayal of Latin 
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American military regimes “as mere ciphers that needed to be prompted to be 
anticommunist.” Even without the prodding of America, Latin American military leaders 
were extremely worried about guerrillas coming from Cuba to invade their country.2 
Other historians have offered less friendly portraits of American interventions in 
the Third World. Considering the significance of the removal of Jacobo Arbenz in 
Guatemala in 1954 by the Central Intelligence Agency, Walter LaFeber has argued that 
the overthrow of the democratically-elected leader Arbenz had less to do with external 
pressures on his rule than internal events. Whereas the Monroe Doctrine protected 
America’s neighbors against external threats, the situation in Guatemala represented a 
new, domestic threat. Though John Foster Dulles and others in the United States 
government cast events in Guatemala as communist-inspired, the Secretary of State 
recognized the unique nature of the situation. As did Guatemala’s Foreign Minister 
Guillermo Foriello, who compared American actions in the country to McCarthyism in 
the United States. Beginning with the 1954 overthrow of Arbenz, America never slowed 
its interventionist tendencies in the region, LaFeber argues3   
IPS’s Critique of Realpolitik 
Though historians continue to discuss America’s imperial ambitions, or lack 
thereof, intellectuals at IPS only had to look at America’s responses to Third World 
revolutions, particularly those carried out by our neighbors to the South, to reach the 
conclusion that America aimed to create an empire. Neither the spread of democracy nor 
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a need for external markets explained American intervention in the Third World, Barnet 
claimed. He rejected the well-worn arguments used to defend American intervention 
abroad, which portrayed the United States as altruistic, but also prone to mistakes despite 
the best of intentions. Neither, though, did Barnet accept the less mainstream, Marxist 
view that America intervened in the affairs of other nations to protect its capitalist 
markets. After all, he explained, non-capitalist industrialized states interfered in other 
nations as well, and American intervention in Vietnam actually hurt American capitalism. 
Who or what, then, was to blame for the tendency among U.S. officials to intervene 
around the world? Not surprisingly, Barnet found an answer in the national security 
bureaucracy. “The urge to achieve stability and control over the world environment by 
taming and cooling independent political forces in other countries is probably inherent in 
the hierarchical character of the foreign-policy bureaucracy,” Barnet opined.4  Like the 
foreign policy bureaucrats striving to make America the “Number One Nation” by 
bombing Vietnam, U.S. officials believed that American supremacy required keeping 
revolutionary forces in the Third World from achieving success. 
IPS intellectuals blamed the calculating and scheming of realists for America’s 
interventionist policy in the Third World. In a speech given in Mexico in 1975, Raskin 
accused Reinhold Niebuhr of being “the most powerful American exponent of the 
national security state and the cold war. . . .” Niebuhr’s ideas “rationalized the 
development of the Central Intelligence Agency, the dirty tricks and covert operations 
which allowed for massive intervention abroad,” Raskin declared. He did not expound on 
the reasons why Niebuhr deserved such scorn, though Raskin claimed that the theologian 
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promoted the view that America needed to act immorally if necessary because of the fight 
against “the forces of darkness.” 5 
A major component of realism, the balance of power in international affairs also 
came under reproach for its total disregard of the less powerful nations of the Third 
World. Barnet blamed America’s foreign policy debacles in the 1970s on “obsolete 
analysis, obsolete style, and obsolete goals.” The Kissinger viewpoint, Barnet wrote, 
“assumes that any world problem can be managed if the right five people get together. It 
is a 19th Century view of world politics based on the assumption that when princes and 
potentates meet, they can deliver their subjects.” Such an understanding of world affairs, 
however, kept “the most obstreperous forces” from the negotiating table. Even when 
denied a political voice, these forces could still “insure that the status quo will not be 
pleasant,” by committing terrorist acts and more generally acting as a thorn in the side of 
the superpowers, Barnet explained. He also criticized Kissinger’s style, which depended 
on “threat, flattery, puffery, and deception” and denied “the democratic process” a place 
in foreign affairs.6 
Kissinger looked to the Austrian diplomat Prince Clemens von Metternich for 
ideas about how to replicate the peace the diplomat brought to Europe in the nineteenth 
century. In fact, Kissinger’s first book, published in 1957, A World Restored: Metternich, 
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Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822, looked at the role the diplomat 
played in securing peace in Europe following the Napoleonic Wars. Bruce Kuklick, in his 
look at foreign policy intellectuals during the first three decades of the Cold War, has 
noted Kissinger’s tendency to see the historical events of the 1800s as a direct corollary 
to the Cold War. Prince Metternnich ably traversed European politics and brought about 
peace by making the “revolutionary state” of France into a non-revolutionary “legitimate 
state.” Kissinger would employ a similar strategy with the Soviet Union through détente, 
which made it possible for the superpowers to reach agreement on Vietnam and the 
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. Kissinger, in the words of Kuklick, posited that “the 
U.S.S.R. could demonstrate its evolution from revolutionary state by helping the United 
States to extricate itself from the war” in Vietnam. Barnet made almost the same 
argument almost thirty years earlier. In explaining America’s role in the 1973 overthrow 
of the democratically-elected leader in Chile, Salvador Allende, Barnet argued, 
“Kissinger is confident that he can isolate the liberation movements from the Soviet 
Union, and in particular, can inspire Soviet non-interference in American plans for the 
Western Hemisphere, by offering the Kremlin an ambiguous junior partnership in 
building a ‘generation of peace.’”  The relationship with the Soviet Union, and China, he 
continued, had as its purpose the quelling of liberation movements in the Third World. 
According to Barnet, Kissinger sought “to accord legitimacy to established revolutionary 
power in order to isolate it from revolutionary movements which at all costs must be 
denied legitimacy.”7  In other words, Kissinger did not seek improved relations with the 
                                                            
     7 See Bruce Kuklick, Blind Oracles: Intellectuals and War from Kennan to Kissinger (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006), 189-190, 193-195; Richard J. Barnet, “The Kissinger Doctrine and 
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Soviet Union and China out of a desire to end the Cold War. Rather, Kissinger hoped that 
détente would compel the Chinese and Russians to forego their support of revolutionary 
movements in the Third World, and thus preserve the status quo.  
IPS’s Promotion of “Ideological Pluralism” 
Under the direction of Roberta Salper, IPS’s Working Group on Latin America 
completed a report in 1977 entitled The Southern Connection: Recommendations for a 
new Approach to Inter-American Relations. In the report, IPS intellectuals offered several 
recommendations that would serve as the foundation for the Institute’s opposition to 
American policy in Latin America. The writers of The Southern Connection hoped that 
their report would inform officials and ordinary Americans of “the broader need to free 
U.S. policy-making from the outmoded assumption of U.S. hegemony; . . . to accept 
ideological pluralism in the Caribbean; . . . not only on the pervasiveness of human rights 
violations in Latin America, but also on the linkages between U.S. interests and 
institutionalized repression.” Allowing for “ideological pluralism” in Latin America 
made it possible to “override narrow, short lived definitions of national interest and 
national advantage that have sometimes led to primitive action,” the report claimed. 
Following a policy of “ideological pluralism,” furthermore, facilitated economic growth 
by allowing nations to choose their own economic system based on what worked best for 
the people of the nation. When outside forces put pressure on nations to implement a 
particular economic system, like what happened in Chile, the citizens of those nations 
suffered. Making the connection between economics and human rights, the report stated, 
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“We think the roots of the systematic and gross violations of human rights are to be found 
in national and international underdevelopment and inequality.”8  Both “ideological 
pluralism” and non-interventionism built on previous arguments put forth by IPS 
intellectuals. At the same time, economic factors held a much more prominent position in 
The Southern Connection than previous IPS writings. 
IPS’s study on Latin America brought the think tank attention, both positive and 
negative. By early 1978, IPS sold 1,800 copies of The Southern Connection. 
Additionally, the Overseas Development Council held a dinner in which congressmen, 
diplomats, and government officials “directly involved in determining U.S. policy in 
Inter-American affairs” used the report. Due in part to the participation of well-known 
policymakers and academics, conservatives took notice of the study and lambasted its 
contents.9  Neoconservative Jeane Kirkpatrick, who would later serve as President 
Reagan’s U.N. Ambassador, spoke out against The Southern Connection, believing that 
the report served as President Carter’s blueprint for Latin American policy. For 
Kirkpatrick, IPS’s The Southern Connection threatened America’s interests even more 
than the 1974 “Linowitz Report,” which came under the intense scrutiny of 
neoconservatives due to the study’s conclusion that America did not face any military 
                                                            
     8 Ad Hoc Working Group on Latin America, The Southern Connection: Recommendations for a New 
Approach to Inter-American Relations (Washington D.C.: Transnational Institute, 1977), ii, 4-6. 
     9 In 1985, the Council for Inter-American Security released a report entitled The Revolution Lobby. The 
report, not surprisingly, touched on The Southern Connection. Robert A. Pastor, who had served as the 
Executive Director of the Linowitz Commission and then as a member of President Carter’s National 
Security Council, also served briefly on the Ad Hoc Working Group on Latin America at IPS. Critics of 
IPS accused Pastor of serving as “a respectable front man for the group.” Speaking before the House 
Foreign Affairs subcommittee, General Gordon Summers, Jr., who served as chairman for various 
conservative organizations, including the publisher of the study, claimed that IPS’s Southern Connection 
“reads like a blueprint for present Administration policies. Policies that have been or are being 
implemented often by individuals like Mr. Pastor and Mr. Schneider who first had a hand in formulating 
them.” See Allan C. Brownfield and J. Michael Waller, The Revolution Lobby (Washington D.C.: Council 
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threats in Latin America and therefore should not support military regimes in the 
region.10 
Most distressing to Kirkpatrick was the report’s “sweeping indictment of past 
U.S. policy,” its plea for America to allow self-development in Latin America, and its 
linkage of human rights to economic rights, which Kirkpatrick labeled a “fight for human 
rights with socialism.” Yet the level of agreement between IPS’s report and the Linowitz 
reports confirmed for Kirkpatrick that the New Left had been welcomed into the foreign 
policy Establishment, that the “new liberalism” squared nicely with “revolutionary 
‘socialism,’” and that the “utopian globalism” espoused by these liberals could turn easily 
into “anti-American perspectives and revolutionary activism.” Had the ideas manifested 
in The Southern Connection remained outside of the political system, Kirkpatrick claimed 
that she would have ignored them since they posed no danger to America. According to 
Kirkpatrick, however, “No sooner was he [Jimmy Carter] elected than he set out to 
translate them into a new policy for dealing with nations of the hemisphere”11  As this 
chapter explores in greater detail, IPS excoriated Carter and rarely approved of his 
foreign policy, but Kirkpatrick did not explore these differences. 
Constantly in fear of Soviet expansionism, the United States, IPS intellectuals 
argued, refused to explore the reasons behind revolutions in Latin America, and thus 
ignored how economic problems encouraged revolutionary activities. In the views of 
Barnet and Landau, the uprisings in several Central American countries “are expressions 
                                                            
     10 Latin American Unit to Saul Landau and Robert Borosage, January 5, 1978, IPSR, WHS, box 24, 
folder 32; Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships and Double Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), 56-60. 
     11 Latin American Unit to Saul Landau and Robert Borosage, January 5, 1978, IPSR, WHS, box 24, 
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of desperate economic and political conditions of the countries themselves,” caused by 
underdevelopment and not evidence of a link to the Soviet Union. Pointing to the 
economic origins of revolution, they contended, “Revolutionary leaders do not sacrifice 
their lives to turn their country over to a superpower 8000 miles away.” What, then, did 
the authors want America to do in response to Nicaragua and other revolutionary states in 
the region? “A consistent commitment to human rights and support for political pluralism 
everywhere is likely to achieve better results than punishing shaky new regimes for their 
excesses by stepping up the pressure and making a state of siege appear unavoidable, 
Barnet and Landau concluded”12  A siege mentality by the United States only made small 
Latin American nations cling closer to the Soviet Union. 
Although IPS intellectuals concentrated most of their energies on Latin America, 
the Institute, beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s, paid greater attention to the 
Middle East and Africa. An expanded focus by IPS on the Middle East had much to do 
with the rising tensions in that region. Fred Halliday went so far as to claim that Jimmy 
Carter’s presidency ushered in a “New Cold War,” and noted “a significant geopolitical 
shift” in emphasis from Europe to the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia. IPS intellectuals, 
however, denied that America had reason to fear recent events in the Middle East, 
particularly in regard to Soviet moves in the region. Not only had the Soviet Union made 
several blunders in its interactions with the Middle East, but communism as an ideology 
did not appeal to people of the region, according to Halliday. He explained that “the 
political character of the countries themselves,” “the relatively opaque development of 
class consciousness,” and “the vitality . . . of religious, ethnic and other sectarian 
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differences,” all contributed to communism’s unpopularity in the Middle East. Matters 
became even worse for the Soviet Union in the 1980s. “At the start of the 1980s, Russian 
influence in the Middle East appears to be at a lower point than at any time since 1955,” 
Halliday concluded. Anwar Sadat’s rise to power in Egypt also weakened the Soviet 
Union’s position in the Middle East. Halliday claimed that Sadat “has repeatedly gone 
out of his way to insult the Russians.” Iraq, too, a major recipient of Soviet aid, defied 
their benefactor by supporting Somalia and Eritrea in their battle against the Soviet-
backed Ethiopia and criticized the superpower for invading Afghanistan. When the Soviet 
Union formed new alliances in the region, as they did with the Syrians and Libyans, 
Halliday suggested that these relationships served more “to check the tendency of both 
regimes towards reckless ventures” that would have helped the West.13  Thus, as leaders 
from the Soviet Union already understood, Islam and religious fundamentalism did not 
lend itself to allying with the Soviets. Regardless, America ignored the Soviet failings in 
the region documented by Halliday. Instead, IPS U.S. officials continued to believe that 
the Soviet Union threatened American interests in the Middle East, proving, IPS claimed, 
that ideology rather than pragmatism guided American foreign policy. 
IPS’s Response to America as the World’s Arms Market 
As it turned out, America’s own activities in the Middle East and Latin America 
did more to inflame the Third World. Michael Klare and other intellectuals at IPS 
exposed the massive amounts of armaments America sent to the Middle East and 
elsewhere, which only exacerbated conditions in and outside of the region. Between 1970 
and 1978, according to Klare, arms sales to Iran composed 25 percent of the total arms 
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sales business. Unfamiliar with the new weapons, Iran had to hire 10,000 American 
weapons experts to train the Iranian military forces. Arms shipments to Iran rose due to 
an “unprecedented partnership” in which Iran acted as a “surrogate” for America. Yet 
Americans’ isolationism following Vietnam and the intense hatred many Middle 
Easterners had for the United States prevented America from taking on a more active role 
in the region. As a result, instead of sending troops, American officials sold larger 
quantities of arms to their allies. When America turned Iran into a “surrogate police 
power, it had no options but to honor the Shah’s requests for the weapons he felt he 
needed to perform the job,” Klare argued.14 
Moreover, these weapons ensured that American technicians would remain in Iran 
indefinitely to work on the devices. According to Klare, the technicians “ensur[ed] that 
the ‘surrogate’ never operated independently of the assigned role as guardian of Western 
oil interests.” Not surprisingly, the presence of greater numbers of Americans in Iran led 
to public outcries. In addition to the presence of American technicians, Iranians also 
complained about the massive amounts of money spent on foreign arms at the expense of 
domestic needs. According to Klare, “The conspicuous presence of affluent Westerners” 
in the midst of economic decline, “naturally created much bitterness.” When the Shah 
used weapons from the United States to crush opposition forces, America lost any chance 
for redemption.15  The United States could point its finger at the Soviet Union for the 
deteriorating relationships in the Middle East, but IPS intellectuals placed the blame 
squarely on the shoulders of the U.S. government. 
                                                            
     14 Michael Klare, “Arms and the Shah: The Rise and Fall of the ‘Surrogate Strategy,” The Progressive, 
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Beyond the issue of sending American technicians to foreign lands whose people 
did not welcome their presence, arms sales generated greater instability in the already 
volatile regions, according to IPS intellectuals. Speaking before a subcommittee of the 
House Committee on International Relations in 1978, Klare and Max Holland rejected 
every major argument made in support of American arms sales to foreign nations. Instead 
of strengthening the self-defense capabilities of weak countries, nations used the weapons 
to instigate wars to further “their own aggressive or imperial ambitions” in their region of 
the world. As a nation possessed more and more weapons, their enemies strove for 
greater arsenals as well, leading to a “local arms race” that intensified distrust between 
nations and increased the likelihood of a surprise attack.16  Inevitably, Klare and Holland 
feared that regional conflagrations would ultimately involve either of the superpowers, 
militarily or otherwise, and raise the threat of a nuclear war. 
Arms sales to the puppet government that the United States installed in Iran in 
1954, furthermore, represented only a portion of the expanding trade in arms to Third 
World nations. In the late 1970s, Klare and other intellectuals at IPS began looking at the 
billions of dollars in aid and trade between the United States and Third World nations in 
the form of arms and other defense technology. A series of actions taken by the Nixon 
administration in the summer of 1973—including the overriding of congressional limits 
on arms sales to Latin America and the sale of $10 billion worth of new weapons to Iran 
prior to making them available to NATO—represented a new direction in U.S. foreign 
policy, according to IPS’s militarism and disarmament project. “The cumulative impact 
of these decisions was to nullify in toto the policies which had governed U.S. arms sales 
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abroad since World War II,” the proposal declared. No longer would the United States 
“prevent needless expenditures on non-developmental programs” by Third World 
nations. Citing Pentagon statistics, the proposal showed that military sales to 
underdeveloped nations in the 1950s and 1960s averaged $230 million per year, while the 
arms sales in the mid-1970s reached $6.7 billion each year. Though the Carter 
administration made much of its rejection of 614 weapons requests totaling one billion 
dollars, arms sales actually increased during his presidency because of loopholes in the 
provisions that limited arms sales. Thus, besides allowing for “more orderly processes,” 
Carter’s arms sales policy, Carter’s biographer has written, “was oversold.”17 
The Carter administration came under intense fire from IPS for its arms deals. 
Despite finding much in the rhetoric of Carter that would suggest a new direction in arms 
sales, Klare and Holland, writing while Carter was still in office, found much lacking in 
the president’s arms sale program. First of all, limits on foreign arms sales did not pertain 
to America’s allies in NATO or Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, which from 1976 to 
1978 had purchased 25 percent of all American arms on the market. Klare and Holland 
also noted that the president could override the limits at his discretion, which Carter did 
when he sold radar planes to Iran. Overall, Klare and Holland concluded that “when all is 
said and done, Carter’s new guidelines will not make a significant dent in the outflow of 
U.S. arms, equipment, and services.” What, then, would have to occur in order to close 
the loopholes and limit the president’s ability to override restrictions on arms sales? One 
recommendation offered by Klare and Holland involved setting a ceiling of $8 billion per 
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year on military exports, with a lowering of the ceiling every year by 10 percent. No 
sales, furthermore, would be allowed to nations currently experiencing internal turmoil.18 
Aside from threatening peaceful relations, arms sales strengthened the grip that 
dictators had over their citizens. The abuses committed by dictators could not have 
occurred on such a scale, IPS intellectuals argued, without American weapons and 
training.19  Writing in the early 1980s, Klare and Cynthia Aronson criticized the U.S. 
government for “stand[ing] at the supply end of a pipeline of repressive technology that 
extends to many of the world’s most authoritarian regimes.” Though President Carter 
trumpeted human rights, the authors provided evidence showing that the ten most 
repressive countries received one-third of all military aid, or $2.3 billion, and these 
nations bought an additional $13.7 billion worth of American arms during Carter’s term. 
The majority of American aid, furthermore, went directly to the local police forces in 
these countries in the form of armored cars, tear gas, riot clubs, and instruments for 
“internal political warfare” against dissidents.20 
Yet the practice of supporting dictatorial regimes through arms sales and police 
training existed well before Carter entered the White House. Unable to defeat the 
insurgency during the Vietnam War, American officials turned to local forces for 
assistance. Before turning over most of its responsibilities to the International Narcotics 
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Control program, the Office of Public Safety (OPS), formed in 1962, acted as a form of 
“preventive medicine,” in the words of Klare and Aronson. Toward the end of the 
Vietnam War, U.S. officials turned to local police forces to extinguish insurgent 
rebellions because police on the scene understood events better than foreign troops and 
native counterinsurgents could target the enemy more precisely, thus posing less of a 
threat to innocent civilians. In addition to the Phoenix program in Vietnam, the OPS 
funded the Border Patrol Police in Thailand. OPS money also went toward creating one 
hundred village police stations, a 75-plane Police Aviation Division, and equipped police 
units.21  As American interventions became more unpopular, U.S. officials turned to 
different methods to achieve their aims, which only exacerbated many of the problems 
that concerned IPS intellectuals. 
Increasing interference by the Soviet Union in both the Middle East and Africa, as 
well as a concomitant rise in the sale of arms to nations in these regions, led IPS 
intellectuals to downplay, even more than they had in the past, the importance of Europe 
to the Cold War. “If World War III has its Sarajevo, it will be in Beirut, Managua, 
Namibia or Kampuchea, not in Europe itself,” argued Peter Weiss, Saul Landau, and 
Adam Hochschild in a 1984 memorandum. The Third World, not Europe, represented the 
battleground of the superpowers. The authors referred to a “serious state of disrepair in 
U.S.-Soviet relations generally,” exacerbated by the stalled nuclear talks, which made 
Third World interventions more appealing. The Soviet Union had also become more 
assertive, sending troops to areas traditionally considered safely in the America’s orbit. 
Yet the authors also blamed the tensions in the Third World on American presidents who 
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could not “regard popular revolutions in the Third World as anything other than 
conspiratorial Soviet plots.” Thus an “American mindset” prevailed in which revolutions 
were seen as a sign of American weakness, which “fed a resurgent militarism in the 
U.S.”22 
Pocketbooks, Morality, and Human Rights: IPS’s Expansive View of Human Rights 
 IPS intellectuals sought a return to the human rights principles set forth most 
forcefully in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. IPS intellectuals 
advocated for a broader definition of human rights to include not only civil and political 
rights, but also social, economic, and cultural rights. Article 25 of the Declaration 
professed, “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical 
care and necessary social services,” along with other protections having to do with 
employment status, age, and disease.23  Covert activities conducted by the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), however, threatened the expansive view of human rights held 
by IPS intellectuals. So too did the rise of Augusto Pinochet in Chile in 1973. In targeting 
Chile, IPS hoped to expose the complicity of American officials and corporations in 
propping up a ruthless dictator. Therefore, IPS intellectuals repeatedly pointed to the 
support given to Pinochet by the American government and private banks, which 
provided political backing for the dictator and, in the case of the latter, bankrolled his 
presidency. Thus, curtailing human rights abuses around the world began at home for 
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IPS. Until America’s elected and unelected leaders promoted a more ethical approach to 
international relations, human rights abuses would never abate. 
As historians have shown, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is one of 
the most neglected documents in history. When the U.N. General Assembly—after the 
Human Rights Commission failed to produce a Covenant—decided in the fall of 1951 to 
make one Covenant for political and civil rights and another Covenant for economic, 
social, and cultural rights, the latter seemed to lose its potency. According to Mary Ann 
Glendon, the decision to separate the two covenants “suggested a retreat from the 
proposition that a better standard of living cannot be accomplished without larger 
freedom, and that freedom is threatened by dehumanizing living conditions.” Elizabeth 
Borgwardt has referred to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights as “a kind of 
Atlantic Charter of the human rights movement,” and thus “toothless in the way the 
Declaration of Independence is toothless” since it had no legal basis. Still, Borgwardt has 
pointed to the staying power of the declaration, bestowing it with “a moral, cultural, and 
even political grip that resisted attempts by great powers…to wiggle free.”24  
Furthermore, historians have cautioned against seeing the term itself, meaning human 
rights, as a static term. For instance, Samuel Moyn has described human rights in the 
1940s as “not a promise waiting to be realized but a utopia first too vague then too 
conservative to matter.” Only after “profound redefinition in a new ideological climate” 
could it come to mean what it does now.25 
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 A human rights “revolution” occurred in the 1970s as transnational activists 
forced the world’s leaders to take heed of the abuses committed by members of their 
ruling club against their own people. Some historians have linked the appearance of 
human rights to a desire among Americans for redemption in the 1970s. Barbara Keys, 
explaining President Carter’s efforts to bring greater attention to the human rights issue, 
has argued that “human rights functioned to absolve sin.” Kathryn Sikkink, similarly, has 
ascribed the rising interest in human rights to a hankering among Americans to reclaim 
the country’s virtue after Vietnam, but she also credits the civil rights movement, which 
dismantled states’ rights arguments, with making it easier for activists to make demands 
on non-governmental organizations and other countries to intervene in the affairs of 
sovereign nations.26  Another historian has suggested that the rise of human rights 
occurred collectively as a result of increased interaction between nation states due to 
globalization. In seeking to explain why human rights emerged as an issue in the 1970s, 
Daniel Sargent, for instance, argues that “human rights served as an ethical or ideational 
counterpoint” to the “structural reconstitution of international society” brought about by 
globalization. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), in particular, helped shatter 
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territorial borders by bringing attention to the internal workings of nations and, in the 
process, stripping away nations’ sovereignty.27 
IPS’s Response to the Immorality of American Foreign Policy 
In one of the earliest studies completed at IPS on the Third World, Richard 
Barnet, in his 1968 book Intervention and Revolution: America’s Confrontation with 
Insurgent Movements Around the World, put to rest any lingering belief that Wilsonian 
idealism still played a role in foreign relations. Investigating interventions by the United 
States in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, Barnet lamented that “the euphemistic rhetoric 
of American Responsibility has yielded to the starker idiom of realpolitik.” As a result, in 
Barnet’s view, American intervention had less to do with “bringing the town meeting, the 
ballot box, and the supermarket to their backward inhabitants than in making sure that 
they do not confiscate, collectivize, or chant communist slogans.” Moreover, to the 
dismay of IPS intellectuals, American officials used whatever means necessary to stop 
the citizens of impoverished countries from creating more equitable societies. Lacking 
morals and ethics, American foreign policy, under the iron fist of realpolitik, ruthlessly 
pursued the nation’s national interest at a tremendous cost to the world’s people, IPS 
intellectuals claimed. Referring to the recent disclosures of intelligence activities, which 
included “a Pandora’s box of murders by the CIA, CIA-supported coups, heroine 
involvements, massive secret budgets, gangster connections,” to name a few, Eqbal 
Ahmad claimed that such acts represented “the quintessence of a Kissinger policy.” In 
order to block the CIA from committing similar acts in the future, IPS intellectuals called 
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for the restoration of ethics and morality in foreign affairs. During a speech in 1981 
before the Chile Solidarity Committee, Isabel Letelier spoke about the need for a “global 
ethics.” Noting the recent refusal by the Reagan administration to join 157 other nations 
in opposing baby formula—activists expressed concern over the use of the product in 
Third World countries where no clean water existed to mix with the powder—Letelier 
argued that “the philosophy which should guide people’s actions should be based on 
spiritual values, not their wallets.”28 
In the mid-1980s, Barnet accused the United States of “resorting to ever more 
sophisticated techniques to defuse the moral qualms of citizens about what it does in their 
name.” Carrying out its activities under cloak and dagger, the United States could more 
easily “diverge ever more sharply from the best moral traditions of the nation: 
encouragement of democracy, tolerance of ideological diversity, dedication to 
international law and promotion of Third World development.” Thus, despite “official 
rhetoric” promoting “moral traditions,” the “operative policy is that enunciated by the 
Athenian generals who subdued the island of Melos: the strong exact what they wish and 
the weak yield what they must.” Barnet referred in 1985 to an “inverted morality” that 
allowed the U.S. government to commit atrocities abroad that in America would be 
considered a crime and deserving of punishment. Deterrence, for instance, required the 
acceptance of substantial American casualties so that America’s nuclear threat remained 
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viable. Instead of “employ[ing] the language of strategy to obscure this moral madness,” 
Barnet suggested “using the language of crime, for if it is not a crime to destroy the 
world, even to attempt to destroy it, even to consider destroying it, then the word has no 
meaning.”29 
Why did Americans so easily put aside moral qualms about their nation’s actions 
around the world? Barnet claimed that official lies and “deadly abstractions” by U.S. 
officials helped “in making us comfortable with turning upside down the moral code” 
that most humans possessed. Other intellectuals at IPS expressed similar concerns in 
regard to ethics and the lack of accountability for American officials. Demanding 
punishment for officials who developed immoral policies, Earl Ravenal and his co-
authors bemoaned “the two-tier ethic of statecraft, the Niebuhrian double standard, 
associated with the ‘realists’....” Ravenal and the others asked, furthermore, that 
statesmen meet the same moral ethics as all other humans, using the criterion established 
during the Nuremberg Trials, which would ensure “morally binding codes of 
statecraft.”30  Morality, whether in times of war or peace, in other words, did not take on 
a new definition. 
A Poster Child for Dictatorships: IPS Wages War Against Pinochet 
In 1970, Salvador Allende, a socialist and Marxist from the Unidad Popular party, 
won election in Chile to become that nation’s president. His ascension to power garnered 
the attention of the world as watchful eyes looked to see how the socialist leader would 
                                                            
     29 Richard J. Barnet, “Losing Moral Ground: The Foundation of U.S. Foreign Policy,” Sojourners 
(March 1985), 1. 
     30 Barnet, “Losing Moral Ground,” 3-4; Earl C. Ravenal with Richard J. Barnet, Robert Borosage, 
Michael Klare, and Marcus Raskin, Toward World Security: A Program for Disarmament (Institute for 
Policy Studies Issue Paper, 1980), 24-25. 
      245 
 
 
handle both domestic and international affairs. During Allende’s presidency, however, 
internal and external forces prevented him from carrying out his political program. The 
end for Allende came on September 11, 1973 when the Chilean military staged a coup 
and killed Allende. Allies of Allende blamed counterrevolutionaries within Chile, but 
also pointed to interference from outside forces, including corporations based in the 
United States and the Nixon administration.31  Following the ouster of Allende, Augusto 
Pinochet took over as president of Chile and dramatically changed course as he granted 
himself dictatorial powers and brought in foreign economic advisors to transform the 
Chilean economy into a citadel for free-market ideals. 
Both during and after the coup there existed a worldwide solidarity movement of 
supporters of Allende’s brand of socialism.32  In the aftermath of the coup, one of the 
leaders of this solidary movement was Orlando Letelier. Under Allende, Letelier served 
first as ambassador to the United States and then, in 1973, as minister of foreign affairs, 
interior, and finally defense, the last of which he held up to the day of the coup and led to 
his being imprisoned for the next year. Settling in Caracas, Venezuela immediately after 
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his release in mid-1974, Letelier and his family left for Washington D.C. in late 1974 
after IPS offered him a position as associate fellow.33 
More than anyone else at IPS, Letelier sought to explain how particular economic 
systems tended to create an environment conducive to human rights abuses. The example 
of Chile is notable, according to Juan Gabriel Valdés, because “the state literally 
dismantled itself” in order to implement neoliberal economic programs. Whereas many 
Latin American countries agreed to put in place neoliberal economic policies at the 
behest of the International Monetary Fund, Chilean politicians voluntarily and 
enthusiastically worked with economists to implement neoliberal programs. The task of 
transforming Chile’s economy went to the University of Chicago economists known 
collectively as the “Chicago Boys.” Trained between 1957 and 1970 at Chile’s Catholic 
University and at the University of Chicago, the “Chicago Boys” had few followers in 
Chile until Pinochet came to power in 1973. As Allende’s election in 1970 brought forth 
more radical leftist policies, businessmen and entrepreneurs who ordinarily held views 
closer to the center of the ideological spectrum increasingly accepted the right’s pleas for 
more “radical” measures, particularly as Chile’s economic, social, and political problems 
intensified, according to Valdés. Unintentionally, therefore, Allende’s policies brought 
neoliberal economic ideas beyond the ivory tower. The unintended growth of neoliberal 
thought in Chile occurred because “the issue was no longer the ‘economic policies’ 
themselves but rather the economic principles underlying society’s organization,” Valdés 
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has argued. The “shock treatment,” as the “Chicago Boys” labeled their policies, led to 
devastating cuts to social services. Aid for health services fell by 17.6 percent from 1970 
to 1980, and aid for education declined 11.3 percent during the same period. By 1980, the 
average salary of a Chilean worker decreased by 16.7 percent compared to 1970. 
Economic stratification continued to grow as Pinochet’s government sold 197 companies 
between 1974 and 1978.34 
Just prior to being assassinated, Letelier wrote an article in The Nation about the 
worsening conditions in Chile. Letelier pointed to a recent loan made to Chile by the 
World Bank that illustrated, he claimed, the inadequate attention economists paid to 
human rights. Letelier complained that “the violation of human rights, the system of 
institutionalized brutality, the drastic control and suppression of every form of 
meaningful dissent is discussed (and often condemned) as a phenomenon only indirectly 
linked, or indeed entirely unrelated, to the classical unrestrained ‘free market’ policies 
that have been enforced by the military junta.” In addition to expressing skepticism about 
the actual amount of choice in the free-market economy in Chile, Letelier ridiculed the 
“Chicago Boys” for not taking into account the unique characteristics of Chile’s 
economy.35 
Letelier did not strive to show the inadequacies of Milton Friedman’s free-market 
system, but rather why it would be ineffective in Chile. Previously senior economist and 
director of the loan division of the Inter-American Development Bank, Letelier found 
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free-market economics “especially objectionable . . . because they propose a total free 
market policy in a framework of extreme inequality among the economic agents 
involved. . . .” The extreme forms of monopolism that existed in Chile meant that free-
market hallmarks like competitive bidding and competition from foreign corporations did 
little for the poor and small business owners. Competitive bids, according to Letelier, 
almost always went to the monopolists and foreign competition rarely came into play 
since many of the local monopolies were subsidiaries of larger transnational corporations. 
The Chilean people understood first-hand the unfairness of their economic system, which 
led, Letelier argued, to human rights abuses. In Letelier’s view, the strong political 
showing by Allende’s Popular Unity government in the 1973 congressional elections 
“convinced the national bourgeoisie and its foreign supporters that they would be unable 
to recoup their privileges through the democratic process.” When, in the aftermath of the 
coup, the new leaders could not “destroy the consciousness of the Chilean people,” 
repression ensued.36 
Letelier’s Nation article represented only the latest effort by the exiled Chilean to 
spread far and wide news concerning the horrors inflicted on the people of Chile under 
Pinochet. Landau described Letelier as “a major leader and unifier of the forces seeking 
the restoration of democracy in Chile.” Letelier, according to Landau, “assumed the 
responsibilities of political leadership in exile,” which involved speaking at venues 
around the world, writing for various outlets, and meeting with governments. In 1976, 
Letelier convinced Holland to renege on a $6.3 million credit to Chile and, that same 
year, briefed the U.S. congressional delegation before its scheduled visit to Cuba to 
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investigate human rights abuses.37 Then came the explosion near Sheridan Circle on 
September 21, 1976 that killed Letelier and Ronnie Karpen Moffitt. Though IPS 
intellectuals had taken notice of the dictatorship in Chile prior to Letelier’s death, 
Pinochet became the prime target of IPS following the assassination. 
Nearly two years after the assassination, on August 1, 1978, the U.S. Grand Jury 
indicted several individuals tied to Chile’s secret police force, DINA, and exiled Cubans. 
DINA agent Michael Vernon Townley, an American citizen who moved to Chile and 
joined the agency, agreed to a plea that made him eligible for parole in as little as 40 
months. His wife, a Chilean national working with DINA, also testified and escaped 
prosecution. The following month, on September 18, 1978, the FBI named bomb makers 
Jose Dionisio Suarez Esquivel and Virgilio Paz Romero as suspects in the case, offering a 
$25,000 reward for their capture. Authorities captured Alvin Ross Diaz and Guillermo 
Novo and charged them with conspiracy to murder. Ignacio Novo paid a $25,000 bond 
after being charged with perjury. Also in September, George Landau, United States 
Ambassador to Chile, asked Chile to extradite General Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, the 
former head of DINA; Colonel Pedro Espinoza Bravo, Sepulveda’s chief of operations; 
and DINA Captain Armando Fernandez Larios. In their account of the assassination and 
the subsequent manhunt for the perpetrators of the crime, John Dinges and Landau 
attributed the drawn out investigation to the stalling tactics of the U.S. government. 
Landau and Dinges found a glaring problem in the FBI’s handling of information related 
to Townley’s unsuccessful attempt to obtain false passports in Paraguay, which the 
United States found out about and derailed. “No bureaucratic explanation can account for 
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the detours and obstacles the investigators encountered in solving the case. It was not 
DINA’s cover-ups nor the secretiveness of the Cuban Nationalist Movement that kept the 
investigation off the right track for almost a year. It was the actions consciously taken or 
willfully omitted by officials and agencies of the United States government,” Dinges and 
Landau wrote. The government’s handling of the case made IPS distrust the government 
even more.38 
Though Chileans and Cubans carried out the bombing that led to Letlier’s death, 
the United States did not escape the notice and ire of IPS intellectuals. Immediately after 
the assassination, IPS alleged CIA involvement in the killing and lambasted the Carter 
administration for inadequately responding to Chile’s blatant terrorist act in the capitol of 
the United States. IPS assumed from the start that Chile’s secret police had played a part 
in the assassination, labeling DINA the “prime suspect” and demanding that the chairman 
of the Senate Committee on Intelligence Activities investigate the group’s “relationship” 
with the CIA. Since Letelier, as well as other ex-Chilean officials murdered in Buenos 
Aires and Rome, “were the most prominent and visible symbols of hope for a decent 
alternative to the military dictatorship” that existed in Chile, Barnet, too, had no doubt 
that DINA and Pinochet were involved in Letelier’s death. Taking into account the nature 
of the attack, Raskin and Barnet argued, “It is unlikely that such a bomb could have been 
developed without techniques available only to professional demolition experts.” Barnet 
and Raskin called on the chairman of the intelligence committee, Daniel Inouye, to look 
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into the close relationship between the CIA and pro-Pinochet forces before and during 
Allende’s rule in Chile and to “investigate the CIA’s ‘penetrations’ of DINA,” which the 
co-directors claimed existed.39 
Though the indictment of Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, head of Chile’s secret 
police, satisfied IPS, many intellectuals at the think tank believed that the investigation 
into Letelier’s and Moffitt’s deaths did not go far enough. Referring to a passage in the 
indictment that started, “With others unknown to the Grand Jury,” Robert Borosage 
argued that complete justice required the arrest of Pinochet, who, Borosage alleged, “took 
personal command of DINA, and used it virtually as his own personal police force.” In 
Borosage’s view, “It is inconceivable that the order to assassinate Orlando Letelier on the 
streets of Washington, D.C. came from anyone but Pinochet himself.” Along with 
Pinochet, Borosage wanted to open an investigations into the role of the U.S. 
government, the CIA, multinational corporations, and private banks in Letelier’s murder. 
While Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger helped Pinochet rise to power, the CIA 
“recruited and supplied Cuban refugees for a campaign of terror, disruption and murder 
aimed against Fidel Castro” and then set these mercenaries loose when no longer needed, 
Borosage reported. “In American law,” Borosage explained, “one who sets a ‘dangerous 
instrumentality’ in motion is culpable for the damage it wreaks, even if no longer in 
control over it.” Despite the pleas of IPS intellectuals, Congress and the government did 
not investigate the relationship between the CIA and DINA.40  On September 21, 1976, 
Edward Kennedy, James Abourezk, and Hubert Humphrey co-sponsored Senate 
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Resolution 561, which stated that the U.S. Senate “condemns the brutal and senseless 
murders of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Karpen Moffitt and the serious injury of Michael 
Moffitt, and urges a complete and thorough investigation by Federal authorities of the 
circumstances surrounding the bombing.”41  Yet no investigations took place regarding 
CIA involvement in the assassination. 
Perhaps it is surprising that IPS intellectuals excoriated Jimmy Carter’s foreign 
policy, of which he devoted so much attention to the issue of human rights, both 
rhetorically and in policymaking decisions. President Carter referred to human rights in 
his inaugural address and he touched on the issue when he spoke for the first time before 
the U.N. At the commencement address he gave in 1977 at Notre Dame, Carter also put 
human rights at the top of his foreign policy agenda. Furthermore, Carter strengthened 
the Human Rights Bureau of the State Department by staffing it with well-regarded 
officials. And, during meetings with foreign ambassadors and world leaders with poor 
human rights records, President Carter voiced his concern over the conditions in these 
countries.42 
Historians have reached mixed conclusions regarding President Carter’s human 
rights policy. On one end, David Schmitz has shown that human rights served as a 
guiding force for Carter, even if the president did not always act in accordance with his 
human rights principles. Pointing to Carter’s refusal to intervene on behalf of the Shah in 
Iran and Somoza in Nicaragua, Schmitz has argued that “Carter did compromise at times, 
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but the president never abandoned his policy and goals even as he turned to more 
traditional Cold War policies in terms of relations with the Soviet Union.” Still, even 
early in 1978, when, according to Schmitz, “the Carter Administration had successfully 
developed and institutionalized its policy of human rights and made it a central factor in 
American foreign policy decisions,” administration officials still worried about the 
“moderation” of Carter’s efforts, as Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Deputy Secretary 
of State Warren Christopher labeled it. In both loans from international organizations and 
bilateral aid, the Carter Administration rarely voted against the former or rejected the 
latter.43  More critical of President Carter’s human rights record, Gaddis Smith points to 
the Philippines as a prime example of a place where human rights fell to the wayside. 
Despite being “an ideal target for the application of a policy based on commitment to 
human rights,” in the words of Smith, the United States never pursued the issue in the 
Philippines. Carter gave Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos “a polite tap on the 
wrist,” but nothing more because America needed the country’s military bases to remain 
open.44 
For IPS intellectuals, Carter’s indifference to the Letelier assassination only 
confirmed their observation of the president as lukewarm on human rights. After 
reviewing his colleagues’ Assassination on Embassy Row, Barnet could not help but 
wonder why Carter did not take a tougher stance against Pinochet. Barnet ascribed 
Carter’s reluctance to force Pinochet to extradite Contreras to an instance whereby 
“geopolitics has triumphed over justice.” “Despite the thousands of murders to his 
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credit,” Barnet continued, “Pinochet has brought a good investment climate to Chile and 
he is clearly preferred in the Carter White House to the uncertainties that would follow 
his collapse. Such is standard realpolitik.” Thus, despite rhetorical flourishes alluding to a 
new type of foreign policy that took into account a nation’s human rights record, IPS 
intellectuals viewed Carter as no different from earlier presidents.45 
In addition to Carter’s inability to shed his realist garb, IPS intellectuals criticized 
the president for sharing with his predecessors a fear of revolution. Several years after 
Carter lost the 1980 presidential election to Republican Ronald Reagan, IPS still targeted 
the former president for his weak human rights policy. A 1984 report written in part by 
IPS intellectuals described President Carter as being “locked in ambiguity” as he 
attempted to balance his desire for a greater respect for human rights with the need to 
prevent revolutions.46  IPS intellectuals claimed that America’s apprehension toward 
revolutions greatly impeded efforts to solve the world’s real problems. With the Vietnam 
War over and a continuing détente between the superpowers, Carter’s early years in the 
White House represented a period of relative calm. IPS intellectuals, however, criticized 
the president for failing to take advantage of the situation. Though calling Carter’s human 
rights policies a “bold step” and praising the outgoing president for creating conditions 
allowing for the “the only opening provided to the Cold War since the 1940s,” Isabel 
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Letelier, an IPS fellow and the wife of the slain former diplomat, argued that Carter did 
not go far enough. Letelier described Carter’s policies as “a yellow light of caution to 
many Latin American dictators,” but nothing more. She blamed Carter’s misguided 
actions in Central America on “very little understanding of Latin American reality, and 
why it is that reality which creates liberation movements and not the Soviet Union.” 
When Letelier spoke about reality, she meant the violence exacted upon the people living 
in Latin American. “To close one’s eyes to this reality is to become a part of a system of 
denial of basic human rights and to become an ally of those who practice violence against 
the majority,” Letelier explained.47 
Therefore, even though Carter took action against Pinochet’s government, IPS 
intellectuals considered the response weak, particularly given that Pinochet orchestrated 
an attack on American soil. Simply put, Carter did not move fast enough for IPS 
intellectuals. Moffitt and Letelier voiced their displeasure with Carter’s inaction and 
questioned the president’s entire human rights policy. In a letter to members of Congress 
written in mid-1977, Moffitt and Letelier claimed that to give loans to known dictators 
“would bury in hypocrisy any future for human rights in Latin America.” IPS 
intellectuals continued to press the administration to take action against Pinochet. In a 
letter to Hodding Carter, who served as Carter’s Assistant Secretary of Public Affairs, 
Peter Kornbluh offered his assessment of the Carter administration’s sanctions on Chile. 
“To a citizen like myself it is apparent that ‘those responsible’ for the decision of how to 
sanction the Chileans for the Letelier assassination are not intent on sanctioning them at 
all,” Kornbluh stated. Asking for a clarification about Carter’s response, Kornbluh 
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concluded, “From where I sit it seems clear that the U.S. government is showing its 
cowardice in the face of a handful of cutthroat generals and a handful of foreign 
investors.”48 
In spite of IPS’s repeated entreaties for action against Pinochet, the Carter 
administration would go only so far. Summarizing an “unfortunate confrontation” he had 
with Robert Pastor, a member of Carter’s National Security Council, Kornbluh, expecting 
as much, found that the Carter administration believed that it had responded to the 
Letelier murder. While Kornbluh argued that Carter’s decision to cut off military aid to 
Chile represented a “token response,” Pastor believed just the opposite. According to 
Kornbluh, Pastor highlighted the fact that Carter not only stopped sending military aid to 
Chile, but also paid private corporations so that they too would stop selling military 
supplies to Pinochet, which showed “that Carter had really done a great deal in response 
to the assassination.” Pastor claimed that “diplomatic limitations” prevented Carter from 
blaming Pinochet’s government for the crime and, furthermore, “no hard evidence” 
existed to prove Pinochet’s role in the assassination. At this point in the conversation, "I 
was told pretty bluntly that the U.S. had done all it was going to do in this case,” 
Kornbluh reported. Admitting that the “conversation had turned quite sour,” Kornbluh 
“suggested to Mr. Pastor that the Carter administration had let Pinochet, a petty military 
dictator, pull the wool over its eyes,” at which point Pastor accused Kornbluh of using 
Reagan’s argument against Carter. From his brief meeting with Pastor, Kornbluh 
concluded, “The Carter Administration doesn’t feel the assassination was of sufficient 
importance to warrant [sic] any further steps than the ones they have taken.” With respect 
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to the Letelier investigation, Kornbluh added, “The case is dead as far as they are 
concerned.” “They think they did a strong job of demonstrating their dissatisfaction to the 
junta,” he recounted.49 
The amount of influence that IPS had on President Carter’s foreign policy is not 
exactly clear, although the Institute’s constant criticism of his approach makes it likely 
that the president did not, in spite of what critics like Jeane Kirkpatrick thought, listen 
closely to the complaints of IPS intellectuals. A 1987 talking paper boasted that IPS 
“played a significant role in defining the Carter Administration’s human rights 
initiatives,” but this contradicts a statement made later by one of the co-founders of IPS. 
Raskin admitted to journalist Sidney Blumenthal that IPS, to its own detriment, “paid 
very little attention to the Carter administration” for myriad reasons. Raskin explained 
IPS thought Carter offered no hope, but also confessed, “We [IPS] were moral snobs.” 
Writing one year after Carter’s election victory, Landau agreed with Raskin’s later 
recollection. Although the election of Carter offered IPS the opportunity to formulate 
policy, the Institute failed to take advantage of the new environment. Landau blamed this 
on the fact that IPS was so “blinded by the glitter of opportunity in the future” that its 
fellows could not “collectively pull ourselves out of the past muck.”50 
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Much clearer was IPS’s ability to influence Congress. Representative Tom Harkin 
(IA-D) and 37 other members of Congress “hand-delivered” a letter to President Carter 
on August 1, 1979 regarding the continued intransigence of the Pinochet government. 
Like IPS, Harkin and his co-signers linked the Letelier-Moffitt murders to the larger issue 
of human rights. He implored the president to take “the strongest measures necessary” to 
force Contreras and other participants in the assassination to stand trial in America. 
Otherwise he predicted that “our government’s passivity can only be perceived as a 
signal that the United States will compromise on our residents’ and citizens’ most basic 
human right—the right to live.” Harkin would repeatedly press Carter to take a stronger 
stand against Pinochet for Chile’s role in the assassination of Letelier.51  
Harkin, along with fellow congressmen Toby Moffett and George Miller, wrote to 
President Carter to inform him of a resolution they put forth in Congress calling for 
sanctions in response to Chile’s unwillingness to extradite the persons [Manuel 
Contreras, Armando Fernandez, and Pedro Espinoza] charged with planning or carrying 
out the Letelier-Moffitt murders. The letter to Carter forcefully argued that “the Pinochet 
regime has literally gotten away with murder. We deplore the Court’s decision, and call 
for firm censure of those who would export their terrorism and violence to this country or 
any other.” The resolution, co-sponsored by sixty members of Congress, noted that “the 
President on several occasions has committed the United States to the strongest possible 
measures against governments which have condoned acts of international terrorism or 
which harbor individuals who have committed acts of international terrorism,” and the 
Letelier-Moffitt murders represented a form of terrorism. Chile, furthermore, had been 
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“harboring and protecting individuals wanted in the United States to stand trial for acts of 
international terrorism” by not extraditing the three accused men. Supporters of the 
resolution wanted the United States to remove the American ambassador from Chile; end 
all bilateral and multilateral aid to Chile; stop sending military aid, both equipment and 
advisors, to Chile; prohibit Export-Import Banks and private banks from offering loans to 
Chile; and demand that Pinochet restore civil rights in Chile.52 
As free-market ideology spread to more countries, a concomitant decline in the 
personal and economic welfare of citizens living in these countries also occurred. 
Therefore, IPS intellectuals called for a return to the principles found in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. Landau, for instance, wanted to replace national security 
ideology as America’s guiding philosophy with a new approach based on human rights. 
“Human rights, in the terms laid out in the U.N. covenants, constitute a solid basis for a 
political alternative to national security doctrine,” Landau wrote. Landau, naturally, 
encouraged American officials to not only allow human rights to form the basis of 
American foreign policy, but also use the broadest possible definition of human rights. 
Far too often, he claimed, Westerners limited human rights to political and civil freedoms 
and ignored issues related to economic security. For instance, the U.S. government and 
certain human rights organizations ignored the “endemic poverty” found in places 
throughout Central America, Landau complained. Such an “oversight,” Landau claimed, 
essentially “covers up the responsibility of U.S. policy for causing these disastrous 
conditions through U.S. support for military dictators and local oligarchies.” Landau 
realized, however, that a more expansive view of human rights required a new mindset in 
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America. “To become a moral guideline for policy, human rights, not welfare, must be 
internalized in the public mind” so that Americans would be more forthcoming, he 
wrote.53  Thus, according to Landau, a semantic shift away from “welfare” to “human 
rights” would not only lessen the stigma attached to providing food and shelter to the 
poor, but also heighten the importance of economic human rights. 
In 1977, IPS announced the creation of the Letelier-Moffitt Human Rights Award, 
which honored the lives of Orlando Letelier and Ronnie Karpen Moffitt. The award 
would go to individuals or organizations fighting to advance the cause of human rights. 
During the news conference about the award, the chairman of IPS’s board of trustees, 
Peter Weiss, advanced a broader definition of human rights, which took into account the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. He referred to the need “to erase the dividing line between 
first and second class human rights. The electrode to the nipple is an affront to human 
dignity; so is the nipple that has no milk for the suckling infant. The use of psychiatric 
institutions to harbor political dissidents is a perversion of professional responsibility; so 
is the failure of hospitals to care for the sick. Arbitrary arrest and detention violate the 
integrity of the person; so does the impersonal system of triage which, under a regime of 
enforced scarcity, decides who is to live and who is to die.” Weiss went on to explain that 
Letelier died because “Pinochet could not afford . . . to have the outside world translate 
human rights policies into financial and economic action.”54  As Weiss’s remarks make 
clear that IPS kept Letelier’s vision of human rights alive. 
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Despite the efforts of IPS intellectuals to link the two, Pinochet succeeded in 
keeping the human rights issue separate from questions related to economics. Protesting 
the “economic private bank bailout” of Chile after foreign governments cut off aid to 
Pinochet’s government in protest of Chile’s human rights record, Isabel Letelier and 
Moffitt admitted that “an enormous influx of private bank loans since 1976 has enabled 
the junta to thumb its nose at the international human rights campaign.” Letelier and 
Moffitt calculated that loans from private firms totaled approximately one billion dollars 
by the end of 1978, with about $927 million coming from American banks. Concerned 
only with “maximizing global profits and minimizing risks,” private banks “do not 
consider human rights criteria in their lending policies,” they wrote. That is how Letelier 
and Moffitt explained the massive loans to Chile made by private banks, which amounted 
to ninety percent of that nation’s foreign capital. In the mid to late 1970s, six 
multinational banks with headquarters in the United States supplied Chile with over $800 
million in loans.55 
IPS intellectuals, therefore, reached the conclusion that stopping human rights 
abuses required changes to the capitalist system and the rules regulating international 
loans. While giving a speech on the role of banks in keeping South African and Chilean 
dictators in power, Moffitt boiled the human rights issue down to capitalism. “It is 
impossible to understand the importance of international banks, the importance of Chile 
or South Africa without going to the root of the problem, the international expansion of 
the capitalist system,” he told the crowd. Moffitt could not understand how Carter, who 
championed human rights more forcefully than any previous president, did not block 
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private loans to South Africa and Chile. “The large private banks have given the 
governments a green light to go on violating human rights. Freed from international 
pressure, they act with impunity attempting to solidify and enhance their rule,” Moffitt 
explained.56  International banks and loans, as a result, took on added importance in the 
writings of IPS intellectuals as the globalization of both finance and industry took off in 
the 1970s. 
In order to publicize their ideas, IPS organized boycotts against banks that offered 
loans to Chile. As part of its D.C. Bank Campaign in 1979, IPS closed its account at 
Riggs National Bank due to the bank’s loan practices. Such banks, Moffitt and Nena 
Terrell wrote, were “among those whose redlining policies are hastening the deterioration 
of our major cities while they loan and/or invest in morally bankrupt regimes whose 
economic policies warrant force to impose them on the majority of the population.” Prior 
to the large-scale divestment movement of the mid-1980s, IPS sought to “make it 
unprofitable” for banks to do business with nations committing human rights abuses. IPS 
director Borosage wrote to the chairman of the board at Riggs and compared the bank’s 
willingness to make loans to Chile and South Africa to lending money to the Nazis. 
While recognizing that banks had “a duty to seek profitable investments,” financial 
institutions, according to IPS, also had to abide by “moral limits” as well. Comparing 
loans made by Riggs to South Africa and Chile to banks that discriminated against 
individuals of a particular “race, color, or creed” or “invested in Nazi Germany and 
profited therefrom,” IPS informed the bank that it refused to do business with such a 
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company. Borosage and Landau castigated the bank for providing loans to South Africa 
and Chile that “undermine the effect and the principle of our own Government’s 
policy.”57 
America, both through its liberal use of covert operations and support of human 
rights abuses, represented a major impediment to IPS’s efforts to expand the definition of 
human rights. Political and civil rights represented only a portion of the entire body of 
human rights developed in the 1940s at the U.N. Until the American government and 
private corporations understood the connection economics and human rights, such abuses 
would never abate. Unlike the majority of liberals concerned with human rights, IPS did 
not limit its understanding of human rights to torture and other civil and political rights. 
Whereas many liberals, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, looked to human rights as a 
way to restore America’s global image, IPS claimed that the U.S. government and 
corporations and banks played a key role in propping up dictators.  
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Chapter Seven: Arms Control Is Not Disarmament 
When President Truman made the decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki in August 1945, he changed war forever. Though no other nation resorted 
to nuclear warfare after the United States used the weapon to end World War II, the 
following decades witnessed an arms race between the United States and the Soviet 
Union that led to the stockpiling of tens of thousands of the deadly weapons. The very 
existence of nuclear weapons, with each generation’s more destructive and efficient than 
the last, had an indelible effect on American society.1  Driven by a distrust of the Soviet 
Union and an ideological aversion to communism, American officials built larger and 
more accurate weapons. IPS intellectuals, though, claimed that fears of the Soviet Union 
were overblown and that U.S. officials let their suspicions of their rival superpower 
determine the course of America’s nuclear policies. IPS intellectuals encouraged U.S. 
officials to moderate their anti-communist rhetoric and nuclear threats to make it easier 
for America to take the lead in disarming the world of nuclear weapons. After all, how 
the United States and its people viewed the Soviet Union played a large part in whether 
Americans would wholeheartedly support disarmament. From early on in the nuclear age, 
U.S. policymakers pursed a contradictory path of building ever larger numbers of nuclear 
weapons while pursuing disarmament. In the view of IPS intellectuals, however, 
American efforts to reduce the world’s nuclear stockpiles fell far short of the mark. For 
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much of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union rarely went beyond arms 
control proposals, putting down attempts at disarmament as utopian.  
IPS and Cold War Revisionism 
 In his highly critical study of New Left Cold War revisionists, Robert James 
Maddox distinguished the “soft” revisionists from the “hard” revisionists. The former 
argued that the Cold War began as a result of individual actions by new players on the 
scene, particularly Harry Truman. Conversely, the latter looked beyond individual actions 
to institutional factors, such as the felt need of Americans to dominate the world and 
spread capitalism.2  Intellectuals at IPS clearly subscribed to the perspective of the “hard” 
revisionists. In fact, one of the historians whose work Maddox dissected, Gar Alperovitz, 
a founding fellow of IPS and a student of William Appleman Williams, offered one of the 
most well-known revisionist histories with the publication in 1965 of Atomic Diplomacy: 
Hiroshima and Potsdam. The main argument presented in Atomic Diplomacy is that 
America’s decision to drop the atomic bomb on Japan in August 1945 had no military 
basis. Rather, the United States used the device in order to strengthen its economic and 
politic position in Eastern Europe.3  Other intellectuals at IPS offered similar arguments 
about the Cold War, often portraying the United States as the aggressor. Before going any 
further, it is perhaps helpful to discuss how historians have looked at the Cold War. 
 With the end of the Cold War and the subsequent downfall of the Soviet Union, as 
well as greater access to the archives of former communist nations, historians themselves 
have begun to offer a more balanced portrait of the period. According to diplomatic 
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historian Melvyn Leffler, Joseph Stalin’s “overriding goal” was not the spread of 
communism, but rather assurance of the Soviet Union’s survival. Stalin encouraged 
foreign communist movements to create multi-party fronts, but opposed using force to 
turn a country into a socialist nation. Stalin feared that using violence would damage 
relations between his country and Great Britain and America and diminish the Soviet 
Union’s security. In fact, as Leffler points out, Stalin, more concerned with protecting his 
nation’s national security interests, asked communists to moderate their efforts in Greece, 
France, and Italy despite conditions being ripe in these countries for a socialist 
revolution. Furthermore, Stalin’s anti-capitalist rhetoric aside, he actually allowed free 
elections or removed Soviet troops from several European and Asian countries. The 
Soviet Union, furthermore, as Odd Arne Westad has argued, did not coordinate and lead 
a worldwide revolution composed of Third World nations. Westad describes Moscow’s 
Third World policy as “more ad hoc than strategic,” with “alliances [that] were weak and 
conflict-ridden from the outset.” The strained relations between the Soviet Union and 
Third World countries stemmed from the fact that Soviet leaders did not actively seek out 
these “alliances,” but entered into them only after “existing regimes” chose the United 
States as an ally over the Soviet Union.4 
 Other historians still contend that the Soviet Union instigated and prolonged the 
Cold War by continuously seeking new lands to bring into the Soviet sphere. Stalin’s 
decision to exit Iran and the Turkish Straits in 1946 and show restraint during the Berlin 
blockade of the late 1940s and in Korea in 1950 did not represent “limited ambitions,” 
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according to John Gaddis. Instead, Stalin recognized that he could improve the Soviet 
Union’s standing in the world without creating a crisis. Similarly, Vladislav Zubok places 
the blame for the Cold War on the Soviet Union, which sought not only the spread of 
communist ideology, but also wanted to act as an imperial force in the world. Conditions 
grew worse following Stalin’s death, according to Zubok, as his successors used 
“revolutionary-imperial discourse” to guide their foreign policy.5 
Though not apologists for the Soviet Union, IPS intellectuals sought to bring both 
superpowers to task for exacerbating tensions and making it nearly impossible to end the 
Cold War. Barnet explained that he came to a “revisionist” view of history in the late 
1950s while researching the disarmament negotiations between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. At the start of the project, Barnet’s acquaintances predicted that the study 
“would be a very good way of documenting how the Russians used the disarmament 
issue for political maneuvering,” but the future IPS co-founder discovered that American 
attitudes toward disarmament differed little from the Soviet’s. Barnet’s distaste for 
American foreign policy grew during his time in the Kennedy administration after he 
noticed a tendency among officials to use “tremendous abstractions” and show “very 
little concrete thinking about international interests or what the Russians were really up 
to.”6  Instead of erudite thinking on American-Soviet relations, in other words, U.S. 
officials allowed ideology to guide policy in regard to the Soviet Union. 
IPS’s Efforts to End the Ideological Cold War 
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 Looking for an explanation as to why the Cold War continued unabated, IPS 
intellectuals blamed foreign policymakers for allowing ideology to influence their 
decision-making and prolong the Cold War. Alan Wolfe documented several instances in 
which “ideology” spurred a particular “action” during the Cold War. For example, the 
policy paper NSC-68 laid the foundation for an ideological foreign policy and State 
Department officials gave currency to the idea of the Soviet Union as an aggressor, which 
led to the antagonistic policies of the Truman administration. Still a problem in the 1980s, 
Raskin sought to bring an end to the ideological Cold War by encouraging American 
officials to follow a strategy that he termed the New Realism. “It sees the U.S. role in the 
world in flux and in need of redefinition,” Raskin wrote in reference to his strategy. His 
plan encouraged “changing our relationship with the Soviet Union to one in keeping with 
our national interest rather than ideological pretension.”7  Nuclear weapons, for instance, 
did not serve America’s national interest, at least in the view of IPS intellectuals. In fact, 
as later sections of this chapter explain, IPS suggested that America’s massive nuclear 
arsenal actually threatened the nation’s livelihood. 
 IPS’s campaign to end the ideological Cold War, which relied so heavily on 
nuclear weapons and the maintenance of an assertive stance against the Soviet Union 
faced a major impediment in 1976. Eugene Rostow, who served as President Johnson’s 
Under Secretary for Political Affairs, reorganized the Committee on the Present Danger 
(CPD) after the organization had laid fallow for years—former Under Secretary of the 
Army Tracey Vorhees created the first CPD in 1950 to promote NSC-68. In 1976, the 
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CPD immediately garnered publicity after leading the charge to form a “Team B” in 
order to contest CIA estimates of the nature of the Soviet threat.8  Writing in the 
Libertarian Review, Barnet criticized Richard Pipes and the CPD for zeroing in on the 
“bloodcurdling Soviet military maxims” without taking into account the ways that 
deterrence encouraged nations to use such ostentatious language in order to make the 
nuclear threat seem real. Barnet explained that “the deterrence system is sustained by 
huge bureaucracies which are paid a substantial share of the national treasure to think 
about winning nuclear war, planning for it, making it credible by pretending that it is a 
real political option.” In other words, the CPD needed to take the threats of nuclear 
annihilation in context. Yet Barnet and other IPS intellectuals understood that the CPD 
focused on the Soviet’s most bombastic statements as a means to convince Americans to 
support a larger military budget. Not surprisingly, beyond the ability of nuclear weapons 
to “inspire feelings and convey intentions,” Barnet saw little military value in building 
America’s nuclear arsenal in order to meet Soviet increases. “The national insecurity that 
can be so easily fanned by a ‘Committee on the Present Danger’ cannot be cured by 
9,000 more bombs,” Barnet wrote. Arguing that the CPD considered themselves “the 
Paul Reveres of their generation,” Barnet cautioned against inciting “war hysteria” in the 
present moment. The increase in Soviet nuclear weaponry, technological advances in 
military weapons, and the growing demands of hundreds of smaller nations in a world 
with finite resources all made the antagonistic remarks by CPD members far more 
dangerous, according to Barnet.9 
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 Between the CPD and Ronald Reagan in the White House, anti-communist 
rhetoric and ideological warfare reached its highest levels since the early decades of the 
Cold War. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 
1979 reignited debates over the Soviet Union’s expansionist tendencies. During a foreign 
policy meeting held at IPS in early 1980, Barnet disagreed with the widespread view, 
which he called the “Master Plan model,” that the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan as 
part of a master plan to control regions of the world where no opposition existed. Barnet 
preferred to use a “defensive model” to explain Soviet actions, which had the Soviet 
Union invading its neighbor in Afghanistan to protect its borders. As the summary of the 
meeting explained, “While not a justification for Soviet behavior, this model, suggested 
Barnet, may contribute to understanding what motivated the Soviets.” When Earl 
Ravenal inquired as to why the group spent so much time on the Soviet’s “motivations,” 
Barnet claimed that “if the conception of the USSR as a power hungry aggressor, a 
Hitlerian type, was allowed to go unchallenged the hawks will be able to successfully 
argue that the Russians are a nation that can’t be negotiated with, that they only 
understand the meaning of armed force.”10  And, of course, such a view would make 
disarmament nearly impossible to achieve. 
IPS intellectuals generally considered the Soviet’s actions in Afghanistan 
defensive and limited in nature. According to Fred Halliday, the Soviets “tried their best 
to avoid going into Afghanistan,” doing so only after communist leader Hafizullah Amin 
so angered Afghan peasants and assured a future rebellion. In fact, Halliday argued that 
the Soviets “consistently resisted” pleas by both Amin and President Nur Muhammad 
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Taraki to enter Afghanistan in early 1979. Halliday portrayed the Soviet invasion as an 
action of last resort to protect a nation on its border from coming under the control of a 
hostile nation. Citing the aid provided by Pakistan, China, and other Arab nations to 
Afghan rebels, Halliday claimed that without such outside interference, “it is much less 
likely that the Russians would have gone into Afghanistan directly.” With the Soviets still 
bogged down in Afghanistan, Barnet and Eqbal Ahmad wrote in the New Yorker that “it 
seems clear that the Soviet goals in Afghanistan have always been limited.” They based 
their argument on the fact that the Soviets never “claimed sovereignty over Afghanistan” 
and sent only a very small number of troops into the country. The Soviets, moreover, 
“agreed in principle” early on to remove their troops, “a promise they had never made 
with respect to Eastern Europe.”11  Thus, Barnet and Ahmad did not believe that the 
Soviet Union planned on turning Afghanistan into a satellite country. 
The response of IPS intellectuals to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is not 
surprising, given the general understanding among the intellectuals at IPS regarding the 
origins of the Cold War. Writing for Foreign Policy in 1971 Barnet made the following 
comment: 
Indeed, the naive visitor might well have concluded that the problem of military 
aggression in the postwar period had its source in the United States. Soviet armies 
stopped at the point of their farthest advance in World War II and withdrew from 
adjacent areas such as Czechoslovakia only to return when political domination 
threatened to fail. The United States retained the major bases it had acquired in 
World War II and acquired more. Within a few years the Soviet Union was 
surrounded by air and later missile bases from which devastating nuclear attacks 
could be launched—all at a time when the Soviet Union lacked a similar capacity 
to attack the United States. It has been the United States and not the Soviet Union 
that has stationed its military forces on every continent and spread nuclear 
weapons in the tens of thousands on the continent of Asia and Europe and on the 
high seas. It is the United States and not the Soviet Union that has intervened with 
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its military and paramilitary forces almost every year since 1945 on the territory 
of other countries either to prevent local insurgent forces from taking power or 
displacing them from power. 
 
Not until Stalin’s death did the Soviet Union begin to interfere in places like Cuba and 
the Middle East. Barnet blamed this reversal on “the strategy chosen by the U.S. to deal 
with the limited Soviet challenge to American supremacy,” which necessitated a Soviet 
response.12  IPS intellectuals, as shown by their reaction to the Soviet attack of 
Afghanistan, never wavered in their belief that the United States deserved much of the 
blame for starting the Cold War. 
IPS’s Early Opposition to the Arms Race 
The arms race began with the Soviet Union testing its first nuclear device in 1949, 
it took another decade for the race to intensify. The theorists behind the strategy of 
deterrence posited that possession of nuclear arsenals served the purpose of dissuading 
the other side from instigating a nuclear war. By the late 1950s, nuclear strategists had 
modified the theory of deterrence in such a way that encouraged the acceleration of the 
arms race. As Alex Abella has argued in his study of RAND, Albert Wohlstetter’s 1959 
Foreign Affairs article “The Delicate Balance of Terror” succeeded in “laying the 
groundwork for the constant escalation of the nuclear arms race” that led to each 
superpower building massive arsenals. Wohlstetter advocated for a different 
understanding of deterrence that considered the types of nuclear weapons each 
superpower possessed. The famed nuclear strategist stressed that America’s second-strike 
capability required various types of nuclear weapons in addition to a quantitative 
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advantage. Furthermore, the increasing importance of intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBM) in the late 1950s also portended a shift in strategy from one based on a first-
strike, counter-force attack, employing bombers and intermediate-range ballistic missiles 
(IRBM), to a second-strike retaliatory strategy. Nuclear strategists like Thomas Schelling 
claimed that as missiles became harder to strike and destroy, the fear of a first-strike 
would also decline greatly, and so would the tensions of the era.13  However, as IPS and 
other opponents of the arms race would argue, such stability resulted in a cloud of fear 
hanging over humankind due to the constant threat of a nuclear attack. 
 Considered a major step in the path to détente between the Soviet Union and the 
United States, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which banned all nuclear testing in 
the atmosphere, space, and underground, nonetheless failed to slow the nuclear arms race. 
As historians have shown, both the 1963 test ban and the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, which sought to limit nuclear weapons to nations already possessing the device, 
served only to stop other nations from obtaining nuclear weapons and did not limit the 
number of nuclear weapons held by the Soviet Union and America. One historian has 
gone so far as to say that Kennedy had a “near obsession” with China, which served as 
the “primary impetus” for securing a test ban treaty. Kennedy considered China’s attempt 
to secure nuclear capabilities as “the whole reason for having a test ban,” according to the 
historian Francis Gavin. China’s combative actions and proclamations led U.S. officials 
to label the nation a “rogue” state, which shattered the peace brought about by 
containment and deterrence. Additionally, U.S. officials feared that China’s entrance into 
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the nuclear club would threaten American interests in Asia and encourage other nations 
to build their own nuclear weapons. When Lyndon Johnson became president, he issued a 
national security memorandum in 1965 that allowed the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency to pursue a nonproliferation treaty. Johnson took such an approach because he 
agreed with analysts who saw a Soviet attack on Central Europe as far less worrisome 
than the spread of nuclear weapons to smaller nations.14 
 Calling the years between 1963 and 1980 the “Big Sleep” due to the “apathy” and 
“neglect” of disarmament issues by the American public, Paul Boyer has offered several 
reasons for Americans’ disinterestedness in matters pertaining to nuclear weapons. With 
testing prohibited above-ground, Americans no longer had to witness the sheer 
destruction of nuclear weapons, which led to a “loss of immediacy” as nuclear explosions 
no longer seemed so visceral. Also, the growing number of nuclear power plants 
diminished Americans’ fear of nuclear energy more generally. Finally, abstruse nuclear 
strategy kept ordinary Americans in the dark and unable to discuss disarmament and 
nuclear weapons. Activists as well, even individuals previously involved in the 
disarmament movement, turned their attention to Vietnam. For instance, by 1966, SANE 
placed nuclear proliferation on the backburner as the organization’s co-chairman 
Benjamin Spock became involved in the antiwar movement. One of the leading groups of 
the 1960s, moreover, the Students for a Democratic Society, rarely evinced much concern 
over the threat of a nuclear war. Boyer has ascribed SDS’s aloofness toward nuclear 
matters to the organization’s views on the bureaucracy. Whereas opponents of nuclear 
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weapons writing prior to 1963 did not believe that politicians could remain levelheaded 
during a nuclear exchange, SDS argued that the rational bureaucrats would not initiate a 
nuclear war. The New Left reluctantly joined the protest against the Vietnam War, much 
preferring local community organizing to international relations. Thus, even though 
disarmament activists considered the 1963 treaty banning atmospheric testing only a 
preliminary step, ordinary people, even those individuals prone to activism, felt otherwise 
as the mushroom cloud disappeared from the public’s view.15 
 Given the background of IPS’s co-founders, it is not surprising that IPS 
intellectuals advocated for disarmament. Intellectuals at IPS also noticed the lack of 
concern over nuclear weapons among policymakers and public figures. For Barnet, 
though, the indifference grew out of a desire by the U.S. government to preserve the 
status quo. While “a sudden surge of interest in disarmament” followed the Cuban missile 
crisis, some commentators suggested that American nuclear superiority led to the positive 
outcome for the United States in Cuba and therefore argued in support of retaining the 
nation’s nuclear stockpiles. Additionally, Kennedy and his administration “turned their 
eyes anxiously to Europe and found that the Soviets did not dare to move, that a real truce 
has been achieved in Europe without arms control or disarmament.” Moreover, problems 
within NATO, particularly the attempt by Charles De Gaulle to create a European-led 
alliance, detente with the Soviet Union, a diminished Soviet threat in Europe, and efforts 
by Europeans to improve East-West relations made the United States reticent to carry out 
disarmament. There existed within the United States a “deep-seated fear that the whole 
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structure of U.S.-continental relations is shaky and that nothing must be done to disturb it 
further. The decision was made to try to use the detente in Europe to maintain the status 
quo rather than move towards arms control,” Barnet claimed. Furthermore, the advantage 
America held over the Soviet Union in regards to nuclear weapons and the escalating 
nature of the Vietnam War caused support for disarmament to ebb, Barnet argued. IPS 
intellectuals rejected the cautious approach taken by American officials. Writing near the 
end of the Cold War, IPS director Borosage proposed ending the NATO alliance and 
turning Europe into a nuclear-free region. Referring to the relative calm in Europe 
following the construction of the Berlin Wall, Borosage argued that decreasing American 
military aid to Europe could be the first step toward a new world by turning what 
previously served as “the centerpiece of the Cold War, the heart of the militarized 
containment” into a nuclear-free zone with “common security arrangements and common 
sense relationships.”16 
IPS Versus the “Mega-Death” Intellectuals 
 Despite the death and destruction that would follow an all-out nuclear exchange 
between the superpowers, nuclear strategists did not agonize over such outcomes when 
constructing war plans. IPS intellectuals explained the lack of concern on the part of 
nuclear strategists by pointing to the latter’s ability to rationalize a seemingly irrational 
possibility—nuclear warfare. Nuclear strategists often justified nuclear war by arguing 
that such warfare could be controlled. The idea of a nuclear war being manageable 
seemed to Waskow unbelievable. Waskow described such scenarios as “non-scientific 
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strategies” and questioned whether believers of controlled nuclear wars were “real 
scientists,” or just “science-fiction writers.” Analysts at think tanks like RAND, he 
explained. “have responded [to the absence of a thermonuclear war] by spinning out of 
their own brains, with the help of their computers, the quasi-logical fantasies of 
controlled thermonuclear war: fantasies that have nothing to do with science” since no 
historical precedent existed.17 
Writing for The American Journal of Psychiatry in 1964, Raskin described a 
tendency predominant among nuclear strategists in which words took on new and 
different meanings from their traditional definitions. Raskin claimed that bureaucrats and 
scientists used a “special language” to “ease their moral qualms, make the extraordinary 
ordinary, the emotional and abstract seemingly rational and quasi-comfortable.” Devoid 
of human feeling, this “machine language” led “people [to] accept, accede to and support 
situations which they might otherwise reject or oppose.” Citizens, as a result, no longer 
participated in politics as equally informed parties.18  Just like the National Security 
Managers who led America into war in Vietnam, defense strategists used rational and 
technical language to hide the fact that their planning would lead to the deaths of millions 
of innocents. 
In spite of the very real consequences associated with nuclear war, 
neoconservatives and conservatives continued to push for larger defense budgets and new 
weapons systems, even as the Soviet leader Mikail Gorbachev called for reductions. In a 
1986 editorial, Raskin questioned Jeane Kirkpatrick’s criticism of Gorbachev’s call for a 
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reduction in conventional weapons and nuclear disarmament. Raskin admonished 
Kirkpatrick and her supporters for their abiding faith in technological solutions like SDI. 
“Technological fixes” not only had no military value, but Raskin feared that they “will 
either cause or intensify existing political tensions with our adversaries,” and thus 
actually diminish America’s security.19  For IPS intellectuals, political solutions, not 
military or technological, represented the best approach to solving the nuclear weapons 
dilemma. 
 While the critique of defense strategists offered by IPS intellectuals is hardly 
surprising, more unexpected, perhaps, was the lack of enthusiasm among intellectuals at 
the Institute for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). As a former 
official within the agency, Barnet had a close-up view of the work carried out at the 
ACDA. In a lengthy discussion of the limitations of the ACDA, Barnet derided the 
agency for its hard-boiled solutions and constant concern with how disarmament would 
affect America’s military standing in the world. Looking at the origins of the ACDA, 
Barnet distinguished between “two quite different constituencies” that spoke out in favor 
of a new agency devoted to arms control and disarmament. The first group modestly 
“stressed the need for ‘new ideas, but what they had in mind were techniques for 
implementing established policy, primarily in the area of inspection, rather than radical 
new concepts which could be the basis of alternative policies,” Barnet explained. He 
included among this group government officials, arms control officials, and individuals 
with ties to the military. A different assemblage of supporters, which included 
Congressman Robert Kastenmeier, who along with 26 other members of the House of 
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Representatives offered a bill in 1961 for the creation of a National Peace Agency, sought 
peace, not just disarmament. Rather than focusing on arms control, this group sought the 
creation of an agency that undertook “investigation of the causes of war and the 
consideration of various alternatives for establishing and maintaining peace.”20 
The studies conducted by the ACDA illustrated that it existed to carry out the 
goals of the first group. For the most part, the ACDA concentrated on issues having to do 
with inspection and how disarmament proposals would impact America’s military 
strength, Barnet reported. For instance, he noted how the ACDA’s budget for fiscal year 
1965 earmarked almost $10.5 million out of a total budget of $11 million for “inspection 
studies” and “inspection field reports.” The unwillingness of the ACDA to develop 
imaginative and innovative approaches to disarmament prevented the agency from 
looking beyond the Cold War calculus. “Far too much has been made of the ‘lack of 
specifics’ in disarmament proposals,” Barnet claimed while criticizing the ACDA for its 
fixation with coming up with concrete proposals. Barnet acknowledged the need for 
offering specific numbers in regard to how many officials would take part in inspections, 
the number of inspections that would take place, and precisely how many missiles each 
superpower could possess in such a scheme, but he believed that numerical limitations 
did little to bring about disarmament. In Barnet’s view, previous disarmament proposals 
did not fail, Barnet argued, due to inadequate data. “A more likely explanation is that 
both [America and the Soviet Union] had only a partial view of where they wanted to go 
and where they thought their own proposals would lead them,” he wrote.21 
                                                            
     20 Richard J. Barnet, “Some Problems of Government-Sponsored Disarmament Research: The United 
States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,” undated [likely 1965], IPSR, WHS, box 1, folder 45, 1-2. 
     21 Ibid., 2-5, 8-9. 
      280 
 
 
Reviewing the usual explanations given for why disarmament would not lead to a 
peaceful world, Barnet suggested that the ACDA needed to formulate a “theory of 
peace.” While not disputing the need for a “utopian blueprint of a disarmed world,” 
Barnet thought “of greater value would be the analysis of the political process involved in 
moving towards various alternative political structures for the world.” In addition to 
investigating possible paths to disarmament in the future, Barnet wanted more research 
on how present conditions slowed disarmament. For instance, he wondered if the general 
attitude that equated strength with superiority in nuclear weapons really mattered when 
international disputes broke out. As an example, Barnet suggested conducting 
investigations into whether American nuclear superiority actually compelled the Soviets 
to back down during the Cuban Missile crisis. Without such research, opponents would 
use the same well-worn arguments to stall or discredit disarmament, Barnet claimed.22  
Unless analysts and researchers questioned the maxim that nuclear superiority led to an 
increase in American power, disarmament would never occur.23 
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 In response to U.S. officials’ and defense strategists’ penchant for rationalizing 
nuclear war, IPS intellectuals advocated for the broadening of the types of activities 
normally identified as war crimes and human rights violations. Barnet once called it “the 
fundamental intellectual and moral problem” of nuclear war and the arms race that a man 
who kills passengers on a plane demanding a ransom was a “terrorist,” but presidents 
who targeted enemy populations were carrying out a “strategy.” Looking to extend the 
purview of what constituted a human rights violation, Raskin explained his opposition to 
the bifurcated structure that absolved certain individuals for from being charged under 
human rights laws. Calling it “a conceptual and moral error,” to restrict activities that 
occurred only after an outbreak of war, Raskin demanded a new set of legal guidelines 
that would apply also to preparations for war, and thus make it possible to take legal and 
criminal actions against arms producers and war planners. “The final ‘frame’ or act in a 
process which leads to a culminating event, in this case the ‘go signal’ for nuclear war or 
aggressive war, does not have to be completed for us to realize that the event is already 
underway. One needs only to look at arms budgets and strategic doctrine to comprehend 
the criminal nature of the arms enterprise,” Raskin argued24 
Changing Americans’ Minds to Disarm the World 
Addressing the War Resisters International in 1966, Waskow predicted that 
within twenty years nations would free themselves of nuclear weapons. According to 
Waskow, the stalemate in Korea proved that America could not use conventional forces 
to bend the will of others; the Cuban Missile Crisis illustrated the drawbacks of 
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depending too much on nuclear forces; and events in Vietnam demonstrated the 
shortcomings of America’s counter-insurgency strategy. Therefore, Waskow predicted 
that foreign policy failures in Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam would force policymakers to 
rethink America’s nuclear strategy. Unable to achieve a clear-cut victory in the 
aforementioned conflicts, and under increasing pressure from American citizens, 
Waskow claimed that nuclear weapons would cease to exist by 1985.25   
 While nuclear weapons held no military value, they did serve as a marker of a 
nation’s standing on the world stage. For Barnet, the Cuban Missile Crisis showed the 
inexplicable attachment nations had to their nuclear weapons. Referring to President 
Kennedy’s initial reluctance during the Cuban Missile Crisis to remove America’s Jupiter 
missiles from Turkey in exchange for the Soviet’s dismantling of its missiles in Cuba, 
Barnet argued that the goal had become “victory itself, the vindication of the American 
will.” The nuclear weapons in Turkey served no strategic purposes, but Kennedy still 
wavered over whether to remove them in order to end the crisis in Cuba. Barnet blamed 
Kennedy’s recalcitrance on a changed perspective among American officials regarding 
nuclear weapons. Instead of serving as the means to an end, nuclear weapons became the 
end goal. “When a nation defines its interests as winning irrespective of the concrete 
economic and political objectives for which it fights, then the ‘weapons culture’ has 
overwhelmed the art of statecraft,” Barnet concluded. Therefore, the United States 
continued to build up its nuclear arsenal and construct new weapons systems, which 
offered “transcendent symbolic and abstract goals,” but little else for America. According 
to Barnet, even the U.S. military realized that nuclear weapons were of little use in the 
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current environment, where revolutions occurred more frequently than wars. Thus, the 
American military had “to justify a bad bargain” using “mystical or heroic terms” since 
the inflated “defense budget would not stand the test of practical social or political 
accounting.”26 
To counter the unexplainable spell that nuclear weapons had over the world’s 
leaders, IPS intellectuals made repeated appeals to American and Soviet officials to 
employ other means of persuasion than nuclear threats. Barnet admitted that 
“exhortations by the great powers on the advantages of nuclear abstinence will not be 
enough,” and some sort of “guarantees” of nuclear protection would be necessary. Even 
then, Barnet expected that other nations would not necessarily follow the superpowers’ 
lead. Not only would protected nations be unsure if another nation would risk a nuclear 
attack against its own country to defend a faraway country, but nuclear weapons offered a 
nation something more than just physical protection. For many non-nuclear nations, such 
weapons served “as symbols of independence and national sovereignty,” Barnet claimed. 
More than their military utility, nuclear weapons came to represent “status symbols” and 
acted as a sort of “currency of international bargaining.” Therefore, such intangible 
reasons for owning nuclear weapons meant that promises of protection against nuclear 
attack would never be a good enough reason for a nation to forego construction of its own 
nuclear forces. Barnet claimed that “for a nation to accept a nuclear protectorate is to 
admit that it is less than fully sovereign.”27  It was only necessary to look at the strained 
relations among NATO nations to understand the great value placed on nuclear weapons. 
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Whereas disarmament advocates and policymakers sparred over issues pertaining 
to inspection, IPS intellectuals spent little time on the question. While accepting the 
possibility of achieving nuclear disarmament through an agreement that included 
inspections of nuclear reactors and control of the materials needed to build nuclear 
weapons, Barnet wanted to diminish the “incentive” to build the weapons in the first 
place. American officials had talked about reducing nuclear weapons, but by “affirming 
through our military policy and diplomacy the importance of nuclear weapons for great 
power status we have whetted the appetite of other countries for them,” Barnet claimed. 
Accordingly, if the United States made “it clear that nuclear weapons are to play a 
diminished role in their day to day diplomacy, other nations would probably lose some of 
their interest in them.”28 
IPS intellectuals constantly underscored the need for the United States to 
reconsider its understanding of power. Calls for a reassessment only intensified as 
America lost its military and economic advantage in the 1970s and 1980s. Despite a 
growing military force, a concomitant rise in America’s standing in the world did not 
occur. As America continued dividing the world into Communist and non-Communist 
camps, tribal, ethnic, and religious tensions took precedence for many nations, in the 
view of Barnet. Also, the spread of conventional and nuclear weapons made states more 
willing to go to war without the support of the great powers. With the world becoming 
more unpredictable, the United States had to face the reality that it could not control 
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international relations, Barnet argued. Thus minimizing the importance of nuclear 
weapons became even more important.29 
Nonetheless, nuclear weapons still mattered to nations, in large part due to the 
great weight the superpowers afforded the weapons. Until America abandoned its 
dependence on atomic weaponry, nuclear proliferation would continue indefinitely, 
Barnet claimed. He also argued that supporters of disarmament did not do enough to 
prepare humankind for a world without nuclear weapons. “Since the purposes of 
disarmament are unclear and the implications uncertain, most people prefer to stay with 
the world we know or think we know than to enter a world in which we put our trust in 
the sanity and decency of people rather than the power of machines,” Barnet lamented. 
He encouraged American leaders to begin the process of “devaluing” nuclear weapons. 
At the same time, America had to “delegitimize them [nuclear weapons], to keep 
stressing that whether or not they are exploded in anger, they cannot be used as 
instruments of power or as the foundation of security without destroying our society in 
the process.”30 
Neither pleas by the United States to end nuclear proliferation, nor a non-
proliferation treaty would succeed in freeing the world of nuclear weapons. As Barnet 
explained during a congressional seminar held at IPS in 1965, America needed to follow 
a plan “which looks at the whole nuclear proliferation question as an essentially political 
one” requiring “an international political climate” that removed the “incentive” for 
proliferation. Pointing to the fact that some nations possessing the technological 
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capabilities to build nuclear weapons still did not do so, Barnet suggested that the United 
States try to popularize these “natural incentives” against nuclear proliferation. Still, 
Barnet explained, “what we are talking about is trying to generate a political atmosphere 
not in which for the foreseeable future nuclear weapons are going to be abolished, but 
where at least the importance of nuclear weapons as measures of prestige, as badges of 
international position, will be downgraded.”31  Therefore, IPS intellectuals repeatedly 
called on the United States to initiate a policy of unilateral disarmament to encourage 
other nations to follow suit. 
 
IPS’s Critique of Arms Limitations Agreements 
 As criticism of massive retaliation grew in the 1950s and America began 
following a policy of deterrence, arms control replaced disarmament as the preferred 
approach to lessening the nuclear threat. Pointing to such works as 1961’s Strategy and 
Arms Control, written by Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, Charles DeBenedetti 
and Charles Chatfield suggest that by the early 1960s, “arms control as an instrument of 
effective deterrence had become conventional wisdom in mainstream liberalism.”32 As 
arms control agreements took form during the 1970s, lobbyists and nuclear scientists 
continued to press for such measures, but an alternative view also took shape. David 
Meyer has pointed to the existence of another group, composed of faith-based 
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organization and New Leftists who had participated in the Vietnam antiwar movement, 
which viewed the arms as symptomatic of a larger problem in American society.33  IPS 
intellectuals derided arms control advocates for sacrificing disarmament and allowing the 
arms race to continue indefinitely. 
Into the 1970s, both the United States and the Soviet Union continued making 
nuclear threats that discouraged a reduction in arms. Instead of striving for disarmament, 
the superpowers participated in half-measures, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks (SALT). Barnet compared such agreements to the Missouri Compromise, which 
failed to stop the spread of slavery. Carrying the comparison further, Barnet wrote, “As 
with slavery, our economic dependence upon the war system is profound as well as 
anachronistic.” While nuclear weapons, like slavery, “made short-term economic sense,” 
the “war system” has “outlasted its time because it blocks possibilities for much more 
efficient and rational use of resources and more effective means of developing power to 
solve political and social problems,” Barnet explained.34  As historians have made clear, 
SALT I, indicative of the more general inadequacies of arms limitations treaties, did not 
change the behaviors and attitudes of any of the presidents who served in the last decades 
of the Cold War. 
Although President Nixon signed the SALT Treaty in Moscow in 1972, his 
nuclear policy, as several historians have noted, did not indicate that the nuclear arms 
race would subside. Francis Gavin has argued that Nixon’s and Kissinger’s worldview, 
which favored the “supremacy of geopolitics” led them to disavow arms control treaties. 
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The president and his national security advisor believed that wars occurred as a result of 
political disagreement, not because of issues related to the arms race. Moreover, the fear 
of a nuclear war actually led to peaceful conditions because each superpower hesitated to 
start a conflict, fearing nuclear retaliation. Furthermore, Nixon repeatedly referred to 
America’s nuclear superiority during the Cuban missile crisis as the reason for America’s 
victory in that contest of wills. Nixon and Kissinger also worried that nuclear parity with 
the Soviets threatened America’s allies. As a means to overcome the arms control 
agreement, Nixon put into place a strategy of flexible response that increased nuclear 
options. Also, influenced by advisors such as Paul Nitze and T.K. Jones, who claimed 
that as America sought nuclear parity and abided by the tenets of mutually assured 
destruction (MAD) the Soviets aimed for superiority and first-strike capabilities, Nixon 
returned to an emphasis on counterforce strategy, which directed attacks on military 
targets. Following the policy put forth by his Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, 
and thus known as the Schlesinger Doctrine, Nixon advocated a counterforce strategy 
that increased the number of individual targets during a nuclear strike to as many as 
twenty-five thousand. Though “rhetorically qualified” by every president except Reagan, 
each administration since Johnson’s followed the tenets of counterforce strategy. Even 
Jimmy Carter, who spoke of a world free of nuclear weapons, accepted Nixon’s NSDM-
242, which called for a strategy of flexible response including striking the Soviet Union 
with nuclear weapons in the event of an invasion by ground troops.35 
The SALT I agreement set the stage for Nixon’s visit to Moscow in 1972 and 
earned the president many accolades for his statesmanship, but America’s nuclear policy 
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changed little. The nuclear stockpiles of both superpowers continued to rise to 
unimaginable levels. SALT’s inability to slow the nuclear arms race did not surprise IPS 
intellectuals. Speaking at Columbia University in 1985, Raskin informed the audience 
that arms control and disarmament represented two completely distinct processes. Arms 
control talks offered much promise, but the negotiations usually proved more useful 
politically than for actual disarmament. “The Reagan administration sees negotiating on 
arms as a sacrament to buy off one’s own population,” Raskin argued. These discussions, 
Raskin continued, provided “a way of cooling out opposition in both countries and 
getting people off the streets.”36   
More specifically, IPS intellectuals found the numerical limits on nuclear 
weapons that served as the focal point of SALT both ineffectual and misleading. Fred 
Kaplan questioned the value of SALT negotiations because the talks “distorted” the 
important elements of defense strategy and “fundamental problems” received scant 
attention. The distortion involved the excessive emphasis placed on “static indicators” 
like the number of missile launchers, which made little difference because of the ability 
of each superpower to MIRV missiles, but still received attention because numerical 
limits allowed for verification, which each superpower demanded. Kaplan called instead 
for “indirect ways of controlling the spiraling escalation of arms,” which included the 
limiting of nuclear missile tests to levels that made production of new missiles a more 
drawn out process.37  The limitations of arms control catalogued by IPS intellectuals 
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explained why Nixon could sign the SALT I agreement while simultaneously increasing 
the number of targets in a nuclear war. 
Moreover, the SALT I agreement, while limiting one class of weapons, actually 
encouraged production of other weapons. For this reason, Barnet dismissed arms control 
agreements reached in the past as useless and unlikely to bring about disarmament. While 
SALT prevented each superpower from building ABM systems, the agreement allowed 
for an increase in arms, not a decrease. The Vladivostok agreement, which Barnet used as 
an example, limited the United States to MIRV 1,320 missiles. Officials in the United 
States had planned on MIRVing 1,046 missiles, but felt that they had, in the words of 
Barnet, an “obligation” to build more MIRVed missiles. Even more disconcerting for 
Barnet was the fact that the Soviets had no existing MIRVed missiles prior to the 
agreement. Therefore, Barnet claimed that the “agreement was a cap for an empty tube 
that is only now being filled.”38  Most Americans, however, not up to date on the various 
weapons systems and acronyms, took the word of commentators and politicians that the 
agreement limited nuclear weapons. 
The fact that Americans acceded to arms control experts’ opinion of SALT I 
bothered IPS intellectuals. For instance, Raskin blamed arms control for creating a 
situation in which “people are wont to believe that there is an inherently rational process 
to the arms race system and that those involved in it as experts and managers know what 
they are doing.” In reality, Raskin claimed, “we have a system of arming which is 
predicated on the most soggy of assumptions” based on whether a particular weapons 
system is “vulnerable or invulnerable.” Allowing experts to take the lead in arms control 
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talks also made it more difficult to attract people to the anti-nuclear weapons position. 
“The discussions of strategy and arms control, which accept the given—and the present 
imposed future given—as true can only fail to excite large numbers of people,” Raskin 
wrote. Questioning the value of campaigns to either stall or stop production of new 
weapons systems, such as the MX missile, Raskin moved beyond such limited goals, 
preferring instead “a practical vision of future policies and actions” to excite the 
American public and bring them closer to the disarmament cause. Focusing on the 
minutia of the nuclear arms race, in other words, blinded opponents of nuclear war to the 
larger goal, general and complete disarmament. Pushing stop-gap measures, furthermore, 
would likely encourage politicians, even Democrats, to go only so far. Raskin predicted 
that if the Democrats took control of the White House, this new group of politicians 
“would keep in place the war system as well as the programs which Reagan initiated and 
add to conventional forces.”39  Though arms control agreements offered hope to ordinary 
Americans, IPS intellectuals sought to illustrate the difference between such accords and 
actual disarmament. 
IPS intellectuals also blamed liberal groups supportive of arms control for 
confusing the public. Writing in 1986, William Arkin argued, “It is with the liberal 
establishment and their allies in the arms control community that we have our biggest 
fight,” not necessarily conservatives and Reagan. Arkin referred to “non-disarmament 
groups,” such as the Committee for National Security, the Union of Concerned Scientists, 
and the Center for Defense Information, “which fool their public supporters into 
believing that they are working on an end to the arms race, when in fact they are only 
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trying to make it safer.” He further scoffed at peace activists for being into “fads” and 
depending on “capricious funders” and holding generally “partisan” views. Arkin thought 
that activists needed to look beyond SDI because, he claimed, “the only way to defeat 
SDI . . . is to obviate the justification for it (particularly as an augmentation of offensive 
deterrence) by eliminating nuclear weapons.”40  Whether in regard to arms control or 
opposition to a single weapon, IPS intellectuals derided liberals for fighting for piecemeal 
reforms rather than disarmament. 
During his time at the Peace Research Institute, Waskow sought to transform 
foreign policy planning by encouraging policymakers to take into account the long view 
of foreign relations. IPS intellectuals voiced a similar concern in relation to arms control. 
Looking for a historical antecedent for their disarmament proposals, IPS intellectuals 
looked to the late 1950s and early 1960s. In a paper for a Militarism and Disarmament 
Project study group held in 1977, Raskin criticized arms control officials for limiting 
their objective and thus abandoning disarmament. Whereas the McCloy-Zorin 
disarmament plan and the General and Complete Disarmament proposals prescribed a 
date at which nuclear weapons production would end, later agreements did not include a 
specific timetable. “As a result, armaments and disarmament discussions were chopped 
up into pieces all of which did not appear to relate to each other and none of which had 
an interlinked time boundary to them,” Raskin argued. Nuclear weapon stockpiles, 
therefore, actually expanded despite limitations on particular weapons. The history of 
arms control led Raskin to argue, “Any serious comprehensive agreement must be time 
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bound. The document must state what has to be accomplished within a limited period of 
time, what can wait, or be deferred, and what needs to be strengthened.”41  
IPS and Unilateral Disarmament 
Diminishing the importance of nuclear weapons, and moving beyond the 
inadequate arms control measures associated with SALT, required, IPS intellectuals 
claimed, a greater willingness on the part of U.S. officials to take unilateral actions in 
matters related to disarmament. Prior to the 1960s, and before arms control dominated 
nuclear policy discussions, Liberation magazine and the historian H. Stuart Hughes, 
among others, supported unilateral disarmament.42 Despite falling out of favor in 
America, IPS intellectuals continued to urge American officials to carry out unilateral 
measures to achieve disarmament. Barnet, for instance, recommended in 1977 that the 
president announce to the world that the United States would not produce cruise missiles, 
the Trident, the MX, the neutron bomb, and other new weapons systems. “There is such a 
superfluity of nuclear destructive power in American hands that we have ample room for 
experiments that could lead the world back from the edge of madness,” Barnet wrote. 
Thus, even if such unilateral actions by the United States went unreciprocated, it would 
not harm America’s standing in the world.43 
While IPS intellectuals might argue that America could afford to disarm 
unilaterally without similar moves by the Soviet Union, government officials and 
politicians would likely never accept such a plan. During the aforementioned 
congressional seminar held at IPS in 1965, one congressman wondered whether America 
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would agree to take the unilateral steps suggested by IPS intellectuals. Referring to a 
discussion that took place earlier in the seminar about the United States needing to 
downplay the significance of nuclear weapons in international affairs, Congressman John 
Conyers (MI-D), one of IPS’s strongest congressional backers, thought this solution 
unrealistic. “We couldn’t go out tomorrow morning to our respective jobs and even roll 
out to quorum talking like this. So it seems to me that there is a big education task 
confronting the intellectual pocket in America. We have to talk about disarmament as an 
official position, not just several authors and a few people in Washington taking that kind 
of posture,” Conyers explained.44  From the beginning, IPS’s founders saw the Institute 
as playing an educative role in society, but changing the American mindset to allow for 
even a limited unilateral disarmament seemed far-fetched for a group of intellectuals that 
sought pragmatic solutions to the world’s problems. 
Despite the word of caution offered by Conyers, many of the disarmament 
proposals that came out of IPS involved some sort of unilateral actions on the part of the 
United States. Writing in the mid-1970s, Raskin offered a three step plan for 
disarmament. The earliest stage had the United States unilaterally halting production of 
missiles, uranium, and plutonium. Then America could begin the “process of ‘agonizing 
reappraisal’ and reconsideration” within the bureaucracy to prevent disarmament 
measures from being “sabotaged.” Once the bureaucracy was on board, America could 
advocated for the creation of “regional disarmament agreements” that prohibited the 
stationing of conventional armies, nuclear weapons, and missiles in particular regions of 
the world. Raskin explained that each of these steps, furthermore, would occur under the 
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purview of the United Nations. Raskin also included in his disarmament proposal 
“‘confidence building’ measures,” which he claimed “would cause national leaders to 
move to the abolition of weapons and armed forces except for purposes of internal 
order.”45 
Towards the end of the Cold War, Raskin envisioned an even larger role for the 
U.N. in disarmament. He suggested policing disarmament agreements through an 
“International Disarmament Organization” under the auspices of the U.N. This 
organization would “be assured unrestricted access without veto to all [disarmament] 
plans” and create laws and penalties for the disarmament process. Raskin also 
recommended setting up “an international peace force” made up of “peacekeeping 
contingents” from various nations and under the direction of the U.N. Later in the decade, 
Barnet also called for an immediate stoppage of all nuclear weapons development, 
production, and deployment. If the superpowers failed to reach an agreement, Barnet 
suggested that the United States should carry out its “own three-year moratorium on 
production and deployment of new weapons” as a means to create a more favorable 
“negotiating atmosphere.” Next, the United States would need to end its policy of “first 
use” of nuclear weapons.46 
IPS intellectuals did not expect disarmament to take place overnight, or even 
within a few years, as another proposal put forth by Raskin in the mid-1980s made clear. 
Regarding the reduction and abolition of nuclear weapons the proposal included as a first 
step the requirement that the United States and the Soviet Union take the initiative to rid 
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each of their countries of outdated weapons. Proof of disarmament would come from 
“citizens’ inspections” conducted by a nation’s people and satellite surveillance. 
Secondly, Raskin offered a plan whereby each superpower would select one weapon 
from their opponent’s arsenal for dismantling. If either side refused to eliminate the 
weapon chosen by the other superpower, then an alternative weapon would take its place 
on the cutting block. Raskin also proposed creating an “international registry” of persons 
involved in the construction and research of atomic weapons as well as a listing of 
individuals who agreed to sign an “international public oath” refusing to take part in any 
actions that went against the agreed upon reduction. By the third year of the process to 
eliminate nuclear weapons, Raskin predicted that both sides would reach an agreement to 
eliminate all nuclear weapons within fifteen years. As part of the disarmament accord, 
Raskin wanted greater international input, including having a representative from the 
International Court of Justice serve as “judge and mediator” for perpetuity to make sure 
that all sides abided by the nonproliferation agreement.47  While most of Raskin’s 
proposal seems feasible, the component that essentially had the two superpowers 
bartering away one another’s weapons systems ignored the difficulties involved with the 
SALT negotiations and agreements. The great number of variables associated with 
nuclear weapons—quantity, throw weight, range, and number of warheads on each 
missile, to name just a few—made it nearly impossible for such a scheme to work. 
Disarmament By and For the American People 
One aspect of Raskin’s proposal from the previous paragraph that deserves 
highlighting is the portion dealing with “citizens’ inspections,” which would make sure 
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that each nation followed through with its promise to disarm. Given the importance that 
IPS intellectuals placed on citizen involvement in governmental decision-making, it is not 
surprising that Raskin would include in his proposal a role for the people actually 
threatened by nuclear weapons. Yet it might also say something about the attitudes IPS 
intellectuals had towards inspection. In the 1950s and 1960s, especially, the issue of 
inspection prevented the superpowers from reaching a disarmament agreement. Possibly 
considering these earlier failures, Barnet, writing in the mid-1960s, questioned the 
relevance of inspection. He argued that the emphasis placed on inspection by U.S. 
officials ended up “creating obstacles where none need exist.” Using historical precedents 
as evidence, Barnet explained that even though the Versailles Treaty required inspection 
of Germany to prevent rearmament, no such inspections took place. Even without 
conducting inspections, Barnet argued that officials could find “sufficient information” 
regarding rearmament. Furthermore, when the Japanese and Germans did not follow the 
Washington Naval Arms Limitation Treaty of 1922, they did so openly, which led Barnet 
to declare that “secret violations are not particularly likely.”48  Regardless of historical 
precedent, Raskin may have placed too much faith in the people by believing that they 
could overcome their national pride and expose their country’s misdeeds. 
Yet, in the minds of IPS intellectuals, the people would likely do no worse than 
the individuals currently authorized to make nuclear policy. Leaving disarmament to “the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, national security bureaucracies, and defense corporations is a little 
like expecting corporations to self-regulate, and see their destructive side without any 
advice, persuasion or insistence from other forces in the society,” Raskin argued. 
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Therefore, Raskin called on Congress to hold “hearings on the cost of the arms race, 
whether it is related to anyone’s security, and whether there are means to secure the 
United States” besides using nuclear threats. During a convocation held at Riverside 
Church in the late 1970s, Barnet expressed a similar concern over the fact that as the 
arms race continued and the American people did not have a say in nuclear policy. 
Depriving Americans of the ability to determine whether their government used weapons 
that could result in their own death, put the citizenry “in the same position as the people 
of Jonestown,” Barnet argued.49 
Left out of the conversation regarding military spending and nuclear policy, the 
real needs of the American people escaped the attention of officials in power, IPS 
intellectuals argued. Furthermore, groups like the CPD encouraged the view that 
American decline in the recent past stemmed from military blunders and insufficient 
military forces. Barnet responded to CPD claims by arguing that American officials, no 
doubt influenced by neoconservatives, misunderstood the meaning of power at the 
twilight of the American century. According to Barnet, instead of worrying about the 
“Finlandization” of America and calling for massive arms increases, as neoconservatives 
in the CPD did, America needed to learn from France’s fall to Hitler in 1940. “The 
greatest army in Europe surrendered because the society it was defending had rotted,” 
Barnet claimed. To guard against internal decay, America needed to divert its limited 
resources to social programs and allow for the preservation of the “values for which the 
nation was founded—justice, opportunity, and the liberation of the human spirit.” That is 
to say, Barnet did not believe that America’s inability to influence the world had anything 
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to do with the military capabilities of the United States.50 “Something was happening in 
the late twentieth century to change the traditional relationship between the capacity to 
make war and the ability to exercise political power,” Barnet claimed. Military 
domination no longer assured political success. The thriving economies of West Germany 
and Japan illustrated an “uncoupling of economic power and military power” so that 
massive military spending no longer necessarily resulted in a strong overall economy. In 
fact, Barnet explained that a bloated military budget often weakened a nation. He argued 
that “excessive military spending now produces some of the same consequences as 
military defeat; that is, it gives foreign governments greater control over the life of the 
country.”51  As America spent its riches on strengthening its military, Germany and Japan 
modernized their industrial sectors. 
IPS intellectuals believed that greater participation by the American citizenry 
would force government officials to redirect spending from military to social programs. 
Therefore, IPS intellectuals offered several blueprints for creating an economy no longer 
dependent on what critics of military spending still label “military Keynesianism,” after 
the economist John Maynard Keynes, who advocated for greater government spending as 
a means to heighten consumer demand. The issue of converting America’s economy from 
a war-time to a peace-time economy held the attention of Barnet for most of his time at 
IPS. In his 1969 book The Economy of Death, Barnet excoriated American leaders and 
educators for funneling the nation’s students into jobs that benefitted the national security 
state at the expense of the welfare of its citizens. When “our best and brightest, most 
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creative people are given the incentive to apply their talents to the essentially insoluble 
problem of finding security in the technology of death,” education and healthcare suffer, 
Barnet wrote. In his view, the real problems of society remained unresolved due to 
neglect. Yet, while U.S. officials displayed little concern over America’s crumbling 
public and social infrastructure, citizens did, and they often voiced their displeasure 
through protests. In regard to protests, Barnet feared that “a society that has decided that 
it cannot afford to deal with the causes of unrest must suppress unrest” and essentially 
become a totalitarian state.52 
Later on in The Economy of Death, while detailing the steps required to convert 
from a military to peacetime economy, Barnet called on the government to aid in 
transition. The government had to promise corporations that federal funds would cover 
some of the costs associated with risky ventures. “Only when making high-speed 
transport systems is as profitable as making missiles will the weapons-makers voluntarily 
move out of the death business,” Barnet claimed. He further argued that the federal 
government needed to “subsidize the technology of peace as it has subsidized the 
technology of war” by helping keep wages high and conducting research on 
groundbreaking ideas. Barnet recommended creating a National Conversion Commission 
tasked with aiding the transition from a war to peace economy easier. The commission 
would provide funding for scientists and engineers as they transitioned from making 
technology for wars to technology that benefitted civilians. Towns devastated by the loss 
of their local military production facilities would be given “special assistance” because, 
Barnet argued, “they are ‘disaster areas’ and should be eligible for the sort of 
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extraordinary relief that is given to communities stricken by flood or tornado.”53  No 
longer fearing a depression caused by a reduction in military spending as a result of 
disarmament, Americans, IPS intellectuals hoped, would push more forcefully for the 
destruction of nuclear weapons. 
As this study has shown, while hoping to influence policymakers, IPS also 
insisted on empowering ordinary citizens to act outside of government. Thus, in May 
1983, IPS and the Soviet Institute for the Study of the U.S.A and Canada of the Soviet 
Academy of Sciences organized a meeting in Minneapolis between forty representatives 
from the United States and another forty Soviet representatives. The Minneapolis 
conference represented the first of several meetings over the next three years, with the 
delegates meeting in the Soviet Union in 1984 and in San Francisco the year after. 
Participants at the inaugural conference included former Assistant Secretary of State for 
Human Rights Patricia Derian and former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations under 
President Carter, Donald McHenry, who also co-chaired the conference with Minneapolis 
Mayor Donald Fraser. Paul Warnke, who had served as director of the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency and a negotiator at the SALT II talks, provided a paper for the 
conference, though he did not attend. Other well-known activists that appeared included 
Randall Forsberg, Cora and Peter Weiss, Reverend William Sloan Coffin, the editor of 
the Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists Ruth Adams, Jerome Grossman of the Council for a 
Livable World, and co-chairman of SANE Seymour Melman.54 
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Explaining the importance of continuing the conversation between IPS and the 
Soviet group, a funding proposal for one of the later meetings stated, “They [the 
meetings] expose leading scholars and activists from the disarmament movement to 
serious discussion with Soviet scholars on arms control and disarmament.” The proposal 
claimed that the exchanges “develop[ed] an educated community able to challenge 
conservative scholars in discussion on what is possible with the Soviet Union.” Not 
surprisingly, Raskin highlighted the significance of average citizens taking part in 
disarmament talks. The IPS co-founder celebrated the fact that the meetings opened the 
way for citizens of the two superpowers to get together and create an agreement for 
general and complete disarmament. In other words, a type of citizen diplomacy 
materialized in Minneapolis. After receiving input from “senior research institutes around 
the world,” Raskin felt “that by 1988 our work could be presented to all nations in many 
different forums.” To publicize the agreement, Raskin suggested that “joint U.S.-Soviet 
teams should travel together to discuss these matters with nations of military 
significance.” A report describing the planned meeting as a means to go beyond the 
freeze proposal. Participants would explore radical proposals to reverse the arms race.” 
Meetings at the “unofficial level,” would, the report suggested, “begin to influence the 
official negotiating agenda.”55  The meetings, in other words, served as a way to end the 
isolation of government officials and bring into the discussion alternative viewpoints. 
Although Raskin and other intellectuals and commentators involved with the 
Minneapolis conference reveled in the possibility of bringing ordinary citizens into the 
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foreign policy debate, the latter’s inclusion led to a few tense moments when the 
audience posed questioned to the delegates. Rather than issues related to disarmament, 
many of the queries from the floor related to the Soviet Union’s treatment of Jews and 
restrictions on their emigration, which led Soviet delegate Genrikh Trofimenko to reply 
brusquely, “Whoever wants to emigrate from the Soviet Union can.” Derian, Carter’s 
assistant secretary of state for human rights, later said of her experiences at the meeting, 
“For me, the discussions were as weightless as the spoon [referring to a gift she received 
from a Soviet delegate]. And as ceremonial. There is never a concession of imperfection 
by Soviets around a table; total denial is the norm.” Yet Derian felt that the meetings 
needed to occur. “We must meet because our diversity seems mad to them and their 
singular intolerance of diversity seems mad to us,” she explained. Finding some sort of 
common cause between the superpowers, Derian continued, “comes with meeting the 
same people over and over again, getting past opening statements and host/guest rituals to 
whatever else is there.”56 
Conservative politicians and commentators, however, did not have such an open 
mind when it came to reaching an agreement with the Soviets. Writing to Secretary of 
State George P. Schultz regarding the IPS-sponsored meeting, Congressman Larry 
McDonald (GA-R), along with several of his colleagues, claimed, “All available evidence 
indicates that the ‘exchanges’ and ‘dialogue’ advertised for the Minneapolis conference 
are a fraud.” They further argued that the Soviet delegation would be “salted with 
professional KGB officers to have full access to American decision-makers and those 
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who influence U.S. public opinion.” Reporting on the U.S.-U.S.S.R Bilateral Exchange 
Conference, John Rees, a longtime opponent of IPS, alleged, “Among the Soviets were 
known ‘active measures’ specialists, and they played the conference as a classical 
political influence operation.” As for the U.S.S.R.-U.S.A. Friendship Society and the 
Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada, Rees claimed, “These institutions operate under the 
direction of a shadowy and supreme Soviet espionage service that can give orders to both 
the K.G.B. and the G.R.U.” He was referring to the International Department of the 
Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, which replaced the Comintern.57  As it 
turned out, the IPS conferences received more attention from the conservative press and 
anti-communist politicians than from more respectable media venues and political 
leaders.58  Thus, in the highly charged atmosphere of Cold War politics, even citizen 
diplomats with the best of intentions faced a difficult time reaching the decision-makers 
in Washington. 
As noted above, IPS intended for the bilateral talks between citizens from the 
United States and the Soviet Union to offer a way to move “beyond the freeze proposal” 
that dominated disarmament discussions. Randall Forsberg, a founding director of the 
Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies in Cambridge, Massachusetts, grabbed the 
attention of the American public and politicians when she issued a “Call to Halt the Arms 
Race” in 1980. Popular due to its simplicity, the “Call” demanded an immediate stoppage 
of all weapons testing, production, and deployment. Various individuals had put forward 
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a similar demand for a freeze—including the lead U.S. negotiator for the SALT I talks, 
Gerard Smith—but Forsberg’s appeal found the largest audience and led to the formation 
of the nuclear weapons freeze campaign.59 
Not all intellectuals at IPS, however, supported the idea of a freeze. IPS, in fact, 
shared with the American Friends Service Committee and the War Resisters League, 
among other groups, an ambivalence toward the freeze, believing that Forsberg’s 
proposal did not advance any unilateral measures for America to undertake.60  Raskin, for 
instance, found many shortcomings with such an approach. In a 1982 letter to Cora 
Weiss—daughter of Samuel Rubin, a major funder of IPS from its earliest years, and wife 
of Peter Weiss, who served as IPS’s first chairman of the board of directors—Raskin 
expressed his reservations regarding the nuclear freeze movement. He feared that 
politicians would use the freeze option to forestall talks about disarmament or, at the very 
least, turn the freeze proposal into a watered-down version of its former self. For 
instance, he argued that the Democrats had co-opted the issue and, in the process, took 
the initiative away from the American people. Allowing Democrats to stand at the 
forefront of the freeze movement politicized the issue. As a result, moving forward with 
the freeze depended on electoral victory for Democrats, Raskin concluded.61 
Due to the popularity of the proposal among both politicians and the general 
public, the ideals behind the freeze became a “shared rhetoric,” with everyone 
proclaiming their support for ending the nuclear arms race. For Raskin, the fact that so 
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many officials who had previously supported massive spending on arms suddenly 
changed course and advocated a nuclear freeze made it “hard to distinguish the victims 
from the executioners” of a nuclear war. In order to make it perfectly clear who really 
supported a nuclear freeze, Raskin suggested devising a “practical action which cannot be 
symbolically or rhetorically coopted because what is involved is the direct challenge to 
power.” In other words, Raskin wanted to develop a proposal and campaign that could 
not “be easily adopted by the executioners.” The action must “draw a line . . . on our side 
of the line, show[ing] cultural alternatives, possibilities that define a different type of 
relationship and possibility for humanity.” Raskin listed several possible actions for 
Weiss and the Riverside Church to carry out. One possibility involved having church 
members pay the portion of their taxes that normally would have gone to weapons 
production into a “Church Fund,” which would “be proclaimed as the peace and justice 
fund.” Raskin also suggested that localities and states pass laws that punished “nuclear 
age crimes,” which included “crimes against humanity,” “preparation for aggressive 
war,” and “destruction of innocent populations,” among others.62 
The current IPS director, Borosage, also disagreed with the freeze proposal, 
believing that while it sounded good in theory, it would take too long to put into action. 
Describing the anti-nuclear movement’s approach as “prudent,” Borosage wrote, “The 
notion of a nuclear arsenal is not challenged: focus is placed not on disarmament, but on 
ending the arms build-up.” Nonetheless, Borosage supported several measures put forth 
by the anti-nuclear activists. For instance, he supported the main premise of the freeze, 
which involved stopping further production of all nuclear weapons. Borosage questioned 
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the emphasis in the freeze proposal on bilateral actions, which, he claimed, would mean 
that negotiations to carry out the freeze would not begin until 1986, with ratification 
likely taking at least another year. During this time, Borosage claimed, production of 
more and deadlier nuclear weapons would continue. He feared as well that the continued 
dependence on negotiations between the two superpowers “insur[ed] that the arms 
establishment in both countries retain control of the action,” and thus cause further delay 
in the freeze’s implementation. Therefore, Borosage supported a “unilateral freeze” 
carried out by the United States. While he expected immediate outrage by critics on the 
Left and Right for advocating such a policy, Borosage did not understand the contempt 
for a unilateral freeze since the Defense Department periodically destroyed warheads 
unilaterally. “The condemnation of unilateral initiatives should be seen for what it is:  a 
refuge for executive officials who do not want the public or the legislature to infringe 
upon their prerogatives.”63  The freeze, as Raskin and Borosage understood, offered 
politicians a visible and relatively simple proposal to cling to. In the end, IPS intellectuals 
believed that co-optation and bureaucratic inertia would prevent the freeze from 
becoming a reality. 
In calling on the U.S. to end its ideological Cold War against the Soviet Union, 
IPS intellectuals hoped to create an environment more amenable to disarmament. IPS 
intellectuals pursued a strategy whereby a changed understanding of the value of nuclear 
weapons would allow for their ultimate destruction. By merely downplaying their 
significance, the U.S. government, IPS intellectuals contended, could encourage 
                                                            
     63 Robert Borosage, “The Bilateral Box,” Working Papers for a New Society, May/June 1983, IPS 
Reprint, IPSR, WHS, box 30, folder 19, 1-2, 4. For an argument similar to Borosage’s, see Pam Solo, From 
Protest to Policy: Beyond the Freeze to Common Security (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1988). 
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disarmament. Arms control, on the other hand, offered more of the same. In tandem with 
developing a greater trust of the Soviets and devaluing nuclear weapons, IPS intellectuals 
encouraged the United States to disarm unilaterally. Even a freeze, as advocated by 
activists in the anti-nuclear movement, required independent actions by the United States 
if such a strategy hoped to succeed. Unlike the majority of liberal intellectuals, IPS did 
not turn away from disarmament in favor of arms control. Therefore, when the freeze 
proposal found widespread support in the 1980s, IPS offered only a tepid defense of it. 
Liberals and radicals had called for the United States to take unilateral measures in regard 
to testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons, but few, since the 1960s, had 
encouraged the destruction of existing nuclear weapons by America. IPS intellectuals 
also saw greater input from citizens as preferable to a continued reliance on nuclear 
strategists and other experts.  
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Postscript 
 Born into an era of liberal ascendency and persevering during the conservative 
revival of the 1970s and 1980s, the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) challenged Cold 
War liberalism, conservatism, and neoconservatism. IPS intellectuals stood at the 
forefront of the fight against the Vietnam War and played a key role in the struggles of 
the late 1970s to make human rights a fundamental component of U.S. foreign policy. 
Then, as Cold War liberals became neoconservatives, IPS represented the only 
substantive opposition to the militaristic and ideological Cold War of the late 1970s and 
1980s. Usually identified as the singular intellectual force of the 1980s, neoconservatives 
did not speak for all of America. IPS offered its own set of policies for the Cold War and, 
in the process, framed a liberal response to the neoconservatives. Therefore, in many 
ways, and as much as IPS disliked ideology, the Institute took part in an ideological battle 
against neoconservatives. 
 The diametrically opposed views of IPS intellectuals and neoconservatives 
became apparent when Irving Kristol helped found The National Interest in 1985. In the 
journal’s inaugural issue, Kristol published an essay, “Foreign Policy in an Age of 
Ideology,” which, in the words of Gary Dorrien, “proclaimed that a nonideological 
politics in foreign affairs was a disarmed politics.” In its very form liberal 
internationalism, which Kristol saw as the ideology guiding American foreign policy, 
was a type of “nonideological politics” since the strategy, with its emphasis on 
international law, prevented America from asserting itself in international affairs. The 
Soviet Union, on the other hand, succeeded in making Marxism-Leninism attractive, in 
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the words of Dorrien, to “alienated elites in the West and the Third World.” Instead of 
viewing the United States as one nation among many acting in accordance with 
international law, Kristol, in his other writings on foreign policy, urged U.S. 
policymakers to allow a strong nationalistic ideology to guide their actions. Showing an 
utter lack of concern for the difficulties facing Third World nations, Kristol wanted to 
bring an end to the United Nations. Additionally, Kristol, as well as other 
neoconservatives, found the liberal emphasis on human rights abhorrent. Using ideology 
as a weapon, neoconservatives would “unmask America’s reigning, self-weakening 
ideology of human rights,” according to Dorrien. A concern for human rights too often 
led to what Kristol called “antinationalist isolationism.” Kristol and other 
neoconservatives advocated that America follow a policy of “nationalist unilateralism” 
that harnessed the power of ideology in support of American intervention abroad to 
rollback communism. So strong was Kristol’s defense of unilateralism that he even 
opposed U.S. involvement in NATO.1 
 Although sharing with Kristol the label neoconservative, commentator Charles 
Krauthammer supported a much more aggressive foreign policy for America. Dorrien has 
described Krauthammer as “neoconservatism’s chief exponent of the democratic globalist 
faith.” As long as it coincided with American national interest, Krauthammer believed 
that the United States needed to hasten the spread of democracy across the globe. 
Krauthammer saw no contradiction between maintaining a democracy at home and 
becoming an imperial power. Even if America lost some its freedoms, Krauthammer still 
considered an American empire worthwhile. He compared such a forfeiture of democracy 
                                                            
     1 Gary Dorrien, The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture, and the War of Ideology (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1993), 115-123. 
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to “a kind of foreign aid program in which the transfer is made in the coin of democratic 
practice rather than cash.”2  While neoconservatives like Krauthammer promoted 
American exceptionalism and called on the nation to undertake a crusade to spread 
democracy, IPS, as this study has shown, argued that a militaristic and interventionist 
foreign policy actually decreased democracy at home and abroad. 
Thus, even a cursory glance at the foreign policy writings of these two leading 
neoconservatives highlights the stark differences between the IPS vision of the world and 
the alternative put forward by neoconservatives. On almost every issue of importance to 
IPS—ideology, international law, the United Nations, the Third World, human rights, co-
existence between the superpowers, and democracy—neoconservatives took an opposing 
position. At the same time, the counter-arguments put forth by IPS intellectuals offer 
proof that a neoconservative approach to foreign affairs did not lack a comprehensive 
opposition on the Left. 
With the Cold War coming to an end, IPS held no illusions about the likely course 
of American foreign policy in the post-Cold War world. Although the influence of 
neoconservatives declined during the administrations of George H.W. Bush and Bill 
Clinton, calls for a more assertive foreign policy did not disappear.3 While this study is 
interested in IPS during the Cold War, it is worth noting that the Institute considered the 
national security state just as much of a threat in the post-Cold War world.  
                                                            
     2 Dorrien, The Neoconservative Mind, 324-333. 
     3 Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and Global Order (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 74-111; James Mann, The Rise of the Vulcans: The History of 
Bush’s War Cabinet (New York: Viking, 2004), 216-247; Gary Dorrien, Imperial Designs: 
Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana (New York: Routledge, 2004); Maria Ryan, 
Neoconservatism and the New American Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
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While the Soviet Union no longer represented as great of a danger to the nation’s 
security, the Cold War mindset still prevailed among America’s foreign policy experts. 
IPS broke down its research pursuits into three overarching categories, or “working 
groups,” in 1989. These working groups formed around the issues of foreign policy, 
globalization, and the role of citizens in domestic policy. In explaining why IPS 
underwent this restructuring, a report noted, “There is hunger for new ideas for new ways 
to relate to the rest of the world but neither the Administration nor mainstream think 
tanks are presenting anything but dressed-up versions of Kissinger’s détente or plans for 
a new American Century based on the collapse of communism.”4 
America’s attitude at the end of the Cold War differed greatly from the Soviet 
Union’s outlook, IPS intellectuals claimed. Writing in late 1989 as the Berlin Wall fell 
and former Soviet republics began leaving the Communist orbit, Barnet celebrated “the 
intellectual ferment of the new thinking in Moscow,” which differed greatly from “the 
sober, cautious reshuffling of old thought” he found in Washington. Barnet blamed the 
contrasting mindsets on economic conditions in the two countries. With problems “too 
profound to ignore” and glasnost’s allowing for “an astonishing process of self-
examination and self-criticism,” the Soviets had to search for an alternative to the Cold 
War. In America, on the other hand, with its economic recovery, “the national-security 
establishment of the United States feels vindicated by events and shows no enthusiasm 
for making major reductions in force levels and expenditures,” Barnet wrote. Viewing the 
Cold War as inimical to their interests, the Soviet Union happily looked to a future free of 
conflict, according to Barnet. The United States had a completely different interpretation 
                                                            
     4 Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Trustees, Institute for Policy Studies, “IPS Program for Fiscal Year 
1990,” June 26, 1989, IPSR, WHS, box 84, folder 17, 2. 
      313 
 
 
of events. “The Cold War prism has served to simplify and explain world events, to set 
limits on undesired domestic social spending—especially in the nineteen eighties—and to 
shift the domestic political consensus to the right,” Barnet concluded.5  Only 
begrudgingly would foreign policy specialists in America change their perspective of the 
world. 
Therefore, despite the general agreement among scholars that neoconservatism 
replaced liberalism by the 1980s, this study has shown that the Institute for Policy Studies 
deserves just as prominent a place in postwar intellectual histories. Whereas Cold War 
liberals converted into neoconservatives, IPS intellectuals continued to advocate for a 
reconstructed liberalism based on the participatory ideals of John Dewey. The fellows at 
IPS refused to succumb to the bellicose language of the cold warriors associated with the 
Committee on the Present Danger and the voices of The National Interest. In the end, 
whether battling Cold War liberals or neoconservatives, IPS intellectuals stood as the 
guardians of a genuine liberalism.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
     5 Richard J. Barnet, “Reflection: After the Cold War,” The New Yorker, January 1, 1989, 68-69. 
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